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Abstract 
The internationalisation of Chinese firms has attracted attention worldwide although 
most of Chinese MNEs are still in their early stage of internationalisation. Chinese firms’ 
internationalisation has unique characteristics due to their home country’s unique 
political environment, culture and economic structure. This thesis aims to investigate 
the implications of both of short-term stock market performance and long-term 
operating performance of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) by Chinese firms.  
Drawing on signalling theory and the institution-based view, the thesis firstly examines 
the extent of stock market reactions to the announcement of cross-border merger and 
acquisition (M&A) deals from a financial perspective, based on an event study of a 
sample of Chinese firms during the period 2000-2012. The findings indicate that 
Chinese firms’ cross-border M&As result in a positive stock market reaction. The 
shareholders of Chinese firms that acquire a target firm in a host country with a low 
level of political risk gain higher cumulative abnormal returns than those firms targeting 
companies in countries with a high level of political risk. However, the shareholders of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises experience lower abnormal returns compared with 
those of Chinese privately owned firms when engaging in cross-border M&A deals.  
The thesis further examines the impact of M&As on Chinese firms’ post-acquisition 
operating performance by integrating organisational learning theory with the 
institution-based view. The findings indicate that firms with serial cross-border M&As 
achieve better performance than those engaged in first-time cross-border M&As, and 
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those with horizontal M&As perform better than those carrying out vertical M&As. The 
positive effects of acquisition experience and horizontal acquisitions on the post-
acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms are reinforced by the institutional 
quality and language similarity of host countries. 
Finally, this thesis investigates from a management perspective how Chinese MNEs 
adopt different management strategies (e.g. expatriates and subsidiary autonomy) to 
respond to environmental challenges and improve the performance of overseas 
subsidiaries. Drawing on the resource dependence theory, this thesis examines the 
indirect effects of expatriates on subsidiary performance via subsidiary autonomy based 
on a survey sample of Chinese MNEs. The findings show that an increase in expatriates 
reduces the level of subsidiary autonomy and thus negatively affects subsidiary 
performance. This study also finds that the institutional quality of host countries 
reinforces the negative impact of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy, but reduces the 
importance of the latter on subsidiary performance.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Context  
In the past, outward foreign direct investment (FDI) tended to be utilised by firms from 
developed countries to penetrate other countries’ markets. In recent years, outward FDI 
has been gradually adopted by Emerging Economy (EE) MNEs for their 
internationalization (Wright, et al., 2005). According to the World Investment Report 
(2015), EEs accounted for more than one third of global outward FDI flows (35%) in 
2014, up from 13% in 2007. Among them, China is playing an increasingly important 
role in global outward FDI activities as the largest EE in the world. Accompanying this 
rapid growth of the Chinese economy, China’s outward FDI took off in the 2000s as a 
result of the government’s adoption and promotion of the ‘Go Out Policy’, aiming to 
help domestic companies expand internationally to explore and exploit opportunities in 
international markets. China has been chosen as the research context of the thesis due 
to the rapid growth of Chinese outward FDI, with an average annual growth of almost 
50% (WIR, 2014). China’s outward FDI was only $12 billion in 2005, but reached 
$87.8 billion in 2012, which accounted for approximately 61% of outbound FDI from 
emerging economies. China’s outward FDI overtook inward FDI in 2014 making China 
a net capital exporter for the first time. The new ‘One Belt One Road’ strategy 
announced in September 2013, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road fund will continue to promote large scale outward 
investment. According to the World Investment Report 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015), China 
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has significantly strengthened its outward FDI with its outward FDI net flow increasing 
by 14.2% compared to the previous year, up to $123.12 billion. Mainland China has 
been ranked 3rd among all countries (regions) in terms of outward FDI flows, and 8th in 
terms of stock, compared to 11th in the previous year. According to the Ministry of 
Commerce of China, China’s non-financial outward FDI reached $29.92 billion in 
January-February 2016, up 71.8% on the previous year. Table 1.1 presents China’s 
outward FDI annual flow and stock data. These aspects indicate that China serves as an 
appropriate and important empirical setting where we can examine the factors affecting 
Chinese MNEs’ overseas operations. Thus, it is timely to study the performance 
implications of China’s outward FDI.  
Table 1.1 China’s annual outward FDI flows and stock 
 (Billons of USD) 
Year 
Flows  Stock 
Amount 
Global 
Ranking 
Year-on-Year 
Growth Rate (%) 
 
Amount 
Global 
Ranking 
2002 2.70 26   29.90 25 
2003 2.90 21 5.6  33.20 25 
2004 5.50 20 93.0  44.80 27 
2005 12.26 17 122.9  57.20 24 
2006 21.16 13 43.8  90.63 23 
2007 26.51 17 25.3  117.91 22 
2008 55.91 12 110.9  183.97 18 
2009 56.53 5 1.1  245.75 16 
2010 68.81 5 21.7  317.21 17 
2011 74.65 6 8.5  424.78 13 
2012 87.80 3 17.6  531.94 13 
2013 107.84 3 22.8  660.48 11 
2014 123.12 3 14.2  882.64 8 
Note: 1. Data about China’s outward FDI are based on MOFCOM statistics. 
2. Data for 2002-2005 includes only non-financial outward FDI, and data for 2006-2012 
includes outward FDI in all industries. 
          3. Annual growth rate for 2006 refers to that of non-financial outward FDI. 
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Among the different modes of engaging in outward FDI activities, including overseas 
sales, contractual agreements, strategic alliances, greenfield investment and cross-
border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), cross-border M&As have taken place at a 
rapid pace during the last few years and have become by far the biggest means of 
international expansion (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Boateng, Wang, & Yang, 2008; Chen 
& Young, 2010; Deng, 2009). Chinese firms have been actively involved in cross-
border M&As in the past decades. The number of completed cross-border M&As by 
Chinese firms was only 33 and the total value of these deals was 838.86 million dollars 
in 2000, whereas in 2015 the number of completed deals increased to 346 and their 
value reached 55.1 billion dollars (Thomas One Banker 2016). Chinese firms have 
attracted attention worldwide with a series of high-profile cross-border M&As of well-
known western companies, including ChemChina’s acquisition of Syngenta (2016), 
Lenovo’s acquisition of the Motorola mobility division (2014) and IBM’s x86 Server 
Division (2015) and PC division (2005), Geely’s acquisition of Volvo Corporation 
(2010), Wanda’s acquisition of Oden (2016), Sunseeker (2013) and the AMC Cinema 
chain (2012), and Huawei’s acquisition of Symantec (2011) and CIP (2012). No wonder 
that Economist (2010) has noted that ‘China buys up the world!’. 
1.2 Research Rationale  
As the increasing importance of outward FDI by Chinese firms and the rapid pace of 
such internationalisation activities by Chinese firms, which appear to be accelerating, 
further study needs to carry out on the performance implications of outward FDI of 
Chinese firms (Du & Boateng, 2015; Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; Liu, Lu, & Chizema, 2014; 
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Sun, et al., 2015; Zhong, Peng, & Liu, 2013). As emerging multinational enterprises 
(EMNEs) arise from national, cultural and institutional contexts that are different from 
those of Western MNEs, classic theories on cross-border mergers and acquisitions may 
not be directly applied to analyse internationalisation activities by EMNEs. Moreover, 
unlike other emerging economies (like India, Russia, and Brazil), Chinese firms’ 
outward FDI have unique characteristics due to their unique political environments, 
cultural background and economic structure (Tao, et al., 2016). Therefore, this thesis 
focuses on the performance implications of outward FDI by Chinese firms.  
A growing number of studies are emerging examining the short-term performance of 
cross-border M&As by emerging-economy MNEs (Buckley, Elia, & Kafouros, 2014; 
Deng & Yang, 2015; Lebedev, et al., 2015; Ning, et al., 2014; Sun, et al., 2012). Some 
of these studies (Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2011; Boateng, Wang, & Yang, 2008; Wang 
& Boateng, 2007; Zhou, et al., 2015) found a positive market reaction to cross-border 
M&As, while others (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Chen & Young, 2010) found a negative 
one. The inconsistent findings of the existing studies suggest that stock market reactions 
to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms need further academic scrutiny. In addition, 
these existing studies have tended to assume that there are the same market reactions 
between stock markets in mainland China and Hong Kong. However, under the formula 
of ‘one country, two systems’ (China.org.cn, 2008), the Hong Kong stock market is 
different from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in mainland China. The 
different institutional arrangements between the two markets within one country may 
trigger different market reactions to the announcement of cross-border M&As by 
5 
 
Chinese firms. This unique ‘one country, two markets’ scenario remains underexplored 
in the domain of cross-border M&As.  
Moreover, there is a lack of research studies investigating whether the level of political 
risk of target countries and the ownership status of acquiring firms will result in 
different market reactions to cross-border M&A activities by Chinese firms. The stock 
market is sensitive to any political risk associated with cross-border M&As, which is 
considered as an important signal, especially in emerging economies (Chan & Wei, 
1996; Kim & Mei, 2001; Wang, Liu, & Wang, 2004). However, existing studies have 
tended to focus on the impact of geographic and cultural distance on cross-border 
M&As (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013; Ragozzino, 2009) without explicitly taking 
political risks into account. To remedy the research gap in short-term implications on 
stock market performance, this thesis aims to reveal the extent of market reactions to 
the institutional characteristics associated with cross-border M&A deals by Chinese 
listed firms. 
While an increasing number of studies on the performance of cross-border M&As focus 
on short-term stock market performance immediately surrounding announcement dates 
(Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009; Goergen & Renneboog, 2004; 
Gubbi, et al., 2010; Ning, et al., 2014), limited studies have investigated the long-term 
post-acquisition operating performance of acquiring firms, most of which have focused 
on M&As undertaken by firms from developed countries (Ghosh, 2001; Kruse, et al., 
2007; Martynova, Oosting, & Renneboog, 2007; Pazarskis, et al., 2006; Sharma & Ho, 
2002), with a few exceptions addressing EEs such as  Russia (Bertrand & Betschinger, 
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2012), India (Kumar & Bansal, 2008; Mantravadi & Reddy, 2008) and Malaysia 
(Rahman & Limmack, 2004). However, unlike developed countries or other EEs, 
Chinese firms’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions have unique characteristics due 
to their unique institutional environments, language spoken and economic structure.  
Only a few studies focus on the post-acquisition operating performance of cross-border 
M&As by Chinese firms and the results are mixed. Wang (2006) has found negative 
post-acquisition operating performance while Bhabra and Huang (2013) found no 
change in operating performance from the pre to the post acquisition period for 
acquiring firms. The limited research carried out, with inconsistent findings suggests 
the importance of further research on long-term post-acquisition operating performance 
of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms under the special institutional environment in 
China. In addition, the existing studies (Bhabra & Huang, 2013; Wang, 2006) only 
empirically evaluated the operating performance of cross-border M&As in general 
without investigating the influence of a wide range of internal factors and the external 
institutional environment on the post-acquisition operating performance. To remedy 
this research gap in the long-term implications on operating performance, this thesis 
is going to reveal the extent of the impact of a host country’s institutional quality on the 
organisational learning of tacit knowledge in cross-border M&As as well as the impact 
of language barriers that could impede communication and information exchange 
during the organisational learning process.  
In addition to the financial perspective discussed above, the performance of Chinese 
firms’ outward FDI can be tackled from a management perspective by investigating 
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how Chinese MNEs respond to overseas challenges using different management 
strategies to improve the performance of overseas subsidiaries. Over past decades, the 
influence of expatriates on subsidiary performance has been an important theme in the 
international business research (Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 
2007; Gong, 2003a). However, existing studies on this areas focused on the direct 
impact of expatiation on subsidiary performance without considering the mediation role 
of subsidiary autonomy (Benito, et al., 2005; Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Tan & 
Mahoney, 2006; Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004). The mediating role of subsidiary 
autonomy in subsidiary performance has been under-explored, especially in the case of 
EMNEs. 
Moreover, EMNEs have heavily invested in both developed economies and developing 
economies with varying institutional qualities. When institutions in host-countries are 
underdeveloped, in order to cope with increasing external uncertainty and decreasing 
social credibility (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Akhter & Lusch, 1998; Delios & 
Bjorkman, 2000; Henisz, 2000), EMNEs may alter the internal control system (e.g. 
expatriate staffing and subsidiary autonomy) to respond to the institutional 
environments of host countries. However, we know very little about the impact of 
internal control mechanisms such as expatriation staffing on subsidiary performance 
and whether such an impact is contingent on the institutional environment of host 
countries. To remedy this research gap in overseas subsidiary performance, this thesis 
is going to examine the link between expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary 
performance in the different institutional environments of host countries.  
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1.3 Research Questions 
This PhD project aims to help bridge the above three research gaps by investigating the 
performance of internationalised Chinese firms from both financial and management 
perspectives. This thesis intends to answer the following three research questions: 
Q1: What is the short-term impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
on stock market performance by Chinese acquiring firms? How does the 
impact vary with host countries’ political risk and acquiring firms’ ownership 
status?  
Q2: What is the long-term impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
on operating performance by Chinese acquiring firms? 
Q3: How do Chinese MNEs use different levels of expatriation and subsidiary 
autonomy as internal control mechanisms to improve the performance of 
overseas subsidiaries given the host countries’ institutional conditions? 
The first two research questions focus on under which conditions cross-border M&A 
deals improve or hurt the financial performance of Chinese acquiring firms. Both the 
short-term impact on stock market performance and long-term impact on firms’ post-
acquisition operating performance are evaluated in this PhD thesis. Further to the 
investigation regarding the factors affecting financial performance of Chinese firms, 
the third research question focuses on how Chinese MNEs respond to the performance 
challenges by using different levels of expatriates and subsidiary autonomy as internal 
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control mechanisms to improve the performance of overseas subsidiaries, given 
different host countries’ institutional conditions.  
1.4 Intended Contributions 
Building upon the existing research, the author intends to make a number of potential 
contributions by answering the three research questions.  
To address research question Q1, the author intends to extend the literature on cross-
border M&As in general and EE firms in particular. The findings from the thesis will 
provide new insights into different market reactions to the same cross-border M&A 
events within one country, two markets. In particular, by examining the impact of 
political risk in host countries and the ownership status of acquiring firms on the short-
term market performance of cross-border M&As, the study captures how the different 
institutional dimensions, such as political risk in the country of origin of target firms 
and ownership status, influence the market reactions of such activities. Thus, the 
findings enrich our understanding of performance implications of cross-border M&As 
by Chinese firms by showing under what conditions cross-border M&As create value 
for Chinese acquirers. 
To address research question Q2, the author builds on organisational learning and the 
institution-based view and proposed that the long-term post-acquisition operating 
performance of Chinese acquiring firms is influenced by a variety of internal and 
external factors at the firm, industry and country levels. In doing so, this study adds to 
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the existing literature on M&A value creation from an emerging market MNEs’ 
perspective by focusing on the role of cross-border M&As in the long-term operating 
performance of Chinese acquiring firms. More specifically, the author identifies the 
important moderating role of host-country institutional quality on the relationship 
between acquirers’ experience and the target firms’ industrial capabilities on the post-
acquisition performance of EMNE firms. The findings shed new light on institutional 
conditions under which an acquirer’s experience and the relative industrial capabilities 
affect an acquiring firms’ performance and add much needed empirical evidence 
regarding the interrelationship between different types of acquisitions and EMNE 
performance. In addition, the author introduces the Chinese language, an important but 
underexplored informal institutional component in the learning literature, as a boundary 
condition of the organisational learning logic of M&As. By examining the moderating 
effects of the Chinese language, this study offers new insights on the importance of 
language ability in post-acquisition integration and synergy. 
To address research question Q3, the author adopts the Resource Dependence Theory 
(RDT) to study the impact of the subsidiary control strategies adopted by Chinese 
MNEs that have heavily invested in both developed countries and developing countries 
with various degrees of institutional quality. The findings provide new insights on the 
mediating mechanism of subsidiary autonomy and fill the research gap in which 
previous studies have mainly focused on the direct impact of expatriation on subsidiary 
performance without considering the mediation role of subsidiary autonomy. The 
author also extends the existing research by examining the moderating role of host-
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county institutional quality on the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
performance. The findings add much needed empirical evidence regarding the 
interrelationship between internal control mechanisms and EMNEs’ overseas 
performance and advance existing research by capturing the complex linkage between 
EMNE parents and their subsidiaries through expatriates and subsidiary autonomy.  
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis  
This section outlines the structure of this thesis and explains the content and purpose of 
each chapter. The thesis contains five chapters. The main body of the thesis consists of 
three chapters.  
Drawing on the signalling theory and institution-based view, Chapter 2 examines the 
extent of market reactions to the announcement of cross-border M&A deals. The author 
examines whether different institutional characteristics (i.e. different capital market, 
political risk and ownership structure) generate different market reactions and result in 
different short-term market performance of cross-border M&As.  
In Chapter 3, the influence of internal factors and external factors on the post-M&A 
operating performance of Chinese MNEs have been investigated at the firm, industry 
and country level by combining organisational learning and the institution-based view. 
The dynamic panel data model is applied to evaluate the impact of cross-border M&As 
on the post-acquisition operating performance of Chinese acquiring firms.  
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Chapter 4 examines the indirect effects of expatriate staffing on overseas subsidiary 
performance via subsidiary autonomy, drawing on the resource dependence theory. The 
author investigates what extent subsidiary autonomy mediates the impact of expatriate 
staffing on subsidiary performance and how institutional quality of host countries 
moderates the relationship between expatriate staffing and the subsidiary performance 
of EMNEs.  
Chapter 5 concludes the whole thesis by summarising the key findings and research 
outcomes of the previous chapters, discussing contributions and acknowledging the 
research limitations. This chapter also puts forward implications of the study for 
managers and policy makers, as well as making suggestions for possible future research.  
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2. Short-term Implications of Cross-border M&As on 
Stock Market Performance 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the author addresses the first research question raised in Chapter 1 – 
“What is the short-term impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on stock 
market performance of Chinese acquiring firms?”  
Despite the rapid pace and increasing importance of cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms, existing research has predominantly focused on M&As undertaken by firms from 
developed countries (Ghosh, 2001; Kruse, et al., 2007; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; 
Pazarskis, et al., 2006; Sharma & Ho, 2002). Only recently, an increasing number of 
studies have been emerging to investigate cross-border M&As by emerging-economy 
companies (Buckley, Elia, & Kafouros, 2014; Deng & Yang, 2015; Lebedev, et al., 
2015; Ning, et al., 2014; Sun, et al., 2012). However, the research findings are mixed. 
Some research (Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2011; Boateng, Wang, & Yang, 2008; Wang 
& Boateng, 2007; Zhou, et al., 2015) found a positive market reaction to cross-border 
M&As, while negative implications have been identified by others (Aybar & Ficici, 
2009; Chen & Young, 2010). The contradictory research findings suggest that stock 
market reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms remain unclear and further 
academic scrutiny will be needed.  
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In addition, without considering the differences of stock markets in mainland China and 
Hong Kong, the existing research has tended to assume that there are the same market 
reactions across the markets in Hong Kong and mainland China. In contrast, the Hong 
Kong stock market is different from those in mainland China under the formula of ‘one 
country, two systems’ (China.org.cn, 2008). In this thesis, the author called this unique 
scenario the ‘one country, two markets’ scenario, which demonstrates the unique 
institutional setting of China’s stock markets. Due to the different institutional 
arrangements between the two market types in China, including ownership restrictions, 
currency controls and liquidity restrictions, different market reactions may be triggered 
by the announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms. This unique ‘one 
country, two markets’ scenario remains underexplored in the domain of cross-border 
M&As.  
The stock market is sensitive to the political risk associated with cross-border M&As. 
As an important institutional factor, political risk may spur different market reactions 
to cross-border M&A deals. However, the impact of political risk in target countries 
has not been considered by existing studies on cross-border M&As by Chinese firms.  
Existing studies tend to focus on the impact of geographic and cultural distance on 
cross-border M&As (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013; Ragozzino, 2009) without 
explicitly taking political risk into account. A recent study by Harzing & Pudelko (2016) 
has shown that cultural distance is often used as a proxy for political risk and 
government restrictions in a host country, and calls for more studies that use more 
appropriate and accurate constructs to measure host country characteristics, such as 
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political risk. In addition to political risk, we have a limited understanding of how the 
ownership status of Chinese acquiring firms affects investors’ perceptions, and hence 
stock market reactions to different types of Chinese firms’ cross-border M&As.  
To remedy these research gaps, the author examines the following research questions. 
What are the stock market reactions to cross-border M&A announcements by Chinese 
firms? Do investors in the Hong Kong stock market respond differently to cross-border 
M&As by Chinese firms compared with those in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets in mainland China? To what extent does political risk in the country of origin 
of the target firms, and the ownership status of the acquiring firms, affect the short-term 
stock market performance of Chinese firms with cross-border M&As?  
To address these research questions, the author builds the study on signalling theory 
and the institution-based view to propose that the short-term market performance of 
Chinese acquiring firms is influenced by a variety of factors, including the different 
institutional settings within China, the political risk of target countries and the 
ownership status of the acquiring firms. Signalling theory is used to underpin stock 
market reactions to cross-border M&As while the institution-based view is adopted to 
reveal what is behind investors’ perceptions in stock markets. In contrast to existing 
studies which investigate the direct relationship between cross-border M&As and firm 
performance, this chapter intends to capture stock market reactions based on signalling 
theory, and unpack how stock markets react to cross-border M&As by Chinese listed 
firms. More specifically, the author aims to reveal the extent of market reactions to the 
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institutional characteristics associated with cross-border M&A deals by Chinese listed 
firms using an event-study method.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the existing studies on short-
term performance of cross-border M&As, followed by the theoretical foundations. In 
section 2.4, a number of hypotheses are developed based on the signalling theory and 
institution-based views. The author describes the sample and methodology used in the 
study in Section 2.5. The results are discussed in Section 2.6, while Section 2.7 
discusses findings, followed by the conclusions.  
2.2 Literature Review  
A cross-border M&A could be interpreted as an indication of a substantial change in a 
firm’s corporate strategy. Stock market investors will react to this change through 
buying or selling stocks according to their perception of the firm’s future performance, 
which constitutes the stock market reaction. The terms ‘stock market reaction’ and 
‘investors’ reactions’ are interchangeable. Existing research on stock market reactions 
to cross-border M&As can be classified into two broad categories according to the 
country of origin of the acquiring firms – developed economies or emerging economies, 
which will be discussed in this section. 
Considerable research has been devoted to the impact of cross-border M&As on the 
short-term shareholder values of acquiring firms from developed economies (Asquith, 
1983; Faccio, McConnell, & Stolin, 2006; Firth, 1980; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007; 
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Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Schwert, 2000). However, the empirical evidence is mixed. 
For example, the extant studies conducted by Asquith (1983), Morck et al. (1990), Lang 
et al. (1991), Schwert (2000), Floreani and Rigamonti (2001), Moeller et al. (2005), 
Faccio et al. (2006) and Masulis et al. (2007) find positive abnormal returns for the 
shareholders of US acquiring firms. In contrast, Langetieg (1978) provides a contrary 
view, indicating that US acquiring firms earn significant negative abnormal returns over 
the six months before and the twelve months after the merger date, which are similar to 
those reported in more recent studies (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Sudarsanam, Holl, & 
Salami, 1996; Walker, 2000). Bruner (2002) suggests that in aggregate, abnormal 
returns to shareholders of US acquiring firms are essentially zero.  
Positive abnormal returns have been reported for many other developed markets, such 
as Japan (Kang, Shivdasani, & Yamada, 2000; Pettway & Yamada, 1986), Canada 
(Eckbo & Thorburn, 2009) and several European countries, including France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Portugal (Faccio, McConnell, & Stolin, 2006; Goergen & Renneboog, 
2004; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Furthermore, Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) 
provide evidence that shareholders of acquiring firms earned positive returns between 
the periods 1998-2000 based on a sample of mergers and acquisitions by the Canadian 
firms. On the contrary, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) examine a sample of 519 UK 
acquirers over the period 1983 to 1995 and find negative abnormal returns relative to 
the month of the merger announcement, with only a third of acquirers experiencing 
wealth gains. Campa and Hernando (2004) also look at a sample of mergers and 
acquisitions within Europe, reporting that international mergers destroy shareholder 
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value, especially in regulated industries. The main reason is that the existence of a 
strong regulatory framework creates a difficult environment that hampers the potential 
success of an acquisition.  
Due to the increasing number of cross-border M&As by EE firms, comprehensive 
studies need to be undertaken to further examine the impact of cross-border M&As by 
these firms. Zhu and Malhotra (2008) find evidence of positive gains for  the short-term 
shareholders of Indian acquiring firms. Likewise,  using a sample of 425 cross-border 
acquisitions by Indian firms, Gubbi et al. (2010) show that the shareholders of acquiring 
firms earned positive abnormal returns from 2000 to 2007. A similar study of 8 
emerging countries by Bhagat et al. (2011) based on a sample of 678 firms over the 
1991-2008 period reports that cross-border M&As earn positive returns for acquiring 
firms. However, Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine 433 cross-border acquisitions 
associated with 58 emerging-market multinationals between the years 1991-2004 and 
show that shareholders of acquiring firms earn negative abnormal returns. Table 2.1 
provides a summary of previous research on the stock market performance of cross-
border M&As.  
The review of the literature shows that existing studies have either focused on a direct 
link between M&A deals and stock market reactions without providing a theoretical 
underpinning for such reactions (Ben-Amar & Andre, 2006; Faccio, McConnell, & 
Stolin, 2006; Floreani & Rigamonti, 2001; Gubbi, et al., 2010), or adopted the resource-
based view (Gubbi, et al., 2010; Ning, et al., 2014) and agency theory (Chen & Young, 
2010) to examine the impact of internal factors on stock market performance. For 
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example, Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006) investigate the relationship between 
ownership structure and the announcement period of abnormal returns to acquirers of 
listed and unlisted targets in 17 Western European countries, during the period between 
1996 and 2001, without providing a theoretical foundation. They find no significant 
impact of ownership structure on abnormal returns. Based on the resource-based view, 
Gubbi et al. (2010) examine 425 cross-border M&As by Indian firms during 2000-2007 
to investigate whether acquiring firms can create value for their shareholders in cross-
border M&A deals. They argue that firms from emerging economies use the form of 
cross-border M&As as a vehicle to acquire strategic assets in various markets to 
overcome their latecomer and foreignness disadvantages so as to enhance their 
competitive advantage. Based on agency theory, Chen and Young (2010) use a sample 
of 39 cross-border M&As involving 32 Chinese firms from 2000 to 2008 and find that 
overseas acquisitions destroy acquiring firms’ shareholders value, because Chinese 
investors themselves have little confidence in these MNE’s ability to effectively 
manage their acquisitions.   
In summary, a large portion of the existing studies on the performance of cross-border 
M&As only focuses on the extent to which cross-border M&As influence the acquiring 
and target firms’ performance without explicitly investigating the effect of political risk 
in the country of origin of the target firms and different institutional settings of stock 
markets in mainland China. There is a strong need to carry out an in-depth investigation 
of the effect of institutional factors on the stock market performance of cross-border 
M&As by Chinese firms. In addressing this, a series of institutional factors will be 
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evaluated in the following sections in the context of China’s special institutional 
environment by combining signalling theory and the institution-based view. 
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Table 2.1 A summary of existing studies on the link between cross-border M&As and stock market performance 
Market Author(s), (year) Sample period  Details of Sample Findings 
Panel A: Developed markets  
US Dodd (1980) 1970-1977 151 takeovers -0.23% cumulative abnormal return on the 
announcement date from completed bids 
US Bradley et al. (1983) 1962-1980 241 successful deals, 94 
unsuccessful  deals 
-0.64% insignificant returns for the unsuccessful 
bidders over -20 and +20 days period 
US Lang et al. (1989) 1968-1986 87 targets and bidders 
from successful tender 
offers 
Negative impact on bidder returns when the bid is 
made by a firm with a low Tobin's q 
US Smith and Kim 
(1994) 
1980-1986 177 bidders and targets 0.23% significant abnormal returns over -1 and 0 
days 
US Floreani and 
Rigamonti (2001) 
1996-2000 56 listed acquirers 3.65%.abnormal returns obtained by insurance 
companies 
US Song and Walking 
(2004) 
1985-2001 5726 mergers and 
acquisitions 
Acquiring firms with a period of more than one year 
of 'dormant' bid activity receive a positive abnormal 
return of 0.8%. Acquirers with a 'dormant' period of 
less than one year earn insignificant returns  
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US Faccio et al. (2006) 1996-2001 4429 acquirers of listed 
and unlisted targets 
-0.38% significant abnormal returns for acquirers of 
unlisted targets, while 1.48% significant abnormal 
returns for acquirers of listed targets  
US Masulis et al. (2007) 1990-2003 3333 completed 
acquisitions 
Acquires operating in more competitive industries or 
separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the 
board experience higher abnormal announcement 
returns 
UK Holl and Kyriazis 
(1997) 
1979-1989 178 successful bids -1.25% significantly negative abnormal returns for 
bidders over the two months after the bid 
announcement 
UK Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) 
1983-1995 519 listed acquirers between -1.39% and -1.47% significantly negative 
abnormal returns for UK acquirers 
UK Conn et al., (2005) 1984-1998 4344 acquisitions Significantly positive announcement returns for 
bidders when the culture difference is great between 
UK bidders firms and foreign target firms 
UK Gregory and 
McCorriston (2005) 
1985-1994 343 acquisitions Short-run returns are insignificantly different from 
zero irrespective of the location of the acquisition 
EU Campa and 
Hernando (2004) 
1998-2000 262 mergers and 
acquisitions 
-1.96% negative abnormal returns for regulated EU 
acquirers over 60 days around the bid announcement. 
No significant returns for bidders from unregulated 
industries for the same period 
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EU Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) 
1993-2000 187 bidders 1.2% significantly cumulative abnormal returns for 
bidders over 5 days around the announcement date 
EU Chari et al. (2010) 1986-2006 594 acquisitions in 
emerging markets and 
1624 acquisitions in 
developed markets 
1.16% significantly positive abnormal returns for 
developed-marker acquirers over a three-day event 
window 
Canada Ben-Amar and 
Andre (2006) 
1998-2000 238 mergers and 
acquisitions by 138 
Canadian firms 
1.6% abnormal returns for acquiring firms over 3 
days 
Canada Dutta et al. (2013) 1993-2002 1300 completed 
acquisitions 
Significantly positive abnormal returns for Canadian 
acquiring firms' shares around the announcement 
date 
Panel B: Emerging market 
India Gubbi et al. (2010) 2000-2007 425 cross-border 
acquisitions by Indian 
firms 
International acquisitions by Indian firms earn 
significantly positive value for their shareholders 
India and 
China 
Nicholson and 
Salaber (2013) 
2000-2010 203 Indian and 63 
Chinese cross-border 
deals 
Cross-border acquisitions made by Indian and 
Chinese firms lead to significant shareholder wealth 
creation. Indian shareholders are more likely to 
benefit from deals in small culture distance 
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countries, while Chinese investors gain from the 
cross-border expansion of manufacturing companies 
China Chen and Young 
(2010) 
 
2000-2008 39 deals by 32 Chinese 
MNEs  
Negative average cumulated abnormal returns for 
Chinese acquiring MNEs 
China Ning et al. (2014) 1991-2010 335 acquisitions Significant positive shareholder value for Chinese 
acquiring MNEs 
Emerging 
market 
Aybar and Ficici 
(2009) 
1991-2004 433 acquisitions by 58 
emerging-market 
multinationals 
The equity markets react negatively to the emerging 
market cross-border acquisition announcement 
Emerging 
market 
Bhagat et al. (2011) 1991-2008 698 acquisitions by 
publicly listed firms from 
eight emerging countries 
Emerging country acquirers experience a positive 
and significant market response of 1.09% on the 
announcement day 
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2.3 Theoretical Foundation 
Departing from existing research, the author combines signalling theory and the 
institution-based view to capture market reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms by taking account of the impact of various institutional factors. 
2.3.1 Signalling Theory and Cross-border M&As 
Signalling theory is based on the assumption that information is not equally available 
to all parties at the same time and the theory is fundamentally concerned with reducing 
information asymmetry between different parties (Spence, 2002). This theory helps to 
explain how decision-makers interpret and respond to situations where information is 
both incomplete and asymmetrically distributed among parties (Spence, 1973; 1974). It 
includes three primary elements: signallers, receivers and the signal itself. Signallers 
are insiders (e.g. managers or executives) who obtain information about individuals 
(Spence, 1973), products (Kirmani & Rao, 2000) and organisations (Ross, 1977). This 
information is not available to outsiders. Receivers are outsiders who lack information 
about the organisation but would like to receive this information. Due to information 
asymmetries, outsiders (e.g. investors) cannot obtain adequate information to 
accurately assess a firm’s true value.  
Signalling theory is built on the premise that an internal party, such as an acquirer, 
possesses special information while external parties, such as investors, may not be able 
to access such information and may need to rely on other sources of information (Arrow, 
1968; 1973; 1959; Arrow & Debreu, 1954; Grossman & Hart, 1981; Nelson, 1970). 
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This theory has been used in a variety of management literatures, including strategic 
management (Ozmel, Reuer, & Gulati, 2013; Priem, Li, & Carr, 2012; Reuer & 
Ragozzino, 2012), entrepreneurship (Ahlers, et al., 2015; Bergh, et al., 2014; Moss, 
Neubaum, & Meyskens, 2015) and human resource management (Lourenço, et al., 
2014; Renwick, Redman, & Maguire, 2012). 
The author adopts signalling theory to predict whether and how investors would react 
to the announcement of cross-border M&As through buying and selling shares in the 
stock market. The announcement of cross-border M&As serves as a signal sent by 
acquiring firms and can influence the expectations of investors. If there is strong 
confidence in the management of the acquiring firm, and the information about the 
M&A transaction is explicit, it should be reflected in the stock market reaction. If the 
announcement of a cross-border M&A is interpreted by investors as an optimistic belief 
in the future, this should cause an increase in the stock price. It is also true where the 
announcement of cross-border M&As is perceived negatively by investors, resulting in 
a decrease in stock prices.  
2.3.2 Institution-based View and Cross-border M&As 
While signalling theory can help capture stock market reactions to cross-border M&A 
deals, it is insufficient in revealing what is behind such reactions towards M&A deals. 
Therefore, the signalling theory needs to be integrated with other theories in order to 
unpack stock market reactions to show what is behind such reactions. The institution-
based view has been widely used as a pivotal theoretical lens in international business 
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(Buckley, et al., 2007; North, 1990; Peng, 2002; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Wan & 
Hoskisson, 2003; Wright, et al., 2005).  Institutions have long been identified as a key 
factor affecting cross-border M&A performance (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Wan & 
Hoskisson, 2003), given that cross-border M&A activities are subject to institutional 
constraints. Home and host-country institutions exert significant influence on the 
completion rates of cross-border M&A deals, and affect the integration and success of 
post cross-border M&As (Gubbi, et al., 2010; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). Due to 
unique institutional settings of Chinese economy and unique institutional environments 
of Chinese society, institutional factors play an even more important role influencing 
the market reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms. For example,  a large 
portion of Chinese acquirers are state-owned enterprises; many cross-border M&As by 
Chinese firms are state-sponsored or state-supported; the settings of mainland stock 
markets are significantly different from the stock markets in the rest of world including 
the Hong Kong stock market. Therefore, the author integrates the signalling theory with 
the institution-based view to unpack what lies behind stock market reactions to the 
announcement of cross-border M&As.  
The institution-based view has emerged as an important paradigm, and posits that 
institutions in a society influence firm strategy and performance (Buckley, et al., 2007; 
North, 1990; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). North (1990) defines institutions as the ‘rule 
of the game’ in a society. Similarly, Scott (1995) specified that institutions are 
‘regulative, normative and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and 
meaning to social behaviour’.  
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The institution-based view as a widely adopted theoretical lens in IB research is also 
implicitly reflected in Dunning’s Ownership Location Internationalisation (OLI) 
paradigm. In more recent studies, Dunning and Lundan (2008) and Cantwell, Dunning 
and Lundan (2010) have explicitly proposed that institutional factors affecting both the 
determinants and the outcomes of MNE activity can be incorporated into the OLI 
paradigm. Building on the analysis of North (1990), Dunning and Lundan (2008) show 
the direct link between host-country institutional environments and the location-based 
(L) advantages in the OLI paradigm. The institutionally related location advantages 
differ between developed and developing countries. Specifically, well-established 
institutions help firms to reduce uncertainty and risk, and facilitate knowledge 
acquisition (Lu, et al., 2014; Schwens, Eiche, & Kabst, 2011; Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006). 
The host country government can enhance its country’s location advantages by 
improving its institutions in order to attract foreign firms (Guler & Guillen, 2010; Witt 
& Lewin, 2007). Thus, the institutional environment in a host country has important 
implications for MNEs’ internationalisation outcomes (Chung & Beamish, 2005; Cui 
& Jiang, 2012; Gao, Liu, & Lioliou, 2015; Holmes, et al., 2013; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 
2008; Pangarkar & Lim, 2003; Wang, et al., 2012).  
In the case of cross-border M&As, when assessing a firm’s value and evaluating its 
future performance to make investment decisions, investors perceive institutional 
information as an important signal, especially when they are unable to obtain adequate 
firm-specific information due to information asymmetries. The difference in 
regulations on financial markets may lead to different market reactions to the same 
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M&A events. Thus, the author expects that market reactions to cross-border M&A 
events in the Hong Kong stock market may differ from those in mainland Chinese stock 
markets. Moreover, when Chinese firms acquire firms from countries with different 
levels of political risk, which constitutes a major aspect of the institutional environment, 
stock market investors will interpret and respond to such cross-border M&As 
differently. Firms with a different ownership status, such as State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) or privately owned firms, may also generate different stock market reactions, 
resulting in differing performance, given that SOEs can be perceived as a major element 
of Chinese economic institutions.  
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
Based on the theory and evidence discussed above, the author develops here several 
hypotheses related to factors affecting the short-term stock market performance of 
acquiring firms involved in cross-border M&As. 
2.4.1 Market Reactions 
The announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms may release a strong signal 
to the market, according to signalling theory. However, cross-border M&As are still a 
newly emerging activity for Chinese firms and Chinese investors. As a result, many 
Chinese firms involved in cross-border M&As are ‘first-time buyers’ who have not 
been involved in any cross-border M&As previously. Cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms are typically interpreted as a very strong signal released by the top management 
of Chinese acquirers, indicating their ambitions and confidence in the global market 
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(Gubbi, et al., 2010). Thus, the announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms 
is likely to be perceived positively by stock market investors.  
In addition, the announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms may indicate 
Chinese firms’ engagement in seeking strategic assets in order to enhance their 
performance and catch up with global giants (Deng, 2007). M&As are used as an 
important approach through which Chinese firms obtain resources and capabilities that 
are not available in the domestic market (Deng, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008). These 
resources, including natural resources, patent-protected technologies, well-known 
brands, as well as superior managerial and marketing skills (Athreye & Kapur, 2009; 
Chen, 2008; Rui & Yip, 2008), can be converted into competitive advantages in the 
post-acquisition period. Thus, investors may perceive that cross-border M&As serve as 
a strategic means of addressing resource and capability deficits, and overcoming 
domestic market constraints. Moreover, firms can better exploit their existing resources 
and competitive advantages in new markets to realise economies of scale (Li, Li, & 
Wang, 2016). Therefore, cross-border M&As will be perceived to enhance the 
competitive advantages of Chinese firms by integrating the acquired resources and 
capabilities from overseas. Ultimately, investors will expect cross-border M&As to 
create shareholder value due to improved competitive advantage and firm performance.  
Finally, the Chinese government has promoted and encouraged Chinese firms to invest 
abroad with the ‘go abroad’ policy since 1999 (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). The support 
from the Chinese government in the form of tax deductions, low-interest loans and 
investment treaties with other governments has helped Chinese companies to deal with 
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host-country governments and institutions (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). The Chinese 
government’s political and financial support is interpreted as a positive signal and thus 
leads to a positive market reaction.   
It should be noted that cross-border M&A announcements may negatively affect the 
market and hence lead to a decrease in stock prices (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). However, 
growing fast and being big has become a widely accepted strategy among Chinese firms 
and this strategy is supported by the Chinese government (Chen & Shih, 2008). In this 
regard, Chinese firms are likely to create positive market expectations due to the 
potential benefits associated with cross-border M&A deals. Hence, cross-border M&As 
are more likely to generate positive stock market reactions in China (Gaur, Delios, & 
Singh, 2007).  
In summary, for Chinese firms, cross-border M&As may also represent a unique and 
important strategic means of value creation, given that these activities enable Chinese 
firms to obtain critical resources and capabilities and help them overcome domestic 
institutional constraints in developing these critical resources, thus raising their profile 
in the eye of investors. These firms may also create positive market expectations, due 
to the various benefits associated with cross-border M&A deals. This can result in 
positive stock market reactions in general which in turn affect the market performance 
of those firms involved in cross-border M&A activities. Therefore, we propose:  
Hypothesis 1a: The announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms 
results in a positive stock market reaction.  
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While the author hypothesises that cross-border M&As by Chinese firms will generate 
positive market reactions, it is necessary to differentiate market reactions in mainland 
Chinese stock markets with the Hong Kong stock market, given the unique institutional 
settings of ‘one country, two systems’. There may be asymmetric market reactions to 
the same news in the two types of stock markets across China. The different market 
reactions in stock markets across China can be shown in the stock market prices and 
the magnitude of future volatility of return.   
Under the formula ‘one country, two systems’, the Hong Kong stock market is 
significantly different from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in mainland China. 
Good-news-chasing behaviour by investors has been observed in mainland China, but 
to a lesser degree in the Hong Kong stock market and stock markets in the developed 
world (Wang, Liu, & Wang, 2004). This good-news-chasing behaviour means that the 
impact of good news (positive unexpected shock) on future volatility is larger than that 
of bad news (negative unexpected shock) of the same magnitude (Yeh & Lee, 2000) 
and could lead to different market reactions to cross-border M&A activities by Chinese 
firms. The good-news-chasing behaviour of investors in mainland China could be 
explained by the unique institutional features of stock markets in China. In mainland 
China, the liquidity of shares traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets is 
limited compared to those in the Hong Kong market, due to significant constraints on 
the tradability of state shares and legal-person shares (Yeung & Huang, 2014). Given 
the huge amount of ‘hot’ money flowing around mainland China stock markets, limited 
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liquidity of share trading will aggregate the market reactions to the announcement of 
cross-border M&As. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of institutional investors, especially experienced 
international institutional investors in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets due to 
institutional restrictions. Most shares traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets are domestic shares that are generally restricted to domestic investors (Wang 
& Jiang, 2004). Foreign investment is only allowed through a tightly-regulated structure 
known as the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) System. In mainland China, 
the turnover is overwhelmingly a result of actions by individual domestic retail 
investors. According to the Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistical Yearbook (2014), the 
retail investors in this market contributed 82.24% of total market turnover value which 
is considerably higher than the Hong Kong stock market (only 25%). A huge number 
of retail investors in the mainland Chinese stock markets, called ‘noise traders’, are 
relatively inexperienced in trading and they may respond more positively than others to 
the announcement of cross-border M&As because they have no access to inside 
information and so they can, at times, behave irrationally (Black, 1986). Driven by the 
lack of other investment options in less-established Chinese capital markets, and 
institutional restrictions, retail investors in mainland China are more proactive in the 
stock markets than those in any other main stock markets. Those irrationally optimistic 
retail investors in mainland China may react differently from experienced overseas 
institutional investors in the Hong Kong stock market to the announcement of cross-
border M&As. Accordingly, we proposed that:   
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Hypothesis 1b: The positive stock market reaction is stronger in the mainland 
Chinese stock markets than in the Hong Kong stock market. 
In discussing the market reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms, the author 
further considers the extent to which the stock market performance of M&As is 
influenced by institutional characteristics associated with cross-border M&As. 
Specifically, the author assesses the extent of market reactions to political risks in the 
target firms’ country of origin and the ownership status of acquiring firms. In doing so, 
the author aims to capture the political dimension of the institutional environment of 
the target firms’ country of origin, and different types of acquiring firms.  
2.4.2 Political Risk: Stability and Governance Quality 
Political risk constitutes an important aspect of institutional environments and is closely 
connected to the way institutions function in a country (Bilson, Brailsford, & Hooper, 
2002). It refers to the degree of political stability within a country, the quality of the 
laws, regulations, administrative procedures and policies formally sanctioned by the 
government (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; 2006; Delios & Henisz, 2003). Host countries with 
different levels of political risk may have different performance implications with 
regard to cross-border M&As, which in turn can affect market reactions. In this study, 
the author considers two important dimensions of political risk, namely political 
stability and governance quality. 
Political Stability 
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There are a number of reasons why the political stability of a target firm’s country of 
origin can affect market reactions to cross-border M&As. Firstly, the level of political 
stability may affect investors’ risk perception, and thus lead to different market 
reactions (Bekaert, et al., 2014; Pástor & Veronesi, 2013; 2012). Since institutions are 
developed to create order and stable environments, and so promote economic exchange 
and cooperation (North, 1990; Williamson, 1985), host countries with high political 
stability imply low uncertainty and pose low risk to business activities. On the contrary, 
host countries with low political stability pose a serious challenge to the success of 
cross-border M&As (Cao & Liu, 2013). Foreign firms in particular can be more 
vulnerable targets during conflict due to their status of being outsiders (Hutchison & 
Gibler, 2007). For example, Chinese firms have heavily invested in Africa, the Middle 
East and Latin America in recent years, but civil wars and regional conflicts due to 
political instability represent big threats to the safety of investment in these regions. In 
particular, the Libyan civil war in 2011 caused over $18 billion of loss to 75 Chinese 
firms (New.cn, 2011). This implies that the stock market may react negatively to cross-
border M&As if companies seek to acquire firms in countries with a high level of 
political instability, since they may suffer heavy losses in the future.  
Secondly, uncertainty associated with sudden policy changes poses further challenges 
to firms (Bekaert, et al., 2014; Pástor & Veronesi, 2013; 2012). It is evident that Chinese 
firms have encountered U-turns in governmental policy towards foreign investments in 
some African countries when there has been a change of regime (Gao, Liu, & Lioliou, 
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2015). Therefore, future M&As in similar countries may send out negative signals to 
investors due to the uncertainty. 
Thirdly, a low level of political stability is likely to have an impact on post-acquisition 
activities and hinder the acquirer’s efforts to establish and enforce cooperative 
agreements with local partners (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009), 
thus leading to higher transaction costs when the company tries to acquire and integrate 
local resources. With uncertainty and high transaction costs, the acquired companies 
may find it hard to generate positive financial returns to pay dividends or create 
shareholder value, which will in turn be perceived as a negative signal by the stock 
market. Therefore, we propose:   
Hypothesis 2a: The shareholders of Chinese firms that have acquired firms 
from countries with a high level of political stability gain higher cumulative abnormal 
returns than those that have acquired firms from countries with a low level of political 
stability. 
Governance quality 
The governance quality of the host country government and its agencies plays an 
essential role in the success of MNEs’ operations in such countries (Bekaert, et al., 2014; 
Berry, 2006; Pástor & Veronesi, 2013). Specifically, well-established rules and 
regulations help Chinese MNEs reduce the regulatory ambiguity associated with cross-
border investments (Gao, Liu, & Lioliou, 2015). Thus, acquiring firms are able to 
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reduce information search costs and shorten the learning curve associated with foreign 
operations when investing in countries with clear rules and regulations (Uhlenbruck, et 
al., 2006). Consequently, firms can devote their time and resources to post-acquisition 
integration and improved performance.  
In addition, the level of bribery and corruption in the host country government can also 
have an impact on firms investing in these countries. Corrupt practices in host countries 
where target companies originate not only represent legal and reputational risks, but 
also influence the financial viability of cross-border M&A deals (Uhlenbruck, et al., 
2006). If a target company derives a proportion of its revenues through corrupt means, 
this can have a significant impact on the future cash flow of the firm when the acquiring 
company puts a stop to such corrupt practices (Clifford, 2012). Therefore, M&A deals 
in countries with a high level of corruption may send out negative signals to investors.  
Furthermore, advanced knowledge and resources are more likely to be learned and 
obtained from developed countries with a higher level of governance quality where 
more institutional protection is provided for foreign direct investment (Berry, 2006). It 
is widely recognized that Chinese firms tend to seek high quality knowledge and 
resources through cross-border M&As, which has been identified as one of the two 
motivations of Chinese M&A deals alongside knowledge exploitation (Deng, 2007; 
Wang & Boateng, 2007; Zheng, et al., 2016). Chinese MNEs that lack modern 
managerial expertise, international market knowledge and advanced technology may 
be able to acquire valuable knowledge and resources when target firms are from 
institutionally developed countries because these countries are more likely to possess 
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strategic resources needed by Chinese firms (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). Chinese 
firms can obtain advanced knowledge and resources by acquiring target companies 
from developed countries with high governance quality and low political risk (Cui, 
Meryer, & Hu, 2014; Liu, et al., 2016). Combining these acquired strategic resources, 
including technological knowledge, market knowledge and managerial knowledge, 
with low-cost advantage, Chinese firms are able to gain a unique, competitive 
advantage in both international markets and over their competitors in China who are 
unable to obtain the same knowledge and resources in the domestic market, thus 
boosting firm performance (Deng, 2010). Accordingly, we proposed that:   
Hypothesis 2b: The shareholders of Chinese firms that have acquired firms 
from countries with a high level of governance quality gain higher cumulative abnormal 
returns than those that have acquired firms from countries with a low level of 
governance quality. 
2.4.3 Ownership: SOE Acquirer vs. Private Acquirers 
Firms with different ownership status are associated with different capabilities and 
behave differently, depending on different institutional constraints and competitive 
pressures (Zhou & Witteloostuijn, 2010). Research suggests that SOEs not only 
represent an ownership structure or a form of corporate governance, but are also 
products of the institutional environment (Bruton, et al., 2015; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; 
Peng, 2000). This is particularly true in China where SOEs are an important instrument 
used by the government to control and coordinate economic activities (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 
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2006; Sun, Tong, & Tong, 2002; Tian & Estrin, 2008). This implies that SOEs can be 
perceived as a major element of economic institutions. Therefore, the ownership status 
of acquiring firms can affect the market performance of cross-border M&As by 
signalling different performance implications.  
First, Chinese SOEs obtain preferential treatment from the government and a 
favourable allocation of resources, which in turn improve the value of the companies 
(Blanchard & Shleifer, 2001; Sun & Tong, 2003; Tian & Estrin, 2008). Therefore, the 
success of these companies often depends on their monopoly positions in the domestic 
market, rather than their managerial capabilities or the use of advanced technology (Wu 
& Xie, 2010; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). Their performance may be adversely 
affected when SOEs are moving from the Chinese domestic market to the international 
market (Lin, 2010). It is argued that cross-border M&As could lead to a lower 
performance of SOEs due to the weak corporate governance associated with state 
ownership, as well as possible political interference (Ning, et al., 2014). 
Unlike SOEs with a monopoly of government-controlled resources, private firms have 
to compete based on their technological and marketing capabilities in order to survive 
and prosper (Peng, 2001). Moreover, private firms tend to be more effective than SOEs 
in terms of market orientation and innovation (Peng, Wang, & Tong, 2004). In addition, 
many private firms have greater flexibility and autonomy in terms of management and 
decision making. This implies that private firms may be able to compete in foreign 
markets and integrate target firms more effectively than SOEs, thus leading to a higher 
level of performance (Liu, et al., 2016).    
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Moreover, existing research indicates that most SOEs are more interested in utilities 
and infrastructure industries, such as energy, telecommunication and transport (OECD, 
2008). However, this may raise political and public concern in the host countries which 
they target, especially in developed countries (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Gao, Liu, & Lioliou, 
2015). The natural association between state ownership and the Chinese government 
may increase political sensitivity and public concern (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; 
Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011), which may lead to a negative impact on the market 
performance of SOE acquirers due to possible political interference. Therefore, the 
announcement of cross-border M&A deals by firms with a different ownership status 
may send different signals to investors, which may result in different stock market 
reactions and post-acquisition performance. Hence, we propose 
Hypothesis 3: The shareholders of Chinese SOE acquirers have lower 
cumulative abnormal returns from cross-border M&A deals than those of Chinese 
private acquirers.  
2.5 Data and Methodology 
2.5.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The data on cross-border M&As by Chinese firms from January 2000 to December 
2012 was obtained from the Thomason One Banker database. Due to the 
implementation of the ‘Go Global’ policy initiated in 1999 by the Chinese government, 
and China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, large-scale cross-
border M&As by Chinese firms started from 2000 and this is why the year 2000 has 
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been selected as the starting point of our investigation. For M&A deals, the Thomson 
One Banker provides a comprehensive database for global M&As which is widely used 
for academic research. In this study, all M&A deal-related data has been sourced from 
this database, including the announcement date, the name of both acquirers and target 
firms, as well as the home country of these firms. A Chinese acquiring firm should meet 
all the following criteria in order to be included in the sample: (i) the M&A deals are 
listed as completed transactions; (ii) the firm has stock price data which is available on 
the Shanghai, Shenzhen or Hong Kong stock exchanges; (iii) the announcement date of 
M&A lies between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2012; and (iv) the target 
companies lie outside mainland China. The final usable sample consists of 165 cross-
border M&As by Chinese acquiring firms.  
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the sample distribution in terms of the industry 
classification and ownership status of the acquiring firms, as well as the country of 
origin of foreign target firms. Most Chinese acquirers are located in the manufacturing 
industry (SIC 20-39) followed by the financial sector (SIC 60-67), which accounts for 
58.79% and 12.12% of the total cross-border M&As respectively. For Chinese 
acquirers, Asia/Pacific firms were most frequently the target of cross-border 
acquisitions, and account for 49.09% of total cross-border M&As, followed by 23.03% 
of acquisitions in North America and 20.61% in Europe. In addition, 58.18% of cross-
border M&A deals were conducted by Chinese privately owned firms. 
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Table 2.2 Information on the sample firms 
 N 
% of 
sample   N 
% of 
sample 
Acquirers’ industry    Target Country   
  SIC 10-14 Mining 19 12.00%    Europe 34 20.61% 
  SIC 20-39 Manufacturing 97 58.79%    Asia/Pacific 81 49.09% 
  SIC 40-49 Transportation 
and    communications 7 4.24%  
  North 
America 38 23.03% 
  SCI 50-59 Wholesale and 
Retail 8 4.85%    Others 12 7.27% 
  SIC 60-67 Finance 20 12.12%    Total  165  
  SIC 70-89 Services 14 8.48%     
  Total 165      
       
Ownership status of 
acquirers       
  State-owned  69 41.82%     
  Private 96 58.18%     
  Total  165      
 
2.5.2 Methodology 
Measurements 
The author adopts the notion that stock market reactions to the announcement of cross-
border M&As are reflected in the change of a listed firm’s share price around the 
occurrence of the event (Gaur, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2013; Gubbi, et al., 2010) and thus the 
daily stock prices for acquiring firms around the announcement dates are used to 
measure the stock market performance of these firms. This measure has been widely 
used in international business and strategic management studies of M&As (Doukas & 
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Travlos, 1998; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). More 
specifically, the author uses Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) to shareholders as 
a measure of short-term stock market performance. A company is classified as a SOE 
if the government has a majority ownership share. 
Following previous studies (Gubbi, et al., 2010), we use the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) complied by Kaufman et al. (2010) to measure political risk. The 
WGI index constructs aggregate indicators of six dimensions of governance for 215 
countries and territories from 1996 to 2012. These six items include Voice and 
Accountability (VA), Political Stability and absence of violence (PS), Government 
Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and Control of 
Corruption (CC). The author uses the first two items to measure political stability and 
the rest to measure governance quality. Each of these six items have values that range 
from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values reflecting lower political risk in the country of 
origin of respective target firms. Values ≥ 0 reflect lower levels of political risk, 
whereas those < 0 indicate higher levels of such risk.  
Event study 
In order to investigate the impact of Chinese cross-border M&As on the stock-market 
performance of acquiring firms, the event study method is employed to calculate and 
analyse cumulative abnormal returns (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 
2010). This method is based on the assumption of immediate information processing 
by stock market participants (Fama, 1991) and can be used to determine whether there 
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is an abnormal effect on stock prices associated with unanticipated events, such as 
M&As.  
Prior studies using the event study method indicate that investors use information about 
a firm’s cross-border M&As to adjust expectations about its performance potential, as 
evidenced by changes in CARs upon the announcement of cross-border M&As. The 
event study method is widely used to capture market reactions to an announced event 
that was previously unexpected (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
In order to assess the stock price reaction to announcements of cross-border M&As, 
Abnormal Return (AR) is calculated based on a standard market model (Brown & 
Warner, 1985) which can be presented in the following equation.  
 
where  is the abnormal return,  is the actual daily stock return for firm 
 on day , and  is the daily return from the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
Index and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index and Hong Kong HangSheng 
Index on day . The coefficients  and  are OLS parameters estimated through the 
regression of  on .  
To measure the stock market reactions to the announcement of cross-border M&As, the 
event window should be determined, which is the number of days over which there are 
possible ARs caused by the event. A very long window could dilute the possibility of 
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finding any significant evidence. A very short event window may not catch the effect 
of the event if the information comes out after the closing of the market and does not 
arrive in the public domain until the next day. Therefore, the author uses a 3-day, 5-day 
and 11-day event window to examine the stock market’s short-term response to the 
merger and acquisition announcement (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Bhabra & Huang, 2013). 
Furthermore, CARs are calculated by summing the average AR for the days of the event 
window: 
 
where  is the CAR for the time period from t = day 1 until t = day n. 
To further assess whether the CAR is caused by the fluctuation of share prices, the 
statistical significance of the CARs is tested with the t statistic  
   
where  is the standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal returns. If the 
CAR observed during the announcement of Chinese cross-border M&As is 
significantly different from zero, it can be concluded that this event has a significant 
impact on the acquiring firms’ stock prices. 
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2.6 Empirical Results  
Table 2.3 presents the results of empirical analysis of the CARs of 165 cross-border 
M&As by Chinese listed firms surrounding the cross-border merger and acquisition 
announcement dates. Around the announcement date, CARs are consistently positive 
with values of 0.84%, 0.89% and 1.22% for the (-1, 0), (0, +1) and (-1, +1) windows, 
respectively. All of them are significant at the 1% and 5% level. The findings show that, 
on average, cross-border M&As by Chinese listed firms generated a positive market 
reaction by producing positive abnormal returns to the shareholdings of acquiring firms, 
thus supporting Hypothesis 1a. 
Table 2.3 Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Chinese acquiring firms 
 N Mean s.d. t-Stat Positive: negative % positive  
CAR (-1, 0) 165 0.0084 0.0402 2.682*** 92:73 55.76% 
CAR (0, +1) 165 0.0089 0.0503 2.275** 86:79 52.12% 
CAR (-1, +1) 165 0.0122 0.0539 2.902*** 93:72 56.36% 
CAR (-2, +2) 165 0.0050 0.0718 0.890 89:76 53.94% 
CAR (-5, +5) 165 0.0093 0.0936 1.278 80:85 51.52% 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Table 2.4 reports the empirical results of the cumulative abnormal returns based on 
acquiring firms listed in different stock markets. For those listed in the mainland market, 
the mean CARs range from 0.79% to 1.53% and are statistically significant for the 
period of (-1, 0), (0, 1) and (-1, +1) during the announcement date. On the contrary, for 
those listed in the Hong Kong market, the mean CARs range from -0.10% to 1.16%. 
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All of them are positive, but insignificant, except for the period of (-2, +2). This finding 
shows that the positive market reaction is more significant in the mainland stock 
markets than that in the Hong Kong market. Thus, these results support Hypothesis 1b.  
Table 2.4 Market reactions: Mainland China vs. Hong Kong 
Event window 
Mainland  Hong Kong 
N Mean CARM  t-Stat  N Mean CARH  t-Stat 
CAR (-1, 0) 103 0.0133 2.997***  62 0.0003 0.079 
CAR (0, +1) 103 0.0104 2.372**  62 0.0064 0.851 
CAR (-1, +1) 103 0.0153 2.992***  62 0.0070 0.964 
CAR (-2, +2) 103 0.0086 1.334  62 -0.0010 -0.098 
CAR (-5, +5) 103 0.0079 0.970  62 0.0116 0.834 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
As shown in Table 2.5-2.10, we investigate hypotheses 2a and 2b by testing the six 
governance indicators one by one to compare the effect of different levels of each 
indicator on stock market performance. The findings show that for the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms who have acquired the target firms from countries with a low 
level of political stability (e.g. VA and PS) and governance quality (e.g. GE, RQ, RL 
and CC), all of the CARs are insignificant. These indicate that the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms who purchase target firms from such a country have not 
generated substantial positive announcement gains. Conversely, for the shareholders of 
the Chinese acquiring firms who purchase target firms from a country with a high level 
of political stability and governance quality, the CARs for (-1, 0), (0, +1) and (-1, +1) 
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are all positive and statistically significant. These indicate that the announcement of 
cross-border M&As for target firms from such a country have yielded highly significant 
wealth for the shareholders of acquiring firms surrounding the announcement date. The 
difference between the abnormal returns of acquiring firms that purchase target firms 
from countries with different level of political stability and governance quality is 
illustrated in Tables 2.5-2.10. The results show that all the shareholders of acquiring 
firms that purchase target firms from a country with a high level of political stability 
and governance quality earn higher returns than those targeting firms from a country 
with a low level of political stability and governance quality. These further demonstrate 
that a high level of political stability and governance quality is perceived positively and 
this results in a high level of stock market performance. Taken together, the empirical 
evidence supports Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b.  
Table 2.5 VA: High VA vs. Low VA 
Event window 
Low VA   High VA 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH  t-Stat 
CAR (-1, 0) 22 -0.0034 -0.381  143 0.0093 2.833*** 
CAR (0, +1) 22 0.0008 0.077  143 0.0095 2.304** 
CAR (-1, +1) 22 0.0005 0.052  143 0.0131 2.934*** 
CAR (-2, +2) 22 -0.0025 -0.172  143 0.0056 0.939 
CAR (-5, +5) 22 -0.0099 -0.435   143 0.0108 1.414 
Note: VA=Voice and Accountability 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
49 
 
Table 2.6 PS: High PS vs. Low PS 
Event window 
Low PS   High PS 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH  t-Stat 
CAR (-1, 0) 16 0.0056 0.888  149 0.0087 2.559** 
CAR (0, +1) 16 0.0124 1.806*  149 0.0085 1.995** 
CAR (-1, +1) 16 0.0080 1.048  149 0.0126 2.758*** 
CAR (-2, +2) 16 0.0076 0.817  149 0.0047 0.768 
CAR (-5, +5) 16 0.0237 1.300   149 0.0078 0.993 
Note: PS=Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
Table 2.7 PS: High GE vs. Low GE 
Event window 
Low GE   High GE 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH  t-Stat 
CAR (-1, 0) 25 -0.0038 -0.511  140 0.0096 2.870*** 
CAR (0, +1) 25 0.0141 1.691  140 0.0084 1.983** 
CAR (-1, +1) 25 0.0062 0.655  140 0.0128 2.824*** 
CAR (-2, +2) 25 -0.0018 -0.121  140 0.0056 0.944 
CAR (-5, +5) 25 0.0263 1.372   140 0.0076 0.979 
Note: GE=Government Effectiveness 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.8 RQ: High RQ vs. Low RQ 
Event window 
Low RQ   High RQ 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH  t-Stat 
CAR (-1, 0) 13 0.0016 0.158  152 0.0090 2.728*** 
CAR (0, +1) 13 0.0124 1.293  152 0.0086 2.062** 
CAR (-1, +1) 13 0.0093 0.913  152 0.0124 2.774*** 
CAR (-2, +2) 13 -0.0018 -0.116  152 0.0056 0.939 
CAR (-5, +5) 13 0.0362 1.807*   152 0.0070 0.910 
Note: RQ=Regulator Quality 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
Table 2.9 High RL vs. Low RL 
Event window 
Low RL   High RL 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH t-Stat 
CAR (-1, 0) 19 0.0004 0.066  146 0.0094 2.757*** 
CAR (0, +1) 19 0.0108 1.591  146 0.0087 1.996** 
CAR (-1, +1) 19 0.0057 0.756  146 0.0130 2.804*** 
CAR (-2, +2) 19 -0.0005 -0.047  146 0.0057 0.926 
CAR (-5, +5) 19 0.0170 1.087   146 0.0083 1.040 
Note: RL=Rule of Law 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2.10 CC: High CC vs. Low CC 
Event window 
Low CC   High CC 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH  t-Stat 
CAR (-1, 0) 21 0.0019 0.309  144 0.0093 2.698*** 
CAR (0, +1) 21 0.0097 1.544  144 0.0088 1.999** 
CAR (-1, +1) 21 0.0083 1.101  144 0.0128 2.719*** 
CAR (-2, +2) 21 0.0017 0.163  144 0.0054 0.876 
CAR (-5, +5) 21 0.0197 1.323   144 0.0078 0.966 
Note: CC=Control of Corruption 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
The results of testing the impact of the ownership status of Chinese acquiring firms are 
illustrated in Table 2.11. The results in Table 2.11 indicate that for SOE acquirers, the 
CARs for (-1, 0), (0, +1), (-1, +1) and (-5, +5) are positive, but statistically insignificant. 
This suggests that the shareholders of Chinese SOE acquirers did not experience 
substantial positive wealth gains. In comparison, for privately owned firms (acquirers), 
the CARs show positive returns for all event windows. For the event window (-1, 0), 
(0, +1) and (-1, +1), the shareholders of Chinese private firms experienced statistically 
significant positive CARs of 1.31%, 1.28% and 1.88%, respectively. These results 
indicate that the announcement of the cross-border M&As for private acquiring firms 
yielded highly significant wealth gain for their shareholders. The difference between 
the abnormal returns of the private acquirers and SOE acquirers is illustrated in Table 
2.11. The results indicate that cross-border M&As created higher returns for the 
shareholders of Chinese private acquirers than those of Chinese SOE acquirers 
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surrounding the announcement date, except for the period of (-5, +5). Taken together, 
these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 3.   
Table 2.11 Ownership: SOE acquirer vs. private acquirers 
Event window 
SOE  Private 
N Mean CARS  t-Stat  N Mean CARP  t-Stat 
CAR (-1, 0) 69 0.0019 0.582  96 0.0131 2.722*** 
CAR (0, +1) 69 0.0035 1.079  96 0.0128 2.03** 
CAR (-1, +1) 69 0.0030 0.766  96 0.0188 2.852*** 
CAR (-2, +2) 69 -0.0037 -0.628  96 0.0112 1.298 
CAR (-5, +5) 69 0.0146 1.572  96 0.0055 0.518 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
2.7 Discussion  
Accompanying the rapid development of the Chinese economy since the open door 
policy and economic reforms over past decades, Chinese firms are playing an 
increasingly important role in cross-border M&A activities (Li, Li, & Wang, 2016; 
Zheng, et al., 2016). However, we have limited understanding of the performance 
implications of such activities. This chapter examines the stock market reaction to 
cross-border M&As by Chinese firms based on signalling theory and the institution-
based view. The results indicate that cross-border M&As by Chinese firms are 
interpreted by the stock market as strong signals released by Chinese acquirers which 
result in a significant, positive stock market reaction. This implies that M&A activities 
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by Chinese firms symbolise these firms’ global ambitions and financial status, and are 
perceived as a spring board to acquiring strategic resources and capabilities abroad in 
order to seize opportunities and enhance competitive advantage in the global market. 
Thus, the announcement of cross-border M&As is perceived positively and has resulted 
in an increase in stock prices through a positive stock market reaction.  
The findings are consistent with the majority of previous studies (Bhagat, Malhotra, & 
Zhu, 2011; Boateng, Wang, & Yang, 2008; Wang & Boateng, 2007; Zhou, et al., 2015) 
on cross-border M&As by EE firms, but are contrary to Aybar and Ficici’s study (2009) 
and Chen and Young’s study (2010). Aybar and Ficici (2009) used a sample from 13 
key emerging economies between 1991 and 2004, without including China. However, 
unlike other emerging economies (e.g. India, Russia, and Malaysia), Chinese firms’ 
cross-border M&As have unique characteristics due to the unique institutional 
environment and may trigger different market reactions. This may be the main reason 
why our findings differ from those of Aybar and Ficici (2009). Chen and Young (2010) 
studied 39 deals by 32 Chinese firms from 2000 to 2008 and showed that the 
announcement of cross-border M&As resulted in negative average CARs for Chinese 
acquirers. Their results are based on a relatively small sample which also includes 
foreign-invested companies within mainland China as acquired/target firms. Their 
sample period from 2000 to 2008 represented an early stage of cross-border M&As by 
Chinese firms. These factors together may largely influence the empirical results and 
yield a different conclusion. The findings drawn from a sample period up to 2012 may 
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reflect the increasing importance of cross-border M&As in the short-term market 
performance of Chinese listed firms due to the strong market reactions.  
The findings show that there are asymmetric market reactions to cross-border M&As 
by Chinese firms in mainland Chinese stock markets and the Hong Kong stock market. 
Different market reactions in these stock markets reflect the institutional arrangements 
of ‘one country, two systems’ across China. The mainland Chinese stock markets 
behave differently from the one in Hong Kong. The former exhibits good-news-chasing 
behaviour which generates more significant reactions to the same M&A events than 
those in the Hong Kong stock market. This suggests that the ‘one country, two markets’ 
scenario results in different magnitudes of market perceptions. Investors in mainland 
China suffer from significant information asymmetries and limited investment options 
due to the underdeveloped capital market and thus they are more likely to overestimate 
the positive impact of cross-border M&A deals compared with those in the Hong Kong 
stock market. This finding demonstrates that the impact of cross-border M&As is 
affected by financial institutional arrangements. 
Furthermore, the author has evaluated the market performance implications of M&As 
in terms of the target firms’ countries of origin, with different levels of political risk, 
and the ownership status of the acquiring firms (SOEs vs private firms) from the 
institutional perspective. Chinese cross-border M&As benefit from well-established 
institutions and a stable investment environment in target countries with a low level of 
political risk. These target countries may enable Chinese acquirers to access a high 
quality of strategic resources, technological knowledge and market knowledge which 
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are not available in the domestic market or in other emerging economies. Thus, the 
shareholders of acquiring firms that purchase a target firm from an institutionally 
developed country with a low level of political risk can gain higher returns than those 
shareholders of acquiring firms who invest in countries with a high level of political 
risk. Chinese firms use cross-border M&As to signal their quality, especially when 
targeting firms are from institutionally well-developed countries with a low level of 
political risk. This shows that cross-border M&As enable Chinese firms to span national 
boundaries to gain strategic assets and credibly enhance their global reputation (Siegel, 
2009), thus generating positive market reactions. The findings are consistent with real-
life events. For example, the announcement of ICBC’s acquisition of Halim Bank 
Indonesia only resulted in a 0.54% increase in its share price in 2006. However, the 
announcement of ICBC’s acquisition of BEA Canada resulted in a 4.15% increase in 
share price in 2011.  
The results suggest that cross-border M&As have different performance implications 
for acquiring firms with different ownership status. More specifically, the shareholders 
of Chinese SOE acquirers experience lower CARs than those of Chinese private 
acquirers. The possible reason is that SOE acquirers face stronger institutional 
restrictions than private acquirers which may give a negative signal to investors, and 
this in turn is reflected in stock prices. The empirical results also reveal the hidden 
relationship between ownership status and the market performance of cross-border 
M&As. The shareholders of Chinese SOE acquirers earn a lower level of abnormal 
returns than those of private acquirers. This finding implies that SOEs, as both 
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economic and political actors, may carry the baggage embedded in the institutional 
environment of their home country, and investors may be sceptical about the political 
motivations of cross-border M&As by SOE acquirers, thus resulting in lower 
shareholder value.  
2.8 Summary 
Adopting signalling theory and the institution-based view, this study examines how 
stock markets react to the announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese listed firms 
and whether institutional characteristics associated with cross-border M&As generate 
different market reactions and result in different short-term market performance. An 
event study analysis based on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2012 finds 
that the stock market, on average, responded positively and significantly to cross-border 
M&A announcements. The magnitude of such a market reaction to cross-border M&A 
events is greater in the mainland Chinese stock markets than that of the Hong Kong 
stock market. This may indicate that the mainland China stock markets are 
underdeveloped and tend to overreact to cross-border M&A announcements due to 
‘good-news-chasing’ behaviour and irrational trading. The author has further 
investigated the extent to which the political risk inherent in the target firms’ country 
of origin and the ownership status of acquiring firms affect stock market reactions. The 
findings show that the level of political risk and SOE ownership are negatively 
associated with the short-term market performance of Chinese acquiring firms. Taken 
together, the study helps provide new insights into the relationship between the short-
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term market performance and the institutional characteristics associated with cross-
border M&As by Chinese firms.  
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3. Long-term Implications of Cross-border M&As on 
Operating Performance 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the investigation of the long-term implications for the operating 
performance of Chinese firms is undertaken to address the second research question of 
the thesis – “What is the long-term impact of cross-border M&As on operating 
performance by Chinese acquiring firms?” 
Cross-border M&As are increasingly adopted as an important corporate strategy that 
helps firms in their external growth and improves their competitive advantage (Aybar 
& Ficici, 2009; Boateng, Wang, & Yang, 2008; Danbolt & Maciver, 2012; Deng, 2010; 
2010; Eije & Wiegerinck, 2010; Gregory & McCorriston, 2005; Rui & Yip, 2008). 
While most of the existing research on the performance implications of cross-border 
M&As focuses on short-term stock market performance immediately surrounding the 
announcement dates (Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009; Goergen & 
Renneboog, 2004; Gubbi, et al., 2010; Ning, et al., 2014), limited studies have 
addressed the post-acquisition operating performance of acquiring firms in the long run 
(Dutta & Jog, 2009; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Empirical evidence on these 
studies on long-term operating performance is mixed and inconclusive. While a few 
studies have reported the significant impact of cross-border M&As on the post-
acquisition operating performance of the acquiring firms (Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 
1992; Kruse, et al., 2007; Powell & Stark, 2005), others have found non-significant or 
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negative operating performance (Dickerson, Gibson, & Euclid, 1997; Dutta & Jog, 
2009; Ghosh, 2001; Martynova, Oosting, & Renneboog, 2007; Yeh & Hoshino, 2002).  
Much existing research on the implications for an acquiring firm’s post-acquisition 
operating performance has focused on M&As undertaken by firms from developed 
economies (Ghosh, 2001; Kruse, et al., 2007; Martynova, Oosting, & Renneboog, 2007; 
Pazarskis, et al., 2006; Sharma & Ho, 2002). With the increased importance of 
emerging economies in the global market, there is an increasing number of studies 
published recently looking at M&As undertaken by firms from emerging economies 
including India (Kumar & Bansal, 2008; Mantravadi & Reddy, 2008), Russia (Bertrand 
& Betschinger, 2012) and Malaysia (Rahman & Limmack, 2004). However, in contrast 
to developed countries or other emerging economies, Chinese firms’ cross-border 
M&As have unique characteristics due to their unique institutional environments, 
language spoken and economic structure. The existing studies addressing the post-
acquisition operating performance of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms are few, 
and the results are inconsistent. Wang (2006) found negative operating performance 
while Bhabra and Huang (2013) found that there is no change in the operating 
performance from the pre to the post acquisition period for acquirers. The limited 
research with inconsistent findings suggests the need for further research on the long-
term post-acquisition operating performance of cross-border M&As by Chinese 
acquirers. 
In addition, the existing studies (Bhabra & Huang, 2013; Wang, 2006) have empirically 
evaluated the overall operating performance of cross-border M&As without 
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investigating the moderating role of both formal and informal institutions. In order to 
remedy these research gaps, the author examines the following research questions: To 
what extent does an acquirers’ experience and a targets’ industrial relatedness influence 
the long-term post-acquisition operating performance of Chinese acquiring firms? To 
what extent do formal institutions (i.e. a host country’s institutional quality) and 
informal institutions (i.e. sharing the same language) moderate the impact of experience 
and industrial relatedness on post-acquisition firm performance? 
To address the research questions, the author builds this study on organisational 
learning and the institution-based view and proposes that the long-term post-acquisition 
operating performance of Chinese acquiring firms is influenced by a variety of internal 
and external factors at the firm, industry and country levels. Cross-border M&As 
facilitate the organisational learning process that is critical to gain competitive 
advantage for emerging Chinese MNEs, which could significantly impact their 
operating performance. In cross-border M&As, Chinese acquirers could not only learn 
from their own prior acquisition experience both in success and failure which will make 
their future cross-border M&A more successful, but also acquire a broader range of 
knowledge from peer target firms, especially within the same industry. While 
organisational learning is used to investigate the firm- and industry-level factors, the 
institution-based view is used to examine the country-level factors that can also 
influence the operating performance of cross-border M&As. More specifically, the 
author aims to reveal the extent of the impact of a host country’s institutional quality 
on the organisational learning of tacit knowledge in cross-border M&As as well as the 
61 
 
impact of language barriers that could impede the communication and information 
exchange during the learning process. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in section 3.2 reviews the long-term 
operating performance of cross-border M&As; section 3.3 introduces the theoretical 
foundations: organisational learning and institution-based view, followed by the 
hypotheses. The sample and methodology used in this study are described in Section 
3.5. Section 3.6 discusses the empirical results. The findings are discussed in Section 
3.7. Section 3.8 concludes the study. 
3.2 Literature Review  
Existing research on the long-term implications of cross-border M&As for operating 
performance can be classified into two broad categories – the operating performance of 
acquiring firms from developed countries and the operating performance of acquiring 
firms from developing countries. Panel A in Table 3.1 summaries the literature on the 
operating performance of firms involved in mergers and acquisitions from developed 
countries, which yields different results depending on the sample and methodology 
used (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). The greater number of studies investigating the 
operating performance of cross-border M&As are by US firms, which employ more 
complex techniques to measure changes in the post-acquisition performance and lead 
to mixed results. For example, Healy et al. (1992) examine the performance of the 50 
largest acquisitions between 1979 and 1984 and find that cash flow performance 
improves following acquisitions. This is supported by more recent studies of Andrade 
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et al. (2001), Linn and Switzer (2001) and Heron and Lie (2002), which indicate 
improved operating performance. However, Ghosh (2001) argues that no evidence of 
improved operating performance improvement is found after acquisitions. Similarly, 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2004) select a sample of 4430 acquisitions between 1985 
and 1996 and report no significant change in operating performance. In contrast, some 
studies document a significant decline in post-acquisition operating performance (Clark 
& Ofek, 1994; Hogarty, 1970). 
The studies on the performance of cross-border M&As involving UK firms have drawn 
contradictory findings too. Some studies based on UK firms’ acquisitions report a 
significant improvement in operating performance (Chatterjee & Meeks, 1996; Conn, 
et al., 2005; Manson, et al., 2000). Powell and Stark (2005) show that takeovers 
completed in UK firms over the period 1985 to 1993 lead to significant improvements 
in operating performance. In contrast, Dickerson et al (1997) find a significant decline 
in the post-acquisition performance. The findings of Meeks (1997) appear consistent 
with Dickerson et al. (1997) that there is a decrease in post-acquisition performance. 
Similar to the studies of the US and UK firms discussed above, the studies investigating 
other developed countries also yield contradictory results. Evidence suggests that 
Japanese M&As result in a decrease in post-acquisition operating performance of the 
merged firm (Kruse, et al., 2002; Yeh & Hoshino, 2002). However, Sharma and Ho 
(2002) argue that Australian M&As result in insignificant changes in the profitability 
of bidding and target firms after the takeover. Dutta and Jog (2009) do not find evidence 
of any systematic long-term deterioration in operating performance of Canadian 
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acquirers. For Continental European countries, Martynova et al. (2007) examine 155 
European M&As completed during 1997-2001 and find that the profitability of the 
combined firm decreased significantly following the takeover. Likewise, Gugler et al. 
(2003) find a significant decline in post-acquisition sales of combined firms.   
The literature on emerging markets (Panel B in Table 3.1) is scarce despite the fast 
growth of cross-border M&As from these countries. In line with developed-market 
studies, the findings from this stream of research are also inconsistent. For example, 
Kumar and Bansal (2008) conducted a study to analyse the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions on the operating performance of companies from emerging markets and 
show a significant improvement in the post-acquisition performance of acquirers. 
Rahman and Kimmack (2004) investigate the post-acquisition operating performance 
of acquiring firms based on a sample of 94 listed and 113 private Malaysian companies 
during 1988-1992. Their findings reveal that there is a significant improvement in the 
post-acquisition operating performance of acquirers. On the contrary, the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions on operating performance has been investigated by Mishra 
and Chandra (2010) during the period from 2000-2006 considering acquisitions in the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry. They conclude that mergers and acquisitions fail to 
improve the firm’s performance following mergers. Mantravadi and Reddy (2008) 
investigate a sample of 118 cases of mergers and acquisitions to study the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions on the operating performance of acquirers during a period 
from 1999-2003. The results show that acquisitions are usually associated with a 
negative change in long-term operating performance. 
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There are two notable reasons underlying the inconsistent findings from this stream of 
work. First, these studies on long-term operating performance are based on different 
national contexts. Most of these studies based on US data conclude that the acquiring 
firm’s experience has a significantly negative effect on operating performance for 
cross-border M&As (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Heron & Lie, 2002; Moeller 
& Schlingemann, 2004). Second, extant studies have exclusively examined the direct 
impact of various factors (i.e., payment methods, target size, or leverage) on post-
acquisition performance without considering the external environment. It means that 
existing studies lack research on investigating the relationship between various factors 
and operating performance by taking institutional contexts into account.  
The limited existing research with its inconsistent findings indicates the importance of 
this study on the post-acquisition operating performance of cross-border M&As. This 
research will focus on what factors determine the long-term operating performance of 
cross-border M&As by Chinese firms by considering both institutional and industry 
contexts in which both Chinese acquirers and target firms operate. More specifically, 
This chapter will address the research gap by examining under which conditions cross-
border M&A deals improve or hurt the performance of Chinese acquiring firms. In 
addition to the short-term impact on stock market performance which has been 
evaluated in the previous chapter, the long-term impact of cross-border M&As on firms’ 
post-acquisition operating performance will be evaluated in this chapter. 
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Table 3.1 Overview of the empirical studies on post-acquisition operating performance 
Market Author(s), 
(year) 
Sample 
period  
Sample 
size 
Performance 
measure 
Change (C) 
or Intercept 
(I) model 
Determinants Findings 
Panel A: Developed countries 
US Healy et al., 
(1992) 
1979-1984 50 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
C + I Method of 
payment; industry 
relatedness; target 
size 
1. Merged firms have significant 
improvements in operating performance 
after the merger; 
2. The degree of industry overlapping 
has no impact on post-merger 
performance improvement; 
3. The method of financing the 
acquisition deal has no impact on post-
merger operating performance 
US Ghosh, (2001) 1981-1995 135 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
C + I Method of 
payment 
1. There is no evidence that merging 
firms are able to increase operating 
performance following acquisitions; 
2. Cash method is better than stock 
method. 
US Linn and 
Switzer, (2001) 
1967-1987 413 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
C Deal atmosphere: 
tender or 
negotiated merger; 
target size; 
1. Improvements in post-merger 
operating performance is greater when 
deals were paid in cash rather than in 
stocks; 
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industry 
relatedness; 
leverage 
2. The dummy variables are not 
significant in post-merger performance, 
but cash deal is more positive; 
3. Relative large targets outperform their 
small targets 
US Heron and Lie, 
(2002)  
1985-1997 859 Operating 
income 
C + I Method of 
payment; 
experience; 
industry 
relatedness  
1. There is no evidence on the 
improvements in post-merger operating 
performance such factors as: industry 
relatedness and experience; 
2. There is no evidence that the method 
of payment conveys information about 
the acquirer’s future operating 
performance 
US Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 
(2004)  
1985-1995 2362 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
I Global 
diversification; the 
freedom of a 
country’s 
economic and 
institutional 
environment 
1. US acquirers experience significantly 
lower operating performance for cross-
border than for domestic transactions; 
2. Bidder returns are negatively related to 
the target country’s degree of economic 
restrictiveness 
UK Dickerson et 
al. (1997) 
1848-1977 1443 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
Other Target size; 
leverage 
Acquisitions have a decreasing impact on 
company performance, and company 
growth through acquisitions yields a 
lower rate of return than growth through 
internal investment 
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UK Powell and 
Stark, (2005) 
1985-1993 191 Pre-tax cash 
flow adjusted 
for changes 
in working 
capital  
C + I Industrial 
relatedness; the 
removal of the 
target CEO; 
method of 
payment 
1. Takeovers completed in the UK result 
in modest improvements in operating 
performance; 
2. Industry relatedness and the removal 
of the target CEO have an impact on 
post-takeover performance; 
3. Method of payment has no significant 
impact on performance 
UK Carline et al., 
(2007) 
1995-1994 81 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
C + I Corporate 
governance  
The corporate governance characteristic 
of acquiring firms (board ownership, 
board size, and block-holder control) 
have an significant impact on operating 
performance changes following mergers 
Japan Yeh and 
Hoshino, 
(2002) 
1970-1974 86 ROA, ROE, 
Sales 
growth, 
Employment 
growth 
Other N/A Japanese mergers failed to improve the 
firm efficiency, and even caused 
deterioration in the firms’ operating 
performance  
Japan Kruse et al., 
(2002) 
1962-1992 46 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
C + I Industry 
relatedness; 
affiliation; relative 
size of the bidder 
and target 
1. Long-term operating performance 
following the mergers is positive but 
insignificant; 
2. Affiliation and relative size have no 
impact on post-merger operating 
performance 
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Canada Dutta and Jog, 
(2009)  
1993-2002 1300 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
I Mode of 
acquisition; target 
type; related or 
unrelated target; 
payment type; 
growth or value 
acquirer; board 
independence, 
level of 
managerial 
ownership; and 
relative size of the 
deals  
There is no significant change in pre- and 
post- acquisition operating performance 
of Canadian acquiring firms 
Australia Sharma and 
Ho, (2002) 
1986-1991 36 Pre-tax cash 
flow adjusted 
for changes 
in working 
capital 
C + I Method of 
payment; industry 
segment; size of 
the acquisition 
1. Mergers and acquisitions do not 
improve post-merger operating 
performance of the acquiring firms; 
2. Both method of payment and relative 
size have no impact on post-merger 
operating performance 
Australia Humphery-
Jenner and 
Power, (2011) 
1993-2007 1900 Operating 
income 
C Method of 
payment; deal 
1. Australian acquirers significant 
improvement in post-acquisition 
operating performance;  
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atmosphere; target 
size 
2. Deal atmosphere and method pf 
payment have positive effect on 
performance but insignificant; 
3. Large acquisition: most profitability 
than small one, as a consequence larger 
acquirers are less under influence of 
overpayment 
Europe Martynova et 
al., (2007) 
1997-2001 155 Pre-tax cash 
flow adjusted 
for changes 
in working 
capital  
C + I Method of 
payment; deal 
atmosphere; the 
acquirer's leverage 
and cash reserves; 
industry 
relatedness; 
relative size of the 
target; domestic vs 
cross-border deals 
1. There is no significant change in 
operating firms involved in different 
takeover characteristics (such as method 
of payment, geographical scope, and 
industry-relatedness); 
2. The performance deteriorates 
following hostile bids and friendly 
takeovers; 
3. The acquirer’s leverage had no impact 
on the post-merger performance of the 
combined firms, whereas the acquirer’ s 
cash holdings are negatively related to 
performance 
Greece Pazarskis et al., 
(2006) 
1998-2000 50 Profitability, 
Liquidity and 
Solvency 
ratios 
C Type of merger, 
method of 
evaluation and 
method of 
payment 
The operating performance of a firm 
involved an M&A decreases 
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Greece Papadakis and 
Thanos, (2010) 
1997-2001 155 ROA C N/A There is no significant change in 
operating performance of firms involved 
in M&As 
Panel B: Emerging countries 
Malaysia Rahman and 
Limmack, 
(2004)  
1988-1992 113 Pre-tax cash 
flow adjusted 
for changes 
in working 
capital  
C + I N/A Acquisitions improve operating cash 
flow performance of combined firms in 
Malaysian acquisitions 
India Pawaskar, 
(2001) 
1992-1995 36 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
Other Leverage, tax 
savings, liquidity 
There is no significant effect on 
operating performance of the firms 
involved in mergers  
India Kumar and 
Bansal, (2008) 
2003 74 Working 
capital, 
operating 
profit, profit 
before tax, 
ROE, EPS, 
debt to 
equity ratios 
Other N/A The acquiring firms generate synergy in 
the long run in the form of higher cash 
flow, more business, diversification, cost 
cuttings etc.  
India Mantravadi 
and Reddy, 
(2008)  
1991-2003 118 6 different 
financial and 
operating 
ratios 
C Industry type 1. Mergers have a slightly positive 
impact on operating performance of 
firms in the banking and finance 
industry; 
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2. Mergers have a marginal negative 
impact on operating performance of 
firms in pharmaceuticals, textiles and 
electrical equipment sectors 
Russia Bertrand and 
Betschinger, 
(2012)  
1999-2008 609 Pre-tax cash 
flow 
Other Size of the firm, 
solvency ratio; 
industry 
relatedness; state 
ownership; 
domestic vs cross-
border deals 
1. International acquisitions tend to 
reduce the performance of acquirers 
compared to non-acquiring firms; 
2. Russian acquirers suffer from the 
inability to leverage value due to low 
experience and capability when making 
international acquisitions 
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3.3 Theoretical Background   
In this chapter, the organisational learning and institution-based view are adopted to 
analyse the effect of cross-border M&As on the post-acquisition performance of 
Chinese acquiring firms. Levitt and March (1988) defined organisational learning as 
organisations ‘encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behaviour’. 
Recently, researchers have discussed four basic constructs related to organisational 
learning: knowledge acquisition, information dissemination, information interpretation, 
and organisational memory (Clercq, et al., 2012; Gao, et al., 2008; Huber, 1991; Hult 
& Ferrell, 1997; Liu, et al., 2016; Santos-Vijande, López-Sánchez, & Trespalacios, 
2012; Slater & Narver, 1995). Organisational learning examines the manner in which 
organisations acquire, understand and use knowledge. It addresses the value of both 
exploration of new knowledge (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Szulanski, 1996; Tsai, 2001; Zahra & George, 2002) and 
exploitation of existing knowledge (Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1993; 
1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Zander & Kogut, 
1995). Consequently, learning ability can be a major source to achieve a firm’s 
competitive advantage.  
Learning through exploration requires the capability to absorb new knowledge from the 
environment. An organisation will be better able to recognize, understand and utilise 
new knowledge in an area where it has a knowledge base and experience, than in the 
area in which it lacks experience. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) have labelled this 
learning capability as ‘absorptive capacity’, and defined it as a firm’s ability to 
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recognise the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it for commercial 
purposes. Under the concept of absorptive capability, researchers have emphasized that 
prior related experience enhances the development of the path-dependent capabilities 
of acquisition of external knowledge (Szulanski, 1996; Zahra & George, 2002). The 
knowledge that a firm has acquired in the past, its past investments and routines 
repertoire develop the absorptive capacity of the firm (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). On the other hand, learning through exploitation entails 
finding new applications by combining and recombining existing knowledge. Since 
knowledge resides in the individual or subgroups of organisations, it requires sharing 
knowledge through international strategic actions (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Kogut and 
Aander (1992) refer to ‘combinative capabilities’ as the ability to find new applications 
for existing knowledge, which arise from a firm’s ability to develop a social community 
that fosters organisational learning.  
The organisational learning has been recognised as an important factor for a company 
to stay competitive in the highly-complex international business environment. Previous 
research suggests ‘the transfer of an organization’s experience from one event to a 
subsequent one’ plays a crucial role in determining success and failure of a strategic 
action (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Research in organisational learning implies that 
the accumulated experience of success and failure gained from the previous strategic 
action will positively affect the performance of subsequent strategic actions (Amburgey 
& Miner, 1992; March, 1981). In the context of cross-border acquisitions, the 
absorptive capacity of an acquiring firm is largely influenced by the acquirer’s prior 
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related experience in making acquisitions (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), which will be 
crucial for firms to enhance the performance of post acquisitions (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Zollo & Singh, 2004). The acquisition experience 
will lead to the development of routines associated with making acquisitions, such as 
templates for selecting and evaluating targets and/or guidelines for post-acquisition 
resource and technical integration, which offers the potential to improve performance 
of M&As (Lubatkin, 1983). The Chinese serial acquirers can benefit from 
organisational knowledge, which is derived from experimental learning from previous 
cross-border M&A activities. Thus, the organisational learning perspective helps 
underpin the importance of the accumulated experience of a firm involved in cross-
border M&As for post-acquisition performance (Collins, et al., 2009; Haleblian, Kim, 
& Rajagopalan, 2006). 
While organisational learning capability can help highlight the importance of internal 
factors at the firm- and industry-level, it is inadequate to take account of country-level 
factors, which can also affect the post-integration processes, especially the institutional 
processes involved in cross-border M&As. Moreover, organisational experience 
interacts with the environmental context to create knowledge (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 
2011). Institutional environment is a key environmental context the organisational 
experience interacts with, which is important to create knowledge to build competitive 
advantage and generate desirable performance. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate 
organisational learning and the institution-based view as the theoretical framework.  
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The institution-based view is regarded as a pivotal theoretical lens in international 
business (Buckley, et al., 2007; North, 1990; Peng, 2002; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; 
Wan & Hoskisson, 2003; Wright, et al., 2005). Broadly speaking, institutions can be 
defined as the rules of the game in a society (North, 1990; Williamson, 1998). 
According to North (1991), they are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction. In the early study of institutions, Coase (1937) 
and Williamson (1998; 1994) considered formal and informal institutions as 
‘background conditions’ and focused on the determinants of choosing between different 
governance structures (e.g. markets vs. firms) to reduce transaction costs. By contrast, 
North (1990) mainly focuses on formal and informal institutions as direct determinants 
of transaction costs in an economy. Both formal and informal institutions are the focus 
in this paper. As such we explore under which conditions the firms involved in cross-
border M&As can obtain competitive advantage and generate desirable performance.  
Formal institutions refer to explicit rules in a society such as regulations, laws, property 
rights protection or the discipline of economic and political markets and contracts 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Meyer, et al., 2009). For example, the institutional quality 
of the host country are used as a proxy for formal institution and influence target firms’ 
and/or acquiring firms’ behaviour accordingly (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). Informal 
institutions can be understood as those constraints that people in a society impose upon 
themselves to give a structure to their relations with others (North, 1990). These rules 
are transmitted from one generation to another by teaching and imitation (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1995). Language is a key informal institution (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
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Differences in language significantly increase the difficulties in successfully integrating 
two previously separate organisations and facilitating communication (Lane, Greenberg, 
& Berdrow, 2004). In the context of cross-border M&As, the difference between 
languages makes it hard to have a common scheme within which to understand the 
difference in corporate culture (Hofstede, 1991). Berger et al. (2001) argue that 
‘efficiency’ barriers such as language difference impede cross-border activity and offset 
some of the gains of cross-border consolidation, which in turn affect the performance 
of cross-border M&As.  
3.4 Hypotheses Development 
From what has been discussed above, we can see that the acquirers’ experience 
contributes to the firms’ learning capability regarding knowledge absorption to identify 
and understand essential knowledge in the organisational learning process, while 
industry relatedness influence the learning capability regarding knowledge combination 
to ramp up and integrate newly learned knowledge with existing knowledge to generate 
competitive advantages. Moreover, the host country’s institutional quality reflects the 
quality of knowledge to be learned in the organisational learning process, while a 
language difference represents a key barrier for effective communication in the 
organisational learning process. Four hypotheses are developed which will be 
introduced in detail in this section.  
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3.4.1 Serial vs. First-time Acquisitions  
The organisational learning theory provides a useful framework for understanding the 
effect of prior acquisition experience on post-acquisition performance. Existing 
research in organisational learning implies that the accumulated experience of a firm 
involved in cross-border M&As will have an impact on future acquisition behaviour 
and post-acquisition performance (Collins, et al., 2009; Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 
2006). But, the findings have been mixed about whether such an accumulated 
experience is sufficient to ensure superior acquisition performance of acquirers from 
certain countries (Hayward, 2002; Muehlfeld, Sahib, & Witteloostuijn, 2012; Zollo & 
Reuer, 2003; Zollo & Singh, 2004), because strategic assets often are tacit, specific and 
complex (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Firms need to develop the knowledge and 
routines to overcome challenges in order to be successful in cross-border M&As (Zollo 
& Singh, 2004).  
In contrast to their peers in Western countries, many Chinese firms conducting cross-
border M&As are “first-time buyers” who have not been involved in any cross-border 
M&As previously. It is important to differentiate between serial acquirers and first-time 
acquirers in order to investigate the influence of prior acquisition experience on post-
acquisition performance.  
First, serial acquirers with acquisition experience have better knowledge absorptive 
capacity about how to identify the value of new and external knowledge in a target firm, 
how to collaborate with foreign employees and partners, how to operate in a foreign 
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market, and so on (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006; Suh, You, & Kim, 2013; Zhu 
& Qian, 2015). The crucial prior knowledge obtained from cross-border M&As could 
generate competitive advantages over their competitors. The prior knowledge will 
facilitate the development of the acquiring firms’ managerial and coordination 
capabilities and will influence the performance of acquiring firms. The knowledge 
obtained through cross-border M&As could be even more important to Chinese 
acquirers who are from a unique institutional environment and political system which 
are different from the rest of the world. Many Chinese acquirers are state-owned 
enterprises from a highly protected market at home without any internationalisation 
experience. Serial cross-border M&As can provide the Chinese acquirers with an 
opportunity to track the globalisation path of MNEs and examine each step of the 
foreign expansion and its impact on firm performance. The prior knowledge learned 
through the past experience of cross-border M&As is crucial for future successful 
internationalisation (Filatotchev, et al., 2009) and will have a major effect on the 
business of the acquiring firms. Therefore, serial acquirers can avoid pre- and post-
acquisition mistakes and enhance the probability of success in an international market 
with different institutional settings.   
Second, serial acquirers with acquisition experience have better risk management 
ability in dealing with external environmental risks in foreign countries. Chinese 
acquirers, many of which are SOE acquirers, lack the knowledge and experience needed 
for handling environmental risks. In the domestic market, Chinese SOEs are facing 
minimal environmental risks, including political risks and industry risks, as they are 
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carefully protected by their major shareholder – the Chinese government. By involving 
the cross-border M&As, Chinese SOE acquirers will lose such parental care and 
protection in foreign markets and will be exposed to the high environmental risks which 
they probably did not encounter before. The knowledge and experience accumulated 
from past cross-border M&As could be more important for Chinese acquirers in such 
cases. Based on past acquisition experience, serial acquirers are more experienced at 
judging the efficacy of their action which enables them to better anticipate external 
threats pertaining to firms (Beamish, 1988). Furthermore, these firms’ ability could also 
be improved to perform as post-acquisition restructuring and integration tasks 
(Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Ingram & Baum, 1997) and develop feasible responses to 
implementation-related challenges. Therefore, more experience in the environmental 
risk management in foreign countries as well as post-acquisition restructuring and 
integration will result in the improved performance of Chinese acquirers. 
Taking the above arguments together, following the organisational learning literature, 
the author postulates that, through serial cross-border M&As, Chinese acquirers can 
learn from both successes and failures from the previous acquisitions which will make 
future M&As more successful. Chinese serial acquirers have both improved knowledge 
absorptive ability to identify and assimilate new knowledge from target firms and 
greater risk management ability in handling environmental risks in foreign markets, 
which in turn will generate better post-acquisition performance than other ‘first-time 
buyers’.  Hence, the author proposes: 
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               Hypothesis 1: Firms with serial cross-border M&As perform better than those 
with first-time cross-border M&As.  
3.4.2 Horizontal vs Non-horizontal Acquisitions 
Exposure to new external knowledge is just the first step towards generating 
competitive advantages, but it is not sufficient enough to ensure that a firm can integrate 
this knowledge successfully with existing knowledge. Firms need to develop learning 
capabilities regarding knowledge combination to ramp up and integrate acquired 
knowledge (Zollo & Singh, 2004). However, the industry relatedness may affect the 
learning process of knowledge integration and combination. It is important to 
differentiate between horizontal acquisitions and non-horizontal acquisitions in order 
to investigate the influence of industry relatedness on post-acquisition performance. 
There are a number of reasons why the industry relatedness matters.  
First, Chinese acquirers can more seamlessly integrate new obtained knowledge with 
their existing knowledge when engaging in horizontal acquisitions. An organisation 
will be better able to recognize, understand and integrate new knowledge in the industry 
in which it is familiar with, rather than in an industry in which it has little experience 
(Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000; Eesley & Robert, 2012). For Chinese acquirers, a broader 
range of technological knowledge, including R&D, proprietary know-how, patent-
protected technology and special tools and machinery, can be obtained with superior 
marketing knowledge and managerial knowledge to support value creation in Chinese 
acquiring firms. However, the heterogeneity of knowledge could be a barrier for 
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knowledge integration and post-acquisition synergy (Zollo & Singh, 2004). The 
complexity of the post-acquisition synergy process in non-horizontal acquisitions 
increases substantially in the way in which it articulates and assimilates the 
heterogeneous knowledge in the different domains and industries. The barrier might be 
more significant for Chinese acquirers from a closed domestic market with little 
internationalisation experience. The newly acquired knowledge and skills could more 
easily be assimilated and combined with their existing homogeneous knowledge 
through horizontal acquisitions with foreign companies from the same industry rather 
than non-horizontal acquisition with different business types. The integration and 
combination of homogeneous knowledge can also enable the Chinese acquirers to 
obtain cost reduction through the learning curve economy because Chinese acquirers 
alone may not have sufficient accumulated knowledge and experience to exploit 
learning curve economies (Ritter & Schooler, 2002). 
Secondly, horizontal acquisitions by Chinese firms facilitate acquisition of transferable 
knowledge and resources from overseas to cultivate their domestic market and thereby 
improve their post-acquisition performance. There is a huge difference in the objectives 
of cross-border M&As between Chinese MNEs and those from developed countries. 
Firms from developed countries are motivated to exploit their own knowledge in the 
host countries’ market, so that vertical acquisition could help market and distribute their 
products in the host countries. However, many firms from China are engaged to invest 
in the exploration of relevant knowledge to cultivate their domestic market, so called 
knowledge-seeking M&As (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2007; Li, Li, & Shapiro, 
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2012; Wang & Boateng, 2007). Sarala and Vaara (2010) suggested that the acquisition 
of relevant and transferable knowledge is an important objective for acquisitions and 
regarded acquisitions as vehicles to access tacit knowledge. The horizontal M&As 
facilitate the acquisition of transferable knowledge and resources that are not available 
in the domestic market, and thereby improve the Chinese acquirers’ capabilities to be 
competitive in their home market. An entrepreneurial phenomenon called ‘reverse 
internationalisation’ has been recently observed in which Chinese firms employ their 
knowledge-acquisition capability developed via internationalisation to compete 
domestically (Chin, Liu, & Yang, 2015; Gnizy & Shoham, 2014). This reverse 
internationalisation via reverse knowledge transfer (Mudambi, Piscitello, & Rabbiosi, 
2014; Rabbiosi, 2011) and reverse market expansion have been seen by many cross-
border M&A cases by Chinese firms. For example, following the Chinese acquisition 
of Volvo Corporation and the acquisition of MG Motor, both Volvo and MG reported 
record sales in 2015 which were mainly not in the western market of the host companies 
but in the acquirers’ domestic market - China. However, different industrial relatedness 
might result in a different learning outcome. The degree of homogeneity of knowledge 
between acquiring and target firms plays an important role in facilitating positive 
knowledge spillovers from the target firms to Chinese acquirers. The competitive 
advantage will not be generated if critical knowledge and resources (e.g. trademarks, 
patents and proprietary technology) acquired from a dissimilar industry are difficult to 
transfer and integrate with their own knowledge and resources, which will make it less 
useful in the process of reverse internationalisation.  
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Therefore, it is expected that horizontal acquisitions could be a better strategic choice 
for Chinese acquirers in order to realise the objective of cross-border M&As when 
compared to non-horizontal acquisitions of heterogeneous knowledge in different 
industries. The combined homogeneous knowledge will enable Chinese acquirers to 
use a target firm’s intangible assets through reverse international knowledge and gain 
competitive advantages in the domestic market which in turn improves the post-
acquisition performance of Chinese acquirers. The discussion above leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
               Hypothesis 2: Horizontal cross-border M&As have a more positive impact 
on firm performance than non-horizontal cross-border M&As. 
3.4.3 The Moderating Effect of Host Country Institutional Quality 
The existing research on post-acquisition synergy focuses on how to transfer knowledge 
from the acquiring firms to their acquired companies or subsidiaries overseas (Chang, 
Gong, & Peng, 2012; Fang, et al., 2010; Gonzalez & Chakraborty, 2014). The success 
of post M&A integration thus depends on MNEs’ ability to transfer their valuable 
knowledge to their acquired companies or subsidiaries overseas. However, many cross-
border M&As by Chinese MNEs are driven by a different, namely ‘reverse 
internationalisation’ strategy when compared to the internationalisation strategy of their 
western peers. The previous study (Wang & Boateng, 2007) showed that cross-border 
M&As by Chinese companies are motivated to invest in exploration of superior 
knowledge learned via internationalisation to cultivate their domestic market, which 
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includes superior marketing skills, product differentiation, patent-protected technology 
and superior managerial knowledge. Therefore, the importance of knowledge transfer 
from headquarters to acquired companies may not be as significant as expected, 
especially when the acquired companies are from countries with high institutional 
quality. Contrarily, reverse knowledge spillovers (Mudambi, Piscitello, & Rabbiosi, 
2014), reverse staff movement and reverse market expansion from an acquiree’s market 
to an acquirer’s market has been observed through the reverse internationalisation of 
Chinese firms (Chin, Liu, & Yang, 2015). Considering this special need of Chinese 
acquirers, when we are investigating the organisational learning in M&As by Chinese 
firms, we should not only consider the quantity of knowledge which can be obtained 
through the organisational learning process, but also the quality of knowledge, 
especially quality of tacit knowledge, available to be transferred from the host countries 
to China.     
First, Chinese firms are more likely to obtain high-quality knowledge from host 
countries with high institutional quality, given that countries with high institutional 
quality are developed countries (WGI, 2015). Cross-border M&As happen when the 
deficit in resource and capability cannot be bridged through internal development or 
acquisitions from the domestic market (Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 
2008). M&As are an important solution used by Chinese firms to exchange resources 
and capabilities that are otherwise not possible to obtain in the domestic market (Capron, 
Dussuage, & Mitchell, 1998; Lubatkin, et al., 2001; Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). For 
acquirers from China which is a country with relatively low institutional quality 
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(according to WGI, 2015), the required advanced and high-quality knowledge is more 
likely to be obtained from countries with high institutional quality, instead of the other 
similar countries with low institutional quality. Host countries with underdeveloped 
institutions offer limited opportunities for knowledge exploration (Petersen, Pedersen, 
& Lyles, 2008). Acquiring an existing company located in the country with high 
institutional quality is a quick way to gain access to new knowledge available in the 
country, including innovation, new technology and processes. These strategic assets are 
crucial for Chinese acquirers who lack advanced technology and international brands. 
Thus, serial Chinese acquirers will achieve a better post-acquisition performance when 
acquiring a target firm from a country with high institutional quality.  
Secondly, post-acquisition integration and synergy in the host countries with high 
institutional quality is an important organisational learning process for Chinese firms 
in assimilating the superior knowledge and ramping up the knowledge for their own 
needs. The acquirers participating in serial cross-border M&As in the host countries 
with high institutional quality will not only develop the ability to identify the value of 
new external knowledge in a target firm, collaborate with foreign employees and 
partners on how to operate in a foreign market, but also have more opportunities to 
assimilate and merge new knowledge acquired from the countries with high 
institutional quality during post-acquisition integration and synergy. The accumulative 
competitive advantages could be achieved through the serial cross-border M&As taking 
placed in the host countries with high institutional quality instead of those in the 
countries with low institutional quality. The learning curve effect will occur which 
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improves the post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquirers. Hence, the author 
proposes: 
                 Hypothesis 3a: The positive effect of serial cross-border M&As on the post-
acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms is stronger for serial cross-border 
M&As taking place in the host countries with high institutional quality. 
Institutional quality will not only moderate the relationships between serial acquisitions 
and post-acquisition performance, but also the relationship between horizontal 
acquisition and post-acquisition performance. While knowledge homogeneity resulting 
from industry similarity will facilitate knowledge transfer and integration in horizontal 
acquisitions, the knowledge transfer and integration process will also be affected when 
it is exposed to the potential external risks and uncertainty involved in the knowledge 
transfer. When host-country institutions are underdeveloped, the institutional 
environment tends to be risky (Wang, et al., 2013). Chinese firms operating there are 
subject to increasing external uncertainty and decreasing institutional credibility 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Akhter & Lusch, 1998; Delios & Beamish, 1999; 
Delios & Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2000) which will influence the process of 
organisational learning and homogeneous knowledge integration and in turn reduce the 
post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquirers.  
High institutional quality will help facilitate the acquisition of transferable knowledge 
and resources from overseas to cultivate their domestic market. The new knowledge 
obtained in horizontal acquisitions will be transferred from the target firms to Chinese 
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acquirers in a speedy fashion when the target firm is from a country with high 
institutional quality. An EMNE will rely more on internal resources and knowledge 
instead of inter-organisational resource exchanges when facing uncertainty stemming 
from the unstable external environment (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). Chinese acquirers, 
who lack international managerial expertise, international market knowledge and 
advanced proprietary technology, would be able to acquire these strategic resources 
through horizontal acquisitions in host countries with well-developed institutions. 
These strategic resources include higher-value front-end capabilities and advanced 
knowledge available in the market with high institutional quality. By seamlessly 
combining these relevant higher-value front-end resources with existing low-cost back-
end capabilities developed at home, Chinese acquirers can generate a unique, joint 
competitive advantage over their competitors in the domestic market (Deng, 2009; 
Nicholson & Salaber, 2013) through horizontal acquisitions in the host countries with 
high institutional quality, which will in turn boost the performance of Chinese acquirers. 
Hence, we propose: 
                 Hypothesis 3b: The positive effect of horizontal cross-border M&As on the 
post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms is stronger for horizontal 
cross-border M&As taking place in the host countries with high institutional quality. 
3.4.4 The Moderating Effect of Language 
As discussed above, organisational learning plays an important role in the creation of 
synergies in cross-border M&As by Chinese firms. Acquisitions are often justified by 
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accessing and creating new knowledge, because they provide a precious opportunity 
for organisational learning (Junni, 2005). Communication, visits, and meetings between 
the Chinese acquiring firms and overseas acquired firms facilitate effective knowledge 
acquisition for value creation. The study by Schweiger and DeNisi (1991) shows that 
effective communication can reduce negative short-term and long-term implications of 
M&As based on psychology and organisational behaviours. Moreover, rich 
communication is necessary to solve ambiguity. The existing research (Fai & Piekkari, 
2003; Henderson, 2005; Ranft, 1997) shows that effective communication is essential 
for successful knowledge acquisition and is necessary to solve inherent ambiguity 
occurring during the transfer of tacit knowledge. However, the language barrier restricts 
effective communication.  
Language is an important element of informal institutions. ‘Language is the basic social 
institution in the sense that all others presuppose language, but language does not 
presuppose the others’ (Searle, 1995). Language is associated with knowledge transfer 
which has long been recognised as a key source of competitive advantages in setting up 
business in a foreign market (Dunning, 1993). In cross-border M&As, language 
differences can create misunderstandings, confusion, and frustration in the process of 
communication that can hinder learning and the development of a social community 
that supports learning (Buckley, et al., 2005; Schoenberg, 2001; Tietze, 2008). The 
previous studies (Barner-Rasmussen & Björkman, 2005; Harzing, Köster, & Magner, 
2011) have found that language is an important barrier, slowing down the organisational 
learning and increasing the cost of decision making, and suggested that all MNEs 
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should find proper ways to deal with the language barriers when expanding into foreign 
markets which do not share the same language of their home markets. 
Having examined the language barrier in organisational learning and effective 
communication, the author goes on to explore the importance of common language in 
the specific context of China and the role of the Chinese language in the process of 
organisational learning between Chinese acquirers and target firms. The Chinese 
language is one of oldest living languages in the world. Belonging to two different 
language families, English and Chinese have many significant differences which makes 
learning Chinese a serious challenge for English native speakers, and vice versa. The 
Chinese language has been regarded as one of the most difficult languages for native 
English speakers. In the US, less than 1% of people can speak Chinese according to the 
American Community Survey 2009. Similarly in China, English speakers in China is 
only about 0.73%, one of the lowest in the world (Yang, 2006). However, common 
language is one of the key factors associated with the transfer of tacit knowledge (Joia 
& Lemos, 2010). If the cross-border M&As take place in one of the Chinese speaking 
regions (e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore or Marco), the common language will 
facilitate the organisational learning between Chinese acquirers and overseas target 
firms through serial M&As and significantly reduce the operating cost and delay of 
foreign language training and document translation. 
Serial acquirers can accumulate more knowledge and experience from each of the 
previous cross-border M&As when cross-border M&As take place in Chinese speaking 
regions/countries. Common language plays an important role in facilitating positive 
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organisational learning from past experiences. Effective communication in 
organisational learning will enable serial acquirers to better learn the pre- and post-
acquisition mistakes which will make their next cross-border M&As more successful, 
especially enhancing the probability of success in a market with the same informal 
institutional settings. Moreover, by removing the communication barrier, the post-
acquisition integration and synergies will not only happen between Chinese acquirer 
and target firms, but also among different target firms from serial M&As occurring in 
Chinese speaking regions/countries. Higher levels of integration among the Chinese 
acquirer and target firms are necessary in order to explore the value creation potential 
of serial cross-border M&As through cost saving or through revenue enhancing 
mechanisms (Anand & Singh, 1997; Capron, Dussuage, & Mitchell, 1998; Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987), and thereby improves the post-acquisition performance. Hence, 
the author hypothesises: 
                   Hypothesis 4a: The positive effect of serial cross-border M&As on the 
post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms is stronger for serial cross-
border M&As taking place in Chinese speaking regions/countries. 
Language has been identified as a key part of the firm’s comparative advantage in doing 
business in foreign markets (Dinning, 1993). Language difference increases uncertainty, 
which can result in lower trust and interaction avoidance, which in turn results in lower 
commitment to each other in the long run (Gudykunst, 1995). This would make the 
sharing of knowledge and information difficult between both sides (Buckley, et al., 
2005), even though the acquiring firm and the target firm are in the same industry. As 
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discussed in section 3.4.2, knowledge homogeneity will facilitate knowledge transfer 
and organisational learning in horizontal acquisitions. However, the successful 
knowledge transfer not only relies on the property of knowledge itself, but also the 
communication channel by which knowledge is transferred.  
First, knowledge transfer requires the use of language to enable articulation in order to 
promote the assimilation of acquired knowledge. Articulation is a process of 
interpreting transferred knowledge to make it understandable, which is an important 
step in the organisational learning process to understand, test and share the transferred 
knowledge (Hedlund & Nonaka, 1993). According to the study by Buckley (2005), the 
success of knowledge transfer depends on the level of language skills of employees in 
both parties and language differences between foreign employees and local staff have 
been a primary barrier in the assimilation of transferred knowledge. The integration and 
combination process of new knowledge occurred in horizontal acquisitions could be 
interrupted if the knowledge is encoded in different languages. However, if the 
horizontal M&As were taking place in the Chinese language speaking regions/countries, 
this primary barrier for knowledge transfer would be removed in horizontal acquisitions, 
which in turn promotes organisational learning between Chinese acquirers and target 
firms. 
Secondly, a common language can minimize the potential for miscommunication and 
provide easy access to company documents (e.g. technical, product manuals and 
financial reports). Due to limited foreign language skills of Chinese acquirers and 
limited Chinese language ability of foreign targets (in a non-Chinese language speaking 
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regions/countries), a significant amount of technical and managerial documents need to 
be translated which imposes significant cost and delay in the organisational learning 
process. Moreover, common language will improve individual communication and 
information exchanges through employees between acquiring and acquired firms in 
horizontal M&As who share the same interests and technical expertise. Bi-directional 
staff exchanges would be promoted by easily sharing their knowledge and experience 
with their overseas peers of the same occupation. As differences in language represent 
the biggest obstacle for knowledge exchange (Buckley, et al., 2005; Harzing, Köster, 
& Magner, 2011; Liu, et al., 2015; Piekkari, et al., 2005), a common language will 
facilitate knowledge exchange across all the levels of acquiring firms and target firms 
in the same industry. The knowledge exchange will not only occur at the senior 
management level, but also among all middle level and first line managers and 
employees with similar knowledge structure and expertise. 
In summary, from the individual perspective, a common language would remove the 
language barrier in communication between managers in acquiring firms and those in 
target firms for the sharing of individual managerial experience of the same industry in 
horizontal M&As. From the firm perspective, a common language would facilitate the 
post-acquisition knowledge transfer, resource re-deployment and sociocultural and 
managerial integration in horizontal M&As. This will improve post-acquisition 
synergies and enhance capability which in turn improves the post-acquisition 
performance. Hence, the author proposes: 
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                 Hypothesis 4b: The positive effect of horizontal cross-border M&As on the 
post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms is stronger for horizontal 
cross-border M&As taking place in Chinese language speaking regions/countries. 
Figure 4.1 summarises the conceptual framework adopted in this chapter. It shows that 
acquisition experience (e.g. serial acquisitions and first-time acquisitions) and industry 
relatedness (e.g. horizontal acquisitions and non-horizontal acquisitions) might affect 
the long-term operating performance of acquiring firms. However, because of the 
mechanisms discussed in the above, we expect that serial acquisitions and horizontal 
acquisitions have a positive and significant impact on the performance of acquiring 
firms (H1 and H2). In addition, different institutional environments have different 
moderating effects. As a proxy of formal institution, we propose that the positive 
moderating effect of a host country’s institutional quality is more pronounced when 
Chinese acquiring firms have prior acquisition experience (H3a) and invested in the 
same industry (H3b). As a proxy of informal institution, we also expect the moderating 
effect of language to be stronger when Chinese acquiring firms have prior acquisition 
experience (H4a) and invested in the same industry (H4b). 
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Figure 3.1 The Conceptual framework 
 
3.5 Data and Methodology 
3.5.1 Data 
Two different data sources are used to create the dataset for this study. The first is 
Thomson One Banker produced by Thomson Financial Corporation, which provides 
data on aggregate cross-border M&A activities. These data include information on the 
data of M&A announcement, the name of the primary stock exchange, primary ticker 
symbol, etc. The second data source is China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company. 
CSMAR is the comprehensive database for Chinese business research, which covers 
data on the Chinese stock markets, financial statements and China Corporation 
Governance of Chinese listed firms.  
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The data on cross-border M&As by Chinese firms from January 2000 to December 
2012 was obtained from the Thomson One Banker database. The data should meet the 
following criteria: (i) the M&A deals are listed as completed transactions; (ii) the 
sample is limited to firms with stock price data which is available on the Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Firm-level financial data is collected for acquiring firms for 
the 2000-2012 period from CSMAR. A Chinese firm should meet both of the following 
criteria in order to be included in the sample: (i) the firm should be a public firm listed 
in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange; and (ii) the firm has released 
comprehensive information on the explanation variables in their financial statements. 
The financial statements in the period of 2000-2012 of all Chinese listed firms have 
been retrieved from CSMAR. The final sample includes 121 cross-border M&A deals 
by 82 Chinese firms, which leads to 736 observations over the period of 2000-2012.  
3.5.2 Variable Measurement 
Dependent variable 
To capture the financial aspect of firm performance, an accounting profitability measure, 
return on asset (ROA), is used to measure performance, which is the most commonly 
used profitability measure in economics or management studies (Capar & Kotable, 
2003; Lu & Beamish, 2004). ROA is measured as the Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes (EBIT) divided by the amount of total assets of a firm. 
Independent variables 
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Serial vs. First-time acquisitions 
To capture foreign investment experience of cross-border M&As, two dummy variables 
are employed, namely serial cross-border M&As and first-time cross-border M&As. 
The author classified a Chinese acquirer as a serial acquirer if the acquiring firm has 
prior acquisition experience. The author codes 1 for companies with serial cross-border 
M&As and 0 for otherwise. A Chinese acquirer is regarded as a first-time acquirer if 
the acquiring firm does not have any prior acquisition experience. The author codes 1 
for companies with only one cross-border M&A and 0 for otherwise. 
Horizontal vs. Non-horizontal acquisitions 
Furthermore, to distinguish the industry relatedness between the acquiring firms and 
target firms, two other dummy variables are employed, namely horizontal cross-border 
M&As and non-horizontal cross-border M&As. The author classified the cross-border 
M&A deals as horizontal ones if the acquirer and the targeting firms occur in the same 
industry. The author codes 1 for horizontal M&As and 0 for otherwise. If the acquirer 
and the targeting firms do not occur in the same industry, the cross-border M&As are 
defined as non-horizontal M&As. The author codes 1 for non-horizontal M&As and 0 
for otherwise.  
Moderating variables 
Host country institutional quality  
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Based on previous studies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Slangen & Tulder, 2009), 
the author uses the worldwide governance indicators (WGI) developed by Kaufmann 
et al. (2010) to capture the host country’s institutional quality. These indicators 
emphasise, by construction, different aspects of governance: voice and accountability; 
political stability; absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; 
rule of law; and control of corruption. The WGI indictors cover 215 countries and 
territories for the period 1996 to 2013 and follow a normal distribution with a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one in each period, which indicates final scores lying 
between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher values representing advanced institutional 
environments in the country of origin of respective target firms (Dikova, 2009), which 
the author names as a target country. Therefore, for each target country in our sample, 
the author takes the mean across these indicators to obtain the final value. Values ≥ 0 
reflect higher levels of institutional quality, whereas those <0 indicate lower levels of 
institutional quality. The author takes the value of 1 for higher levels of institutional 
quality, 0 for otherwise. 
Language 
The target countries will be classified into two broad categories - M&As taking place 
in Chinese language speaking regions/countries and M&As taking place in other 
regions/countries to see how the culture and language differences will moderate the 
relationship between post-acquisition performance and independent variables. 
Therefore, if M&As took place in a Chinese language speaking region/country, the 
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corresponding transaction in the sample would receive a coding of 1. Otherwise the 
variable would receive a coding of 0. 
Control variables 
When examining the relationship between cross-border M&As and firm performance, 
it is necessary to control for other factors that may also influence performance. Given 
that state-owned enterprises enjoy preferential status in obtaining loans and other key 
inputs (Brandt & Li, 2003), the author controls for state ownership. State shareholding 
is calculated as the percentage of states owned by central government, local 
governments and government related agencies. The author also includes foreign 
shareholdings to control for the influence of foreign investors, which is measured as the 
percentage of equity shares owned by foreign investors. The author controls for firm 
size as a proxy of a firm’s resources and capabilities, which is measured by the natural 
logarithm of firm total assets. Larger firms can benefit from larger economies of scale 
and scope and also have more slack resources for internationalisation. The author also 
controls for firm age as a proxy of experience and resource, which is measured by the 
number of years since establishment. Debt-equity ratio is controlled for slack resources. 
3.5.3 Method  
In this study, a panel design is selected to show time-varying influences on performance. 
Panel data, also called longitudinal data or cross-section time-series data, is a dataset 
that follows a given sample of individuals over time, and thus provides multiple 
observations on each individual in the sample. Compared with traditional cross-
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sectional or time-series data, panel data can give researchers a large number of data 
points which allows it to increase the degree of freedom and reduce the collinearity 
among explanatory variables and hence improve the efficiency of econometric 
estimates (Hsiao, 2003).   
It should be considered that profitability measures (dependent variable) could be at least 
partially persistent over time (Mueller, 1990) and thus a lagged dependent variable 
should be included in the empirical analysis. Therefore, this study used the dynamic 
panel model to test the hypothesized impacts of the independent and moderating 
variables on post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms. The empirical 
model the author analyses is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑥𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐶𝑖𝑡 + η𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑡            (1) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a proxy of the post-acquisition performance of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
the lagged independent variable to account for dynamic effects in performance; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 
refers to a vector of independent variables proposed in the hypotheses; 𝐼𝑖𝑡 stands for a 
vector of moderating variables; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡 indicates a vector of moderating terms; and 𝐶𝑖𝑡 
represents a vector of control variables. η𝑖  is the firm specific effect. 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the 
idiosyncratic error term with E(𝜀𝑖𝑡)=0.  
In order to estimate Eqs. (1), the author employs a Generalised Method of Moment 
estimation (GMM) for the dynamic panel data model, which is a commonly used 
estimation procedure to estimate the parameters in a dynamic panel data model with 
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unobserved individual specific heterogeneity (Bertrand & Zuniga, 2006; Gugler & 
Yurtoglu, 2004; Hakkala, Heyman, & Sjoholm, 2010; Hansen, 1982; Harris & 
Robinson, 2002). In the case of OLS this would give rise to a dynamic panel bias, which 
does not account for the time-series dimension of data and the unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity. To account for unobserved heterogeneity in GMM estimations, 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) introduced a GMM estimator for first-differenced data, 
proposing twice-lagged differences or levels, while Arellano and Bond (1991) defined 
additional orthogonality conditions to increase the efficiency of the estimators. Arellano 
and Bond (1991)’s first-differenced GMM estimator eliminates the firm-specific effect 
and uses all possible lagged levels as instruments.  
However, Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that the first-differenced GMM 
estimators are likely to have sample bias when the time series are persistent and the 
number of time period is small. This is because lagged levels of the series provide only 
week instruments for the differenced equations. Another disadvantage of using the 
difference estimator is that the process of differencing to remove the firm specific effect 
also eliminates information on the cross-firm variation in levels. The system GMM 
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) was 
developed by adding the dependent variables in levels to the transformed dataset, 
differencing the instruments to make them exogenous to fixed effects. The standard 
errors are reported with the Windmeijer correction (Windmeijer, 2005) without which 
standard errors would be downward biased. Finally, the two standard tests are applied 
to evaluate the relevance of the GMM model. The first is the Arellano and Bond test, 
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which examine the hypothesis to which the error term is not serially correlated. Under 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, this test is distributed standard-normal. The 
second is the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity 
of the instruments. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of both tests gives support to the 
model specification.  
3.6 Empirical Results 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables used in this study are 
reported in Table 3.2, while the results of the empirical analysis are reported in Table 
3.3 and 3.4. In all these tables, the results of the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions provide no grounds to reject the validity of the instrument. And AR(2) tests 
show no evidence of second order serial correlation.  
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Table 3.2 Summary statistic and correlations 
 Mean  SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1    ROA 0.049 0.105 1.000            
2    Serial CBMAs 0.110 0.313 0.042 1.000           
3    First-time CMBAs 0.295 0.456 0.090 -0.222 1.000          
4    Horizontal CBMAs 0.126 0.332 0.068 0.238 0.340 1.000         
5    Non-horizontal CBMAs 0.308 0.462 0.085 0.455 0.560 -0.054 1.000        
6   Language  0.137 0.344 -0.030 0.287 0.314 0.408 0.370 1.000       
7    Institutional quality 0.346 0.476 -0.132 0.289 0.750 0.485 0.674 0.492 1.000      
8    State shareholdings  0.218 0.263 0.043 -0.082 -0.240 -0.123 -0.208 -0.168 -0.253 1.000     
9   Foreign shareholdings 0.021 0.073 0.050 -0.087 -0.009 -0.026 -0.064 0.036 -0.038 -0.053 1.000    
10  Firm age 10.024 4.727 0.070 0.204 0.274 0.171 0.325 0.214 0.368 -0.270 -0.224 1.000   
11  Firm size 9.651 0.834 -0.013 0.350 0.092 0.113 0.303 0.251 0.217 -0.012 -0.061 0.279 1.000  
12  Debt-equity ratio 1.332 3.680 0.096 0.086 -0.082 -0.011 -0.019 0.402 -0.006 0.008 -0.047 0.142 0.310 1.000 
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Table 3.3 presents the system GMM estimator results for the post-acquisition 
performance in each of different type of cross-border M&As. Model 1 presents the 
results for all control variables. Model 2, model 3 and model 4 show the results of the 
main effects depicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. Hypothesis 1 states that firms 
with serial cross-border M&As perform better than firms with first-time cross-border 
M&As. As shown in model 2 and model 4 in Table 3.3, serial cross-border M&As were 
positively associated with the post-acquisition performance (β=0.034 and 0.029, 
p<0.01). However, there is no significant relationship for first-time cross-border M&As 
in post-acquisition performance (β=0.002 and 0.011, p>0.10). These results provide 
support for Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2 posits that firms with horizontal cross-border M&As have a more positive 
impact on firm performance. Model 3 and model 4 in Table 3.3 indicate that the 
relationship between horizontal cross-border M&As and post-acquisition performance 
are positive but not significant (β=0.002 and 0.004, p>0.10). In contrast, non-horizontal 
cross-border M&As have a negative influence on post-acquisition performance (β=-
0.006, p>0.10). From the results, it can be seen that firms with horizontal cross-border 
M&As still perform better than those with non-horizontal cross-border M&As. But the 
relationship between horizontal acquisitions and operating performance is not 
significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
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Table 3.3 Results of system GMM estimation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ROAt-1 0.133
*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.088*** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) 
State shareholdings  0.010 0.078 0.039 0.039 
 (0.030) (0.008) (0.024) (0.014) 
Foreign shareholdings 0.075 0.823 0.073 0.052 
 (0.083) (0.289) (0.073) (0.042) 
Firm age 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Firm size -0.048*** -0.035*** -0.019 -0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) 
Debt-equity ratio 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.004*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
H1: Serial cross-border M&As  0.034
***  0.029
*** 
  (0.008)  (0.011) 
       First-time cross-border M&As  0.002  0.011 
  (0.009)  (0.008) 
H2: Horizontal cross-border M&As   0.002 0.004 
   (0.009) (0.004) 
      Non-horizontal cross-border M&As   -0.006 0.000 
   (0.011) (0.007) 
     
Constant 0.476*** 0.288*** 0.205* 0.341*** 
 (0.084) (0.066) (0.123) (0.069) 
     
Observations 736 736 736 736 
Number of firms 82 82 82 82 
Hansen testa 0.329 0.841 0.420 0.810 
AR(2)b 0.266 0.238 0.247 0.189 
Notes: The dependent variable is ROA. The results reported in this table have been 
obtained using dynamic system GMM estimators using the two-step estimation 
including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. Data is for 2000-
2012. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no 
second-order serial correlation. 
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Table 3.4 shows the interactions between the serial and horizontal cross-border M&As 
and the two different institutional environments. The direct impact of country-level 
factors (i.e., host country’s institutional quality and language) on the dependent variable 
has been tested in Model 1. The coefficient of host country’s institutional quality and 
language is negative and insignificant (β=-0.039 and -0.005, p>0.10), indicating that 
host country’s institutional quality and language do not have direct impact on the post-
acquisition operating performance of the acquiring firms.  
Model 2 and model 4 in Table 3.4 show that the interaction between serial acquisition 
and institutional quality (β=0.043 and 0.051, p<0.05) and the interaction between 
horizontal acquisitions and institutional quality (β=0.046 and 0.038, p<0.10) are all 
positive and significant. These results indicate that host country’s institutional quality 
positively moderated the relationship between serial cross-border M&As and post-
acquisition performance and the relationship between horizontal cross-border M&As 
and their operating performance. Hypothesis 3a and 3b are therefore supported.  
Also, as for the moderating effect of language, the results provide support for 
hypothesis 4a and 4b. Model 3 and model 4 in Table 3.4 show that there are statistically 
significant positive relationship between serial acquisitions and language (β=0.104 and 
0.113, p<0.01) and between horizontal acquisitions and language (β=0.088 and 0.064, 
p<0.05 and p<0.01). These results indicates that language positively moderates the 
relationship between serial cross-border M&As and post-acquisition performance and 
between horizontal cross-border M&As and post-acquisition performance. Therefore, 
hypothesis 4a and 4b are confirmed.  
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Table 3.4 Results of system GMM estimation: Moderating effects  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ROAt-1 0.110
*** 0.126*** 0.131*** 0.127*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) 
State shareholdings  0.010 -0.014 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) 
Foreign shareholdings 0.143 0.235 0.284 0.169 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.037) (0.040) 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm size -0.044*** -0.022*** -0.039*** -0.038*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Debt-equity ratio 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Serial CBMAs 0.023** 0.019* 0.014 0.039*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Horizontal CBMAs 0.002 0.039*** 0.021 0.037* 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.026) (0.009) 
Institutional quality -0.039 -0.034* -0.019 -0.035* 
 (0.026) (0.019) (0.031) (0.019) 
Language -0.005 -0.136*** -0.181*** -0.154*** 
 (0.036) (0.043) (0.037) (0.030) 
H3a: Institutional quality*Serial CBMAs  0.043
**  0.051
** 
  (0.021)  (0.023) 
H3b: Institutional quality*Horizontal 
CBMAs  0.046
*  0.038
* 
  (0.025)  (0.022) 
H4a: Language*Serial CBMAs   0.104
*** 0.113*** 
   (0.025) (0.024) 
H4b: Language*Horizontal CBMAs   0.088
** 0.064* 
   (0.039) (0.039) 
     
Constant 0.417*** 0.197*** 0.324*** 0.335*** 
 (0.055) (0.036) (0.068) (0.037) 
     
Observations 736 736 736 736 
Number of firms 82 82 82 82 
Hansen testa 0.569 0.766 0.682 0.909 
AR(2)b 0.331 0.299 0.325 0.316 
Notes: The dependent variable is ROA. The results reported in this table have been 
obtained using dynamic system GMM estimators using the two-step estimation 
including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. Data is for 2000-
2012. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order 
serial correlation. 
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3.7 Discussion 
With the increasing importance of EMNEs in international investment (Buckley, et al., 
2007; Deng, 2012 ; Wang, et al., 2012), this study examines whether cross-border 
M&As, initiated by emerging economies in different destinations, affect their operating 
performance. The results suggest that, at the firm-levels, cross-border M&As tend to 
increase the operating performance of Chinese acquiring firms when making serial 
acquisitions. The positive impact of serial acquisitions can be explained through the 
lens of the organisational learning theory. The prior knowledge learned through the past 
experience of cross-border M&As plays a crucial role in identifying the value of 
external knowledge in target firms and enhancing post-acquisition integration and 
synergy. Moreover, Chinese acquirers, especially for Chinese SOE acquirers, will lose 
the parental protection of their main shareholder, the Chinese government, and may 
have to face high environmental risks which they probably have never experienced 
before. The knowledge and experience obtained from previous cross-border M&As will 
be very important in dealing with external risks and threats which in turn results in the 
improved performance of Chinese acquirers. Therefore, firms with serial cross-border 
M&As perform better than those with first-time cross-border M&As. 
The author also explores the moderating effects of host country institutional quality. 
The findings indicate that the positive effects of serial cross-border M&As and 
horizontal cross-border M&As on the post-acquisition performance of Chinese 
acquiring firms are stronger for cross-border M&As taking place in host countries with 
high institutional quality. Acquiring a target company located in the countries with high 
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institutional quality represents a fast way to gain access to superior knowledge and 
resources which usually are not available in the closed domestic market. Therefore, the 
host-country institutional quality positively moderates the effect on the post-acquisition 
performance of Chinese acquiring firms. The positive effect of institutional quality is 
consistent with our study on overseas subsidiary performance in host countries (Liu, et 
al., 2016), while this study further illustrate the importance of high institutional quality 
in generating good performance in both host and home countries for acquiring firms. 
Furthermore, the author also examines the moderating effects of language. The author 
has found that the positive effects of serial cross-border M&As and horizontal cross-
border M&As on post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms are stronger 
for cross-border M&As taking place in Chinese speaking regions/countries. Compared 
to the other language, Chinese language has been regarded as one of the most difficult 
languages for native English speakers. In the US, less than 1% of people can speak 
Chinese, while less than 1% of people in China can speak English, one of the lowest 
countries in the world (Yang, 2006). Language difference is a significant barrier for 
effective communication between Chinese acquirers and target firms from non- 
Chinese speaking regions/countries during post-acquisition integration and synergy. 
While target firms are from Chinese speaking regions/countries, the common language 
will facilitate organisational learning between Chinese acquirers and overseas target 
firms. The learning process will not be restricted to the senior level management teams 
but also to the individual employees who are the connectors between the acquiring and 
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acquired firms in horizontal M&As and have similar technical expertise. This will 
positively enhance the post-acquisition performance of Chinese firms. 
3.8 Summary 
In recognition of the rapid pace and increasing importance of cross-border M&As by 
Chinese firms, the author focused on the timely and important research issue of post-
acquisition operating performance of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms, which is 
different from the majority of research conducted on this area addressing the short-term 
market performance of M&As by Chinese firms (Du & Boateng, 2015; Gubbi, et al., 
2010; Ning, et al., 2014). Inspired by different motivations for the exploration of 
superior knowledge by Chinese acquirers, the author tackles this challenging issue by 
combining organisational learning and institution-based view by systematically 
investigating the influence of internal factors and external factors on the post-
acquisition performance of Chinese EMNEs at the firm, industry and country levels.  
In this chapter, the author applies dynamic panel data model to investigate the impact 
of cross-border M&As on the post-acquisition operating performance of Chinese 
acquiring firms. The findings indicate that firms with serial cross-border M&As 
achieved better performance than those with first-time cross-border M&As. The 
positive effects of acquisition experience and horizontal acquisitions on post-
acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms are reinforced for cross-border 
M&As taking place in host countries with high institutional quality. This study sheds 
new light on the contingency of the institutional environment of a host-country and 
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EMNE performance. The moderating effect of the Chinese language has also been 
examined in this study where Chinese language speaking regions strengthened the 
positive implications of serial cross-border M&As and horizontal acquisitions on the 
post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms. Thus, the study advances 
research on the post-acquisition performance of EMNEs by providing new insights into 
the role of the acquirers’ acquisition experience and industry relatedness on knowledge 
exploration and knowledge integration in host countries with different institutional 
qualities and different spoken languages. 
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4. Expatriates, Subsidiary Autonomy and Overseas 
Subsidiary Performance 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the author tackles the performance issues from a management 
perspective by investigating how Chinese MNEs dynamically respond to performance 
challenges using different management strategies to improve the performance of 
overseas subsidiaries. This part of the research addresses the third research question of 
the thesis – ‘How Chinese MNEs respond to the institutional factors by using different 
levels of expatriates and subsidiary autonomy to improve the performance of overseas 
subsidiaries given host countries’ institutional conditions?’ 
Over recent decades, the impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance has been an 
important research theme in the fields of international business and international human 
resource management (HRM) (Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 
2007; Gong, 2003a). The term expatriates in this study refers to parent country 
nationals (PCNs) from MNE parent companies assigned to their foreign subsidiaries 
(Tan & Mahoney, 2006). As one of the most important resources of MNEs expatriates 
are expected to achieve a wide range of corporate objectives, including facilitating firm-
specific knowledge transfer (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004; Wang, Tong, & Koh, 2004), 
establishing international operations and opening new markets, as well as gaining 
international experience. These, in turn, help MNEs obtain competitive advantage and 
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enhance their subsidiary performance (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Tan & Mahoney, 
2006).  
Although the importance of expatriates for the subsidiary performance of MNEs has 
been confirmed by the existing studies, extant research has overwhelmingly focused on 
the performance benefits of expatriates of MNEs from developed-countries. These 
studies are based on the assumption that the knowledge will be transferred from 
headquarters to subsidiaries, through expatriates positively impacts subsidiary 
performance (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Gong, 2003a; Tan & Mahoney, 2006). 
However, in the past decade, outward FDI from EMNEs has dramatically increased. 
EMNEs have invested heavily in both developed and developing countries, and the 
increasing presence of EMNEs in the global market place has raised the question as to 
whether the findings on the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
performance based on established MNEs can be applied to EMNEs. In particular, we 
know very little about the influence of internal control mechanisms through expatriation 
on subsidiary performance and whether such an influence is contingent on the 
institutional environment of host countries.  
In addition, previous research on expatriation and subsidiary performance has 
overwhelmingly focused on the direct impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance 
through the lenses of Transaction-Cost Economics (TCE) (Benito, et al., 2005; 
Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Tan & Mahoney, 2006) and institutional theory (Xu, Pan, 
& Beamish, 2004) without considering the role of subsidiary autonomy. However, 
subsidiary autonomy plays an important role between expatriation and subsidiary 
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performance. First, expatriates can be regarded as an extended form of management 
control over overseas subsidiary by MNE parents (Boyacigiller, 1990; Egelhoff, 1984; 
Lorange, 1986; Steers & Nardon, 2006) and significantly affects  autonomy of overseas 
subsidiaries. As an important internal strategic resource of MNEs, expatriates are 
supposed to carry out the mission of headquarters, and MNE parents may exert control 
over a subsidiary by adjusting the activities of expatriates in host countries (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991). Secondly, a growing body of previous studies has shown that 
subsidiary autonomy is an important element of MNE strategies and is positively 
associated with subsidiary performance (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Gammelgaard, 
et al., 2012; McDonald, Warhurst, & Allen, 2008; Tran, Mahnke, & Ambos, 2010; 
Wang, et al., 2013). For instance, McDonald, Warhurst and Allen (2008) find that there 
is a positive relationship between varying degrees of subsidiary autonomy and 
performance. Ambos and Birkinshaw (2010) indicate that subsidiaries achieve superior 
performance enjoying high levels of local decision-making authority and by attracting 
the parent company’s attention within the MNE network. Tran et al. (2010) suggest that 
subsidiary autonomy is an important element of MNE strategies and is positively 
associated with subsidiary performance. Similarly, Gammelgaard et al. (2012) present 
evidence that subsidiary performance is increased  with  subsidiary autonomy. Kawai 
and Strange (2014) also suggest that the appropriate balance between subsidiary 
internal and external factors can help a subsidiary to achieve superior performance. 
Wang, et al., (2013) find that subsidiary autonomy is considered as a strategic 
mechanism with which to overcome EMNEs’ lack of experience in managing globally 
dispersed businesses and home-country disadvantages. 
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Although the effect of subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance has become an 
important theme in international HRM research (Gammelgaard, et al., 2012; Gomez & 
Werner, 2004; Kawai & Strange, 2014; McDonald, Warhurst, & Allen, 2008; Slangen 
& Hennart, 2008), the mediating role of subsidiary autonomy between expatriates and 
subsidiary performance has been under-explored, especially in the case of EMNEs. It 
is important to delineate the path from expatriates to subsidiary performance via 
subsidiary autonomy in host countries with different institutional environments, given 
that EMNEs originated in under-developed institutional environments. They may 
respond to the institutional environments of host countries through altering internal 
control systems such as expatriate staffing and subsidiary autonomy. Thus, the link 
between expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance may be 
contingent on the institutional environment of a host country.  
To address the research gaps, the author adopts the resource dependence perspective 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) to examine the following research questions: To what extent 
does subsidiary autonomy mediate the impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance? 
To what extent does host-country institutional quality moderate the relationship 
between expatriates and the subsidiary performance of EMNEs? The author proposes 
that subsidiary autonomy may act as an intermediate factor between expatriates and 
subsidiary performance given the institutional quality of host countries.   
This chapter is structured as follows: After the brief literature review, the next section 
focuses on theory and hypotheses. The author then introduces the sample and variables 
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used in the study in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the empirical results, followed by 
discussion of the findings. Section 4.7 concludes.   
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Role of Expatriates 
In the international arena, there are two types of human resources, local and expatriate, 
and the latter may be from the MNE parent company or from a third country. The 
existing studies on expatriate staffing can be classified into several broad categories 
according to the nature of expatriate assignments and the reason why MNCs utilise 
expatriates (Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977; Novecevic & Harvey, 2004). The original 
classification made by Edstrom and Galbraith (1977) suggested that there are basically 
three company motives for the use of expatriate managers. The first motive is to fill 
positions that require specific skills when qualified local nationals are not available. 
The second motive is management development, which is concerned with giving high-
potential mangers international experience and preparing the person for important 
future tasks in subsidiaries abroad or with the parent company. The third motive is not 
to individual development but organisation development, and this motive infers that 
expatriates are used as a part of a coordination and control strategy and involve more 
strategy responsibilities than the previous two.  
Within the growing body of literature on expatriation, a stream of research emphasises 
that expatriates have been conceptualised as performing two primary functions in a 
subsidiary (Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977; Egelhoff, 1984; Ondrack, 1985). The first is a 
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knowledge function. The expatriate not only plays an important role in transferring the 
parent firm’s knowledge to the subsidiary, but also is an agent for the acquisition of 
host-country knowledge. The second is a control function in which the expatriate works 
to align the operations of the unit with that of the parent organisation.  
Extant research emphasises that tacit and complex knowledge is often transferred from 
parent firms to subsidiaries through social interactions and the exchange process (Huber, 
1991; Subramaniam & Venkatraman, 2001), and thus transferring is often completed 
through the use of expatriates (Teece, 1977; Wang, Tong, & Koh, 2004). In this area, 
expatriates are defined as individual knowledge carriers who can help improve 
subsidiary performance by transferring personal experience and individual knowledge, 
which are lacking in foreign subsidiaries (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007; Minbaeva & 
Michailova, 2004; Tan & Mahoney, 2006). Therefore, expatriate assignment is 
considered as an effective means for MNE parents to increase the knowledge 
accumulation of their subsidiaries by transferring knowledge that is useful for their 
foreign operations (Bjorkman, Barner-Rasmussen, & Li, 2004; Delios & Bjorkman, 
2000; Tung, 1987). For example, Tsang (2001) examines the antecedents of learning in 
MNEs’ foreign subsidiaries and shows that expatriates play an important role in 
transferring knowledge to the subsidiaries. Hebert et al. (2005) indicate that the 
acquired firm’s survival considerably dependents on the type of experience which is 
extracted from expatriates. Following on from Hocking et al. (2007), they suggest that 
expatriates serve as conduits of transferring tacit knowledge about culture-specific 
customer preferences and expectations in host countries.  
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Once the knowledge that defines how things are done in the company is transferred, 
MNEs’ subsidiaries may continue to use expatriates for the purpose of control. A 
number of studies argue that one of the important roles played by all expatriates is to 
enable MNE parents to control the subsidiaries (Black, Mendenhall, & Oddou, 1991; 
Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Harzing, 2001; Tung, 1987). One commonly used approach 
by the headquarters to control foreign subsidiaries is to assign expatriates to work in 
them who will implement headquarters’ policies and strategies. Harzing (2001) argues 
that the most distinctive role of expatriates is the implementing of ‘an informal 
coordination and control strategy through socialisation and the building of informal 
communication networks’, and emphasises the increasing importance of informal 
control mechanisms in MNEs. Following Bartlett et al. (2008), it can be argued that the 
use of expatriates on international assignments is to forge interpersonal links and 
supervise organisational cohesion with the corporate values of headquarters. Paik and 
Sohn (2004) demonstrate that expatriates should not only be committed to corporate 
values but also have high levels of cultural knowledge of the host country. Using the 
samples of Japanese MNEs in 4 countries (Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and the USA), 
they indicates that while expatriate personnel with inadequate culture knowledge of the 
host country are not only less effective in controlling the subsidiary but may also have 
damaging effects on the MNE’s control. 
As a summary, MNEs use expatriates for a number of reasons. It seems to provide 
management skills and expertise not available in the host country, to transfer firm-
specific and tacit knowledge and skills, and to maintain control and organisational 
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identity (Bjorkman, Barner-Rasmussen, & Li, 2004; Fang, et al., 2010; Tan & Mahoney, 
2006), which can influence subsidiary level outcomes such as performance.  
4.2.2 Subsidiary Autonomy 
A logic step forward for MNE parents is to consider the appropriate balance between 
their control over their foreign subsidiaries and subsidiary autonomy. Subsidiary 
autonomy can be defined as the degree of freedom a subsidiary obtains from the MNE 
parent in the decision making process on all areas that concern the subsidiary, such as 
strategic, functional and operational areas (O'Donnell, 2000; Taggart & Hood, 1999). 
It means that subsidiary managers have more managerial discretion for choosing the 
way to leverage firm-specific resources (e.g., knowledge, technology, finance and 
human capital). Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) assess that the appropriate level of 
subsidiary autonomy plays an important role in managing parents-subsidiary 
relationships. They argue that overseas subsidiaries relying solely on their parents may 
find it difficult to exploit local market opportunities due to lack of local responsiveness. 
Similarly,  Luo (2003) suggests that subsidiary independence results in the appropriate 
alignment of business strategies and local market conditions (i.e., customer, 
competitors, and  legal institutions).  In this regard, subsidiary autonomy is an essential 
issue for an MNE since appropriate levels of control could result in potential benefits 
for the MNE and for the subsidiary. On the one hand, there is the need for MNE parents 
to control subsidiary behaviour in order to ensure that the activities of subsidiaries are 
aligned with corporate strategy (Gates & Egelhoff, 1986; Harzing, 1999; Roth, 
Schweiger, & Morrison, 1991). On the other hand, subsidiaries provide access to 
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knowledge and ideas through their linkages with the host country and can add great 
value to the MNEs by participating autonomous entrepreneurial behaviour.  
Although the effect of subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance has become an 
important theme in the existing IB literature, most of the existing studies have examined 
the direct link between subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance 
(Gammelgaard, et al., 2012; Gomez & Werner, 2004; Kawai & Strange, 2014; 
McDonald, Warhurst, & Allen, 2008; Newburry, Zeria, & Yeheskel, 2003; Tran, 
Mahnke, & Ambos, 2010; Young & Tavares, 2004). In particular, the mediating role of 
subsidiary autonomy in the relationship between the level of expatriates and subsidiary 
performance has been under-explored, especially in the case of EEMNEs. It is 
important to delineate the path from expatriates to subsidiary performance via 
subsidiary autonomy in host countries with different institutional environments, given 
that EEMNEs originated in under-developed institutional environments and they may 
respond to the institutional environments of host countries through altering subsidiary 
autonomy.   
4.2.3 Expatriates and Subsidiary Performance  
The employment of PCN expatriates to manage foreign subsidiaries may have an 
influence on subsidiary performance. The influence of PCN expatriates on subsidiary 
performance can be either positive or negative (or potentially neutral) depending on 
contextual factors and the fit between the staffing approach and the contextual variables. 
Some studies found that expatriates can transfer firm-specific knowledge to the 
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subsidiary, control and coordinate subsidiary operations, and hence improve subsidiary 
performance (Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977; Harzing, 2001; Riusala & Suutari, 2004). On 
the contrary, some studies find that the use of expatriates may result in interpersonal 
friction due to poor intercultural communication and hence reduces subsidiary 
performance (Gong, 2003a; Kopp, 1994). Therefore, in this study, the author does not 
assume a direct relationship between expatriate staffing and performance but focus on 
the indirect relationship which is dependent on contextual factors.  
Although there has been a sizable empirical research examining the relationship 
between expatriate staffing and subsidiary performance, the mixed evidence that has 
accumulated supports the notion that we need to consider contextual factors in this 
relationship. For example, Konopaske et al. (2002) found support for the interactive 
effects of mode of entry and staffing approach on the subsidiary performance of 
Japanese MNCs. Specifically, they found that ethnocentric staffing in joint ventures 
relates negatively to subsidiary performance and ethnocentric staffing in wholly owned 
subsidiaries relates positively to subsidiary performance. Richards (2001), in her 
comparison of the subsidiaries of US MNEs in UK and Thailand, found that locally 
managed subsidiaries in Thailand were more successful than expatriate-run ones 
because of the higher cultural distance between the US and Thailand, compared to UK 
and US. Gong (2003a) reported that the positive impact of expatriate staffing on 
subsidiary performance increases with cultural distance but decreases over time as the 
host country learns from the parent country. Most recently, Gaur et al. (2007) found 
that the positive effect of expatriate staffing levels on subsidiary performance is 
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dependent on the institutional distance between the host and home country and 
subsidiary experience. Colakoglu and Caligiuri (2008) investigated the link between 
the use of expatriates and subsidiary performance as a function of culture distance. They 
found that a higher ratio of PCN expatriates is related to lower subsidiary performance, 
particularly in cases where cultural distance is long.  
Despite a large number of studies on the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
performance as summarised in Table 4.1, there are still some research gaps. Most 
studies tend to focus on the role of expatriates of MNEs from developed-countries. In 
addition, extant research has exclusively investigated the direct impact of expatriates 
on subsidiary performance without considering the role of subsidiary autonomy. There 
is a lack of research on examining the overall relationship between expatriates, 
subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance in various institutional contexts based 
on a mediating and moderating model. In other words, we need a better understanding 
of the relationship between expatriate staffing and subsidiary performance and the 
contextual factors that are crucial in mediating and/or moderating this relationship. In 
addressing these research gaps, the mediating role of subsidiary autonomy in subsidiary 
performance and the moderating role of host-country institutional quality will be 
explored in the following sections. 
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Table 4.1 Prior studies on the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance  
Authors 
(year) 
Regional 
focus  
Research 
method  
Sample size 
Theoretical 
perspectives 
Key findings 
Richards 
(2001) 
US Quantitative 
(interview) 
24 US 
manufacturing 
multinational 
headquarters, 23 
UK subsidiaries, 
and 26 Thai 
subsidiaries 
No theoretical 
framework; 
economic 
explanation  
Locally managed subsidiaries in Thailand were 
more successful than expatriate-run ones because of 
the higher cultural distance between US and 
Thailand, compared to the UK and US 
Konopaske, 
Werner and 
Neupert 
(2002) 
Japanese Quantitative 
(Survey) 
3835 subsidiaries 
(2102 wholly 
owned and 1733 
joint ventures) from 
48 Japanese 
industries in 31 
different countries 
No theoretical 
framework: 
rationale based 
on theories of a 
firm’s resource 
profile 
Ethnocentric staffing in joint ventures relates 
negatively to subsidiary performance and 
ethnocentric staffing in wholly owned subsidiaries 
relates positively to subsidiary performance 
Gong 
(2003a) 
Japanese Quantitative 
(Survey) 
400 subsidiary top 
management teams 
(TMT) with a total 
of 2,506 top 
managers from 28 
Japanese MNEs 
Agency theory 
and RBV 
A positive effect of expatriate staffing on subsidiary 
performance increases with culture distance but 
decreases over time 
Beechler et 
al. (2004) 
Japanese Quantitative 
(Survey) 
119 Japanese 
subsidiaries in the 
US (41) and Europe 
(78)  
Functional/Cont
ingency 
approach 
Overall subsidiary performance is negatively 
related to expatriate staffing (non-significant 
results); 
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In the European subsample an increase in the 
percentage of expatriates is significantly negatively 
related to performance.  
Gong 
(2006) 
Japanese  Quantitative 370 STMTs of 28 
Japanese MNE 
throughout the 
world with a total of 
2290 top managers 
Upper echelon 
theory 
STMT nationality heterogeneity has a positive 
impact on subsidiary performance; 
Subsidiary age moderates this relationship such that 
the positive influence is stronger for subsidiaries 
with more years of operation.  
Gaur, 
Delios and 
Singh 
(2007) 
Japanese Quantitative  12,997 subsidiaries 
of 2,952 Japanese 
firms in 48 
countries 
Institutional 
theory 
The positive influence (subsidiary labour 
productivity) is dependent on the institutional 
distance between the host and home country, and 
subsidiary experience 
Colakoglu 
and 
Caligiuri 
(2008) 
US Quantitative 
(Survey) 
Wholly-owned US 
subsidiaries of 52 
multinational 
corporations 
Transaction 
costs theory 
A high ratio of parent country expatriates is related 
to lower subsidiary performance, particularly in 
cases where culture distance is high. 
Wang, 
Tong, Chen 
and Kim 
(2009)  
China Quantitative 
(Survey) 
242 subsidiaries RBV; 
international 
strategy 
Using expatriates with motivation and adaptability 
for knowledge transfer improved subsidiary 
performance;  
Using expatriates with technical skills only 
indirectly improves subsidiary performance via the 
knowledge transferred to the subsidiary. 
Kaeppeli 
(2009) 
Japanese Quantitative 
(Survey) 
64 wholly owned 
Swiss subsidiaries 
in Japan 
Functional 
approach 
Well performing subsidiaries have less than 15% of 
expatriates and their managers are well in their 50s 
and have worked in Japan for more than 10 years, 
with experience in different Japanese companies.  
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Colakoglu, 
Tarique and 
Caligiuri 
(2009) 
Japanese Quantitative 
(Survey) 
N/A (theoretical 
paper) 
RBV PCN staffing will lead to a higher subsidiary 
performance within the MNC than HCN or TCN 
staffing as PCNs have more social capital within the 
MNC; 
The relationship between subsidiary staffing and 
host market performance depends on the 
environmental contingencies around the 
subsidiaries.   
Fang et al. 
(2010) 
 
Japanese Quantitative 1660 foreign 
subsidiaries of 
Japanese MNCs 
(50.3% in Asia, 
22.4% in North 
America, 21.9% in 
Europe, RoW 
5.4%) 
RBV The ratio of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary 
positively supports the impact the parent 
companies’ technological knowledge has on the 
subsidiaries short-term performance; 
The ratio of expatriates in a foreign subsidiary 
negatively moderates the relationship between the 
parent companies level of marketing knowledge and 
the subsidiaries’ long-term performance. 
Bebenroth 
and Li 
(2010)  
Japanese  Quantitative 643 foreign 
subsidiaries in 
Japan from all over 
the world mainly 
from the US, UK, 
Switzerland, 
Germany and 
France 
Functional 
approach, 
agency theory 
Foreign subsidiaries in Japan perform statistically 
significant better when having a foreign CEO and 
having a higher ratio of expatriated managers on the 
subsidiary board. 
126 
 
Sekiguchi, 
Bebenroth 
and Li 
(2011)  
Japanese Quantitative 643 foreign 
subsidiaries in 
Japan (215 PCN, 
428 HCN; 40.4% in 
TMT) from 31 
countries 
Knowledge-
based view, 
Upper echelon 
theory 
Young subsidiaries perform better under PCN 
management;  
Larger subsidiaries among younger ones perform 
better when the proportion of PCNs in the TMT is 
rather large than small.  
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4.3 Theory and Hypotheses 
4.3.1 Theoretical Background 
The extant literature has used multiple theories to examine the optimal level of 
expatriates, such as institutional theory (Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004), TCE (Benito, et 
al., 2005; Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Tan & Mahoney, 2006) and resource-based 
view (Tan & Mahoney, 2006). The findings from existing studies have enhanced our 
understanding of the importance of expatriates in MNEs’ overseas operations. However, 
these studies have paid little attention to the impact of expatriates on subsidiary 
autonomy (Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011) and how EMNEs respond to external 
uncertainty through adjusting their internal management strategies (Davis & Cobb, 
2010), such as localisation (Lu, et al., 2014; Yildiz & Fey, 2012) and parental support 
(Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Luo, 2003). The Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) has 
been increasingly influential as a theoretical basis for international business research. 
For example, Lewin et al. (2004) suggest that the RDT is a particularly appropriate 
approach to account for the dynamic relationship between an MNE parent and its 
subsidiaries. Thus, this study takes an overarching theoretical view of RDT to examine 
the indirect impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance via subsidiary autonomy. 
RDT considers the behaviour aspect of firms and explains the importance of intra and 
inter-organisational behaviour based on power relationships (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
According to RDT, a host country is endowed with scarce resources needed by MNE 
subsidiaries (Cui, Meryer, & Hu, 2014; Moran, 1985), and a dependency situation arises 
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when MNE subsidiaries rely on irreplaceable resources controlled by local resource 
holders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In particular, when local institutions are 
underdeveloped, MNE subsidiaries face increasing risk and uncertainty due to 
ambiguous regulations and perhaps an unstable government. In order to decrease the 
risk or transaction costs associated with resource acquisition, an MNE subsidiary can 
reduce its dependence on local resources by utilizing more internal resources from its 
parent (Kobrin, 1982). This internal flow may consist of not only physical resources 
but also knowledge and human resources (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). Thus, the 
improvement of resource support from MNE parents may help reduce the external 
dependency of the subsidiaries.  
Expatriates constitute an important internal resource within MNEs and the utilisation 
of expatriates influences the parent-subsidiary relationship (Fang, et al., 2010). An 
MNE parent may assign expatriates to the subsidiary as a specific governance 
mechanism (Gong, 2003). This internal control mechanism helps ensure a subsidiary’s 
compliance with the parent company’s organisational values and operational priorities 
(Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005; Boyacigiller, 1990). In addition, expatriates can play a 
key role in facilitating the transfer of firm-specific tacit and complex knowledge from 
a parent to its subsidiary, particularly for recently established foreign subsidiaries 
(Delios & Bjorkman, 2000; Wang, et al., 2009). Through the formal communication 
channel and the informal socialisation mechanism, expatriates can identify, access and 
bring relevant parent knowledge to the subsidiary (Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977). This 
knowledge may include a corporate culture, a management style and ways of 
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conducting business that create causal ambiguity and barriers to transfer and imitation 
(Simonin, 1999). Therefore, an MNE parent will have substantial control over its 
subsidiary through the usage of expatriates. The subsidiary in turn will rely on its parent 
for resources and knowledge to minimise risk and external dependence in host countries 
with low quality institutions. This suggests that expatriates may serve as an internal 
control mechanism for an MNE parent and affect subsidiary autonomy, which in turn 
may impact on subsidiary performance (McDonald, Warhurst, & Allen, 2008). This 
implies that the effect of expatriates on organisational outcomes is more complex than 
the existing literature suggests. Therefore, this study focuses on the indirect impact of 
expatriates on subsidiary performance via subsidiary autonomy.  
As shown in Figure 4.1, the author proposes that expatriates have a negative impact on 
subsidiary autonomy, and a reduction in subsidiary autonomy leads to a decrease in 
subsidiary performance. Furthermore, institutional quality in the host country positively 
moderates the first link (i.e. the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
autonomy), but negatively moderates the second link (i.e. subsidiary autonomy and 
subsidiary performance) in the mediation relationship. In other words, subsidiary 
autonomy mediates the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance, 
given the institutional quality of the host countries. Taken together, the author proposes 
a moderated mediation model to capture the complex relationships between expatriates, 
subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance, given different levels of institutional 
quality.  
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Figure 4.1 The conceptual framework 
 
4.3.2 A Mediating Role of Subsidiary Autonomy 
Subsidiary autonomy is a complex concept (Young & Tavares, 2004) which is 
commonly defined as the extent to which a subsidiary has the authority to make 
decisions with a degree of independence from the MNE parent (Brooke, 1984; Nell & 
Andersson, 2012; O'Donnell, 2000). If a subsidiary can make decisions on main value 
activities, such as HRM, procurement, marketing and sales (Browman, Duncan, & Weir, 
2000; Edwards, Ahmad, & Moss, 2002), and enjoy higher levels of decision-making 
power for these value activities (Newburry, Zeria, & Yeheskel, 2003), it will have more 
autonomy. 
A growing body of existing literature has established that subsidiary autonomy serves 
as a mechanism for management control, which affects subsidiary performance (Ambos 
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& Birkinshaw, 2010; Gammelgaard, et al., 2012; McDonald, Warhurst, & Allen, 2008; 
Tran, Mahnke, & Ambos, 2010; Wang, et al., 2013). However, very little research has 
systematically examined the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy, 
as well as the question of whether the autonomy granted to a foreign subsidiary will 
mediate the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance.  
The author proposes that in addition to the direct impact of expatriates on subsidiary 
performance, there may be an indirect impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance 
via subsidiary autonomy. Drawing upon the RDT, expatriates, as a valuable internal 
human resource, are considered a common mechanism in subsidiary control in reducing 
the external dependence outside MNEs (Chalos & O'Connor, 2004). Assigning 
expatriates is an important way for the headquarters to exercise its power (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991). In order to process a substantial amount of information regarding 
subsidiary operating protocols, an MNE parent usually assigns expatriate managers 
whose function will be to increase the channels of communication between the parent 
company and the subsidiary, which guarantees that the parent company’s interests are 
well represented within the subsidiary (Boyacigiller, 1990). Expatriates and subsidiary 
autonomy are closely related to each other. As expatriates can be considered an 
extended form of headquarters control and supervision (Boyacigiller, 1990; Egelhoff, 
1984; Lorange, 1986; Steers & Nardon, 2006), subsidiary autonomy will become lower 
when the level of expatriates is higher. 
On the other hand, a reduction in subsidiary autonomy will reduce subsidiary 
performance due to more limited access to valuable external resources which can be 
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available locally in the host countries. Extant research shows that subsidiary autonomy 
granted by MNE parents has a positive impact on subsidiary performance 
(Gammelgaard, et al., 2012; Gomez & Werner, 2004; McDonald, Warhurst, & Allen, 
2008). Most existing research has argued that less autonomy will discourage the 
subsidiary from fostering a higher level of organisational learning (Luo, 2003), reduce 
parent-subsidiary cooperation (Birkinshaw, et al., 2000), block knowledge creation 
(Young & Tavares, 2004)  and hinder strategic leadership initiatives (Birkinshaw, Hood, 
& Jonsson, 1998). All of these reduce competitive advantage and decrease subsidiary 
performance. More importantly, a lower level of autonomy may block or represent 
barriers in the access to complementary external resources in host countries. For 
example, the operational costs will be significantly increased where companies do not 
work with local suppliers and embed subsidiaries within the local supply network (Fan, 
Nyland, & Zhu, 2008; Rangan & Drummond, 2011). The subsidiaries with limited 
autonomy find it difficult to bond and cooperate with local businesses without the 
involvement of local managers and employees who have better knowledge of local 
market environments than expatriates (Law, et al., 2009; Selmer, 2004). This will in 
turn negatively influence subsidiary performance.  
In summary, the author argues that subsidiary autonomy will mediate the impact of 
expatriates on subsidiary performance. Expatriates not only transfer firm-specific 
knowledge to the subsidiary, but also tend to result in more control from the parent 
company, thus leading to a lower level of subsidiary autonomy, which in turn is 
associated with a lower level of subsidiary performance. Adopting RDT logic, 
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subsidiary autonomy serves as an intermediate mechanism through which expatriate 
resources assigned by the MNE parents can affect subsidiary performance. Therefore, 
departing from the existing research in this domain, the author posits a mediation path 
that moves beyond the direct impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance. That is, 
using expatriates can enable the parent company to have tighter control on subsidiaries 
and thus reduce subsidiary autonomy, which in turn leads to a decrease in subsidiary 
performance. Hence, the author hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Subsidiary autonomy mediates the relationship between 
expatriates and subsidiary performance in that the level of expatriates has a negative 
impact on subsidiary autonomy, and a reduction in subsidiary autonomy leads to a 
decrease in subsidiary performance.  
4.3.3 The Moderating Role of Host-country Institutional Quality 
The institutional quality of host countries has long been identified as an important factor 
affecting MNE subsidiary performance (Luo & Tung, 2007). It refers to the degree of 
stability and development of the institutional infrastructure of host countries, which 
includes the set of laws, regulations, administrative procedures and policies formally 
sanctioned by the government (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Delios & Henisz, 2003). 
The existing research reveals that knowledge is more likely to be learned and obtained 
from a host country with well-established institutions where effective institutional 
protection can be provided for foreign firms operating there (Berry, 2006; Buckley, et 
al., 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007). EMNEs that lack international managerial expertise, 
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international market knowledge and advanced technology may be able to acquire these 
strategic assets when their subsidiaries are located in host countries with well-
developed institutions. Local firms in these host countries are more likely to possess 
strategic resources needed by EMNEs, but such resources are not usually available in 
the EMNEs’ domestic markets or in other emerging markets (Nicholson & Salaber, 
2013). The asset-seeking behaviour of EMNEs may reduce the dependence of their 
subsidiaries on headquarters in such host countries (Lu, et al., 2014). This in turn may 
reduce the need for expatriates compared to those subsidiaries in host countries with 
underdeveloped institutions which offer limited opportunities for knowledge 
exploration. The reduced level of expatriates also lessens the control from the corporate 
parent. This implies that higher autonomy may be achieved by a subsidiary located in 
those host countries with high institutional quality, thereby gaining access to strategic 
resources and advanced knowledge available locally, and hence reducing transaction 
costs. Thus, the negative relationship between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy will 
be reinforced in those host countries with well-established institutions. 
In contrast, when host-country institutions are underdeveloped, the institutional 
environment tends to be risky (Wang, et al., 2013). EMNEs operating within such an 
environment are subject to increasing external uncertainty and decreasing credibility 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Akhter & Lusch, 1998; Delios & Beamish, 1999; 
Delios & Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2000). According to RDT, a subsidiary relies more on 
internal resources and knowledge transferred from MNE headquarters in order to 
replace inter-organisational resource exchanges (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). Expatriates 
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can be used as an internal resource to reduce the external dependence when facing 
uncertainty stemming from an unstable external environment. Thus, an increasing level 
of expatriates may become a pragmatic response strategy when EMNE subsidiaries 
operate in such host countries (i.e. those with institutional ambiguities, underdeveloped 
markets and ineffective enforcement of regulations) (Wright, et al., 2005). When 
uncertainty in business activities is high in a host country, centralised subsidiaries are 
unlikely to overcome the frequent changes and unknowns inherent in environmental 
uncertainty, due to a high level of bureaucracy in the decision making process and 
coordination costs associated with a high level of centralisation (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989). This implies that extra autonomy needs to be granted to respond promptly to 
frequent changes resulting from increasing external uncertainty. As a result, an increase 
in expatriates from headquarters may lead to a disproportionate decrease in subsidiary 
autonomy when subsidiaries operate in an underdeveloped institutional environment, 
given that subsidiaries in such an environment need more internal resource exchange 
and a higher level of subsidiary autonomy to respond to institutional voids. Hence, the 
author proposes: 
Hypothesis 2: Host-country institutional quality will influence the negative 
impact of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy such that the negative relationship 
between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy is stronger in host-countries with high 
institutional quality than those with low institutional quality.  
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Institutional quality in host countries not only moderates the link between expatriates 
and subsidiary autonomy, but also the relationship between subsidiary autonomy and 
subsidiary performance. Since institutions are developed to create order and a stable 
environment, and to promote economic exchange and cooperation (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1985), host-country institutions affect subsidiaries in accessing and 
sharing external resources and knowledge (Meyer & Sinani, 2009). Well-established 
institutions are able to provide an efficient common infrastructure and reduce 
transactional uncertainty (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). Foreign subsidiaries operating in 
host countries with high institutional quality can easily follow ‘the rules of the game’ 
and gain the information necessary for effective operations (Schwens, Eiche, & Kabst, 
2011). In addition, well-developed market-supporting institutions may help subsidiaries 
reduce search costs associated with accessing critical knowledge and resources for 
foreign operations. This indicates that political risks and uncertainty are relatively low 
in host countries with well-developed institutions, so the importance of subsidiary 
autonomy for subsidiary performance may be reduced when operating in such a context. 
This implies that a high level of subsidiary autonomy may not be a necessary condition 
for achieving desirable performance.  
On the other hand, under-developed institutions generate hazards of expropriation and 
transactional uncertainty, and so subsidiaries have to rely on greater autonomy to deal 
with political and operational risks, and thus subsidiary autonomy has a more positive 
impact on subsidiary performance when it is flexible and responds to the frequent 
changes and instability of the host-country government. An ‘agile’ approach with 
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regard to local decision making may be necessary in order to cope with frequent 
decision making cycles. Such a mechanism can help to ensure effective operations, thus 
enhancing subsidiary performance. Extant research shows that uncertainty in a 
turbulent environment strengthens the positive relationship between autonomy and 
subsidiary profitability (Andersen, 2005; Kawai & Strange, 2014). This suggests that 
the positive impact of subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance will be stronger 
in host countries with underdeveloped institutions.  
Furthermore, a lack of effective communication infrastructure could be a major obstacle 
preventing EMNE headquarters from being able to remotely control subsidiaries in 
developing host countries with low institution quality. A significant global digital 
divide has been observed between developed and developing countries; for example, it 
has been estimated that less than 1% of Africans have access to broadband data 
connections (Pingdom, 2008). Common business communication methods, including 
reliable teleconferencing, email and e-chat, are sometimes difficult to establish between 
headquarters and subsidiaries. Thus, granting more power to subsidiaries operating in 
the developing host countries with weak institutions and under-developed infrastructure 
becomes not simply more important but is a strategic necessity compared to those in 
the developed host countries with high institutional quality. Our arguments above lead 
to the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: Host-country institutional quality will influence the positive 
impact of subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance such that the positive 
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relationship between subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance is stronger in 
host countries with low institutional quality than those with high institutional quality. 
4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The data used to test the hypotheses was collected with support from the Asia Pacific 
Foundation of Canada (APFC) and the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade (CCPIT). The former is an independent non-governmental organisation focusing 
on Canada’s relations with Asia, whereas the latter is a national non-government 
organisation for the promotion of foreign trade in China. Collaboration with the CCPIT 
enabled us to access its members through its local representatives who are familiar with 
these enterprises, and thus encourage participation in the survey (Liu, et al., 2015). 
Conducting surveys through local research networks and onsite personal meetings 
proved to be best practice in obtaining reliable and valid information in emerging 
economies such as China (Zhou, Tse, & Li, 2006; Zhu, et al., 2008). Previous surveys 
on China’s outward FDI conducted by the CCPIT and APFC have been widely cited 
(Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010; Tung, 2007; UNCTD, 2006).  
On the basis of a thorough literature review, the questionnaire was originally prepared 
in English and then, with the assistance of an independent translator, translated into 
Chinese. Following Hoskisson, et al. (2000), a back-translation technique was used to 
examine the accuracy of the survey content. The author also conducted four in-depth 
interviews with CCPIT officials who were familiar with companies involved in outward 
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FDI to cross-check questionnaire items and terminology, and to ratify the content and 
validity of our measurements. The questionnaire was modified based on their feedback. 
In the pilot testing, the questionnaire was sent to ten senior managers who were in 
charge of outward FDI and whose companies were CCPIT members. The questionnaire 
was further revised based on their feedback.   
The sample of Chinese companies was randomly selected from the CCPIT’s 
membership enterprises that have registered their outward FDI activities with the 
Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM). The original sample 
consisted of 2000 companies. The CCPIT’s local representatives contacted these 
companies first, and then sent hard copies of the questionnaires to the general managers 
of the chosen companies. Of the 2000 questionnaires mailed out, a total of 365 
questionnaires were received by the headquarters of CCPIT in Beijing, corresponding 
to a response rate of 18.25%. A comparison of the locations and industries between the 
responding firms and non-responding ones suggested two groups of firms have similar 
distribution patterns in both industries and location. 20 respondents were randomly 
selected and then were contacted via phone calls to verify that the questionnaires had 
been completed by senior managers who were familiar with their company’s 
internationalisation activities. After excluding the responses which either had missing 
information or were inapplicable, the author left with 181 observations. For example, 
the author excluded the firms operating abroad mainly through setting up export 
agencies or foreign wholly-owned subsidiaries in China, given that the latter companies 
may have structure and operational processes that may not be compatible with Chinese 
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companies (Yiu, Lau, & Bruton, 2007). Our final sample size is 181, including 45 SOEs 
and 136 private firms. These firms operate in 14 industries and have invested in 49 
countries. The detailed information on subsidiary location is presented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 The location of Chinese subsidiaries overseas 
Investment Destinations: host countries   
Algeria, Australia, Austria,  Bengal, Brazil, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, 
Canada, Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Germany,  
Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, Iran, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, 
Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, 
Tanzania, the UK, the USA, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
Uzbekistan, Vietnam 
 
 
4.4.2 Variables and Measures 
Dependent variables 
Following previous studies (Brouthers & Xu, 2002; He, Tian, & Chen, 2007; Lu, et al., 
2010), a perceptual measure was used to proxy the performance of overseas subsidiaries 
of Chinese MNEs. Some researchers (He, Tian, & Chen, 2007; Woodcock, Beamish, 
& Makino, 1994) indicated that perceptual measures are appropriate when (1) 
companies are either unwilling or unable to provide sensitive accounting data; (2) 
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variations in accounting approaches across countries are likely to hinder the 
reconciliation of differences; and/or (3) there are strong enough fluctuations in 
exchange rates between home and host countries.  As a widely used construct in 
previous studies (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Birkinshaw, Hood, & Young, 
2005; He, Tian, & Chen, 2007; Lu, et al., 2010), perceptual measures of performance 
have been proven to possess strong internal consistency and reliability (Cooper & Artz, 
1995; Ketokivi & Schroeder, 2004).  
The respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of their newly established 
overseas subsidiaries. This focus presents a number of advantages. First, respondents 
can be more able to differentiate the focal overseas subsidiary from other overseas 
subsidiaries, and thus enhance the reliability of this measure. Second, all other key 
independent variables, i.e. expatriates, host country institutional quality and subsidiary 
autonomy, are directly related to the focal overseas subsidiary. Thus, the dependent 
variable and the key independent variables are compatible and focused on the same 
overseas subsidiary. 
The variable consisted of three items on a seven-point scale (1=very dissatisfied; 
7=very satisfied): (1) growth rate of sales; (2) growth rate of market share; and (3) 
growth rate of profit in the overseas subsidiary. The confirmatory factor analysis 
showed that the three items were loaded on a single factor, explaining 83.81% of the 
total variance. Cronbach’s alpha reliability for perceived subsidiary performance was 
0.90, which is greater than 0.60, a commonly acceptable level of reliability (Nunnally, 
1978).   
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Independent variables 
Based on Gong (2003a), Konopaske, et al. (2002) and Boyacigiller (1990), the level of 
expatriates is measured as the percentage of expatriates in the total workforce. In the 
survey instrument, the expatriate percentage was calculated by dividing the number of 
expatriates in a subsidiary by the total number of employees in the subsidiary. 
Traditionally, expatriates are considered individuals of any national origin who are 
transferred outside their home country (Edstrom & Galbraith, 1977; Hocking, Brown, 
& Harzing, 2004). In the context of Chinese MNEs, expatriates are considered 
synonymous with individuals of Chinese nationality who work outside China 
(Belderbos & Heijltjes, 2005). According to Boyacigiller’s (1990) terminology, the 
author uses the terms expatriate and parent-country national synonymously in the case 
of Chinese MNEs. Thus, the term, an expatriate, is considered to be synonymous with 
PCN and a non-expatriate is considered to be synonymous with Host-Country National 
(HCN). 
Mediating variables 
The author followed Williams and van Triest (2009) and assessed the level of autonomy 
based on the respondents’ assessment regarding how much autonomy their 
management team was given to manage the subsidiary in terms of strategic and 
operational decision-making authority. Based on the evaluation and the practical insight 
of the managers from our pilot study, subsidiary autonomy is measured by four items 
along a seven-point scale (1=low; 7=high). The items are related to whether subsidiary 
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managers have the authority to (1) decide the scope of their operations; (2) make 
budgetary and financial decisions; (3) hire, reward, promote and fire employees; and 
(4) undertake merger, acquisition and other capital operations. The factor analysis 
showed that the four items converged into a single factor, explaining 72.58% of the 
total variance. Cronbach’s alpha for the measure was 0.87. 
Moderating variables 
Based on previous studies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Slangen & Tulder, 2009), 
the objective measurement of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) in 2010  was 
used to capture the institutional quality of the host country. The WGI reports aggregate 
and individual governance indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996-2013 
includes six dimensions of government: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political 
stability and absence of violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; 
(5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption. We aggregated the six dimensions and 
labelled it as a company’s institutional quality. As each dimension has been constructed 
by compiling a number of primary and secondary data sources, the index offers reliable 
and comprehensive proxies for empirical studies (Oh & Oetzel, 2011). The values of 
the WGI were rescaled by adding 2.5 so that the values in our sample range from 0 (low 
institutional quality) to 5 (high institutional quality), which helped facilitate the 
interpretation for the statistical significance of this variable (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008). The items were loaded on a single factor, explaining 84.59% of the variance. 
The reliability of the measurement was acknowledged with a Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha of 0.92.  
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Table 4.3 lists the measurement items above and summarises the confirmatory factor 
analysis and internal consistency of the scales.  
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Table 4.3 Measurement scales and factor loadings 
Constructs Measurement items 
Factor 
loading 
Variance 
explained 
(%) 
Cronbach
’s alphas 
Subsidiary performance    83.81 α=0.90 
CR=0.89, AVE=0.74 · Sale growth 0.84   
 · Local market share growth 0.90   
 · Sales margin growth 0.83   
     
Subsidiary autonomy   72.58 α=0.87 
CR=0.88, AVE=0.64 · Right to decide the scope of operations by heads of overseas subsidiary 0.82   
 · Right to decide budgetary and financial decisions by heads of overseas subsidiary 0.87   
 · Right to hire, reward, promote and fire employees by heads of overseas subsidiary 0.87   
 
· Right to do mergers and acquisitions and other capital operations by overseas 
subsidiary 
0.63  
 
     
Institutional quality   84.59 α=0.92 
CR=0.96, AVE=0.81 · Voice and Accountability 0.73   
 · Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 0.81   
 · Government Effectiveness 0.96   
 · Regulatory Quality 0.95   
 · Rule of Law 0.97   
 · Control of Corruption 0.94   
CR, composite reliability; AVE, average variance extracted 
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Control variables 
Several variables that may also affect subsidiary performance were controlled. First, 
the author included a measure of subsidiary age, which was calculated as the number 
of years of operations within a host country (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Fey & Furu, 
2008). Second, an MNE parent’s age and size were included as control variables. They 
were calculated as the number of years in business and the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees, respectively (Van-Wijk, Jansen, & Lyles, 2008; Zhou, Wu, & 
Luo, 2007). Third, because parent ownership types also matter in a transition economy 
(Wu & Lin, 2010), the author differentiated parent company types: state-owned 
enterprises and private-owned companies. A dummy variable with a value of 1 indicates 
that the parent company is a state-owned enterprise, and a value of 0 indicates a private-
owned company. Finally, the author created dummy variables to control for the industry 
sector in which a subsidiary locates.  
4.4.3 Common Method Bias 
As much of the data was collected from the same survey respondents, there may exist 
the potential for the occurrence of common method variance (Krishnan, Martin, & 
Noorderhaven, 2006). The author took a number of steps to minimize common method 
bias. First, multiple item constructs were used in our survey, since response biases are 
more likely to occur at the item level rather than at the construct level. In particular, the 
mediating and moderating effect is included in our hypotheses. This approach is 
effective in controlling for the issue of common method variance because complex 
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relationships between the dependent and independent variables are not part of the 
respondents’ theory-in-use (Chang, Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010). Second, following 
previous studies (Antonakis, Bendahan, & Jacquart, 2010; Kemery & Dunlap, 1986; 
Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Richardson, Simmering, & Sturman, 2009), the author 
performed Harman’s single factor test. This test is one of the widely used techniques to 
diagnose CMV. All the variables in the study are loaded into an exploratory factor 
analysis to see whether one single factor does emerge or whether one general factor 
does account for a majority of the covariance among the variables. From the table 4.4, 
it can be seen from the first row that the Harman’s single factor technique estimates the 
common method variance to be 42.6% which is less than the commonly accepted 
threshold of 50% (Eichhorn, 2014). This suggests that CMV is not of a great concern 
with this dataset. Third, the level of expatriates, as an independent variable, is a 
formative value rather than a self-perceived measure. In addition, the author also used 
an objective measure for the institutional quality of host countries. Taken together, the 
potential extent of common method variance has been reduced substantially.  
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Table 4.4 Results of Harman’s single factor test 
 Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 5.53395 2.05449 0.4257 0.4257 
2 3.47946 1.98185 0.2677 0.6933 
3 1.49761 0.92083 0.1152 0.8085 
4 0.57678 0.15851 0.0444 0.8529 
5 0.41827 0.04211 0.0322 0.8851 
6 0.37616 0.09656 0.0289 0.9140 
7 0.27960 0.04713 0.0215 0.9355 
8 0.23247 0.01915 0.0179 0.9534 
9 0.21333 0.02593 0.0164 0.9698 
10 0.18739 0.09586 0.0144 0.9842 
11 0.09153 0.02266 0.0070 0.9913 
12 0.06887 0.02429 0.0053 0.9966 
13 0.04458 - 0.0034 1.0000 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
The mean, standard deviations and correlations of the variables used in our analysis are 
presented in Table 4.5. It is shown that all correlations among the independent variables 
are fairly low. To avoid potential multicollinearity, the author centred the variables and 
computed the interaction terms as a product of the centred scores on the component 
variables in all analyses. Control variables were included in all regression analyses 
unless specified otherwise. To assess potential multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIFs) of the matrices of independence variables and covariates were computed 
(Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990). The result of the VIF test, reported in Table 4.6, 
shows that none of the VIF values exceed the threshold of 10 and indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a concern. 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive statistic and correlations 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. MNC parent age 20.17 15.09 1.00         
2. Subsidiary age 5.18 2.88 0.03 1.00        
3. MNC parent size 2.81 0.92 0.41** 0.02 1.00       
4. Parent ownership 0.25 0.43 0.31** -0.03 0.07 1.00      
5. Subsidiary industry 0.25 0.43 0.07 0.17* 0.19* -0.07 1.00     
6. Subsidiary performance 4.48 1.01 0.06 0.07 0.26** -0.11 0.19** 1.00    
7. Expatriates 46.37 35.17 0.12 -0.09 0.12 0.18* -0.04 -0.13 1.00   
8. Subsidiary autonomy 4.53 1.15 -0.01 0.04 0.15* -0.14 0.24** 0.43** -0.15* 1.00  
9. Institutional quality 2.93 0.98 -0.07 0.13 -0.31** 0.01 -0.13 -0.22** -0.07 -0.10 1.00 
N=181. Mean and standard deviations for MNC parent age, subsidiary age, MNC parent size, parent ownership, subsidiary industry and expatriates are 
based on raw data. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Table 4.6 Variance Inflation Factor test 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
MNC parent age 1.30 0.7665 
MNC parent size 1.29 0.7780 
Parent ownership 1.17 0.8515 
Subsidiary industry 1.15 0.8729 
Subsidiary autonomy 1.10 0.9064 
Institutional quality 1.08 0.9224 
Expatriates 1.07 0.9353 
Subsidiary age 1.06 0.9391 
Mean VIF 1.15 
 
A moderated mediation model can be tested in a number of ways (Edwards & Lambert, 
2007; MacKinnon, et al., 2002; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). The author follows Edwards 
and Lambert’s (2007) procedure which integrates moderated regression analysis and 
path analysis to comprehensively analyse simultaneous moderation and mediation. This 
includes the first stage (between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy), the second stage 
(between subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance), a direct relationship 
between expatriates and subsidiary performance and an indirect effect through 
subsidiary autonomy, as well as the total effect at a particular level of the moderator 
(institutional quality).  
Therefore, in this study, the author tested the hypothesis on the mediating effects of 
subsidiary autonomy on the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
performance based on Edwards and Lambert’s constrained nonlinear regression module 
(Edwards & Lambert, 2007). A first and second-stage moderated mediation model is 
involved in estimating the following two equations: 
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                                                   (1) 
         (2) 
Where X is expatriates; Z is institutional quality; XZ is the product of 
expatriates and institutional quality; M is a subsidiary autonomy; MZ is the product of 
subsidiary autonomy and institutional quality; and Y is subsidiary performance.  
Equation 3 is obtained by substituting Equation 1 into Equation 2: 
(3) 
In Equation 3, the direct effect of X (expatriates) on Y (subsidiary performance) 
corresponds to the term ( , which varies by Z (institutional quality). 
The indirect effect of X on Y corresponds to , which also 
varies by Z. The term   captures the first-stage moderation of the indirect 
effect, and the term captures the second-stage moderation of the 
indirect effect. 
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Table 4.7 Coefficient estimates for the moderated mediation model for subsidiary performance 
  First stage (dependent variable = SA)   Second stage (dependent variable = performance) 
 Module 1   Module 2   Module 3   Module 4 
  α SE t   α SE t   α SE t   α SE t 
Subsidiary age 0.00 0.03 0.00  0.00 0.03 -0.03  0.08 0.02 1.12  0.07 0.02 1.12 
MNC parent age  0.06 0.01 0.74  0.04 0.01 0.51  0.03 0.00 0.46  0.02 0.00 0.26 
MNC parent size -0.02 0.08 -0.28  -0.03 0.08 -0.39  0.10 0.07 1.42  0.09 0.07 1.34 
Parent Ownership  -0.12 0.17 -1.52  -0.10 0.17 -1.47  -0.07 0.14 -1.07  -0.07 0.14 -1.07 
Subsidiary industry 0.23 0.18 2.97**  0.23 0.18 3.30**  0.04 0.14 0.59  0.05 0.14 0.82 
Expatriates -0.15 0.00 -2.02*  0.19 0.00 2.74**  -0.07 0.00 -1.03  0.11 0.00 1.75 
Institutional quality -0.09 0.08 -1.21  0.07 0.08 0.97  -0.22 0.06 -3.10**  0.04 0.06 0.66 
Subsidiary autonomy         0.43 0.08 5.08**  0.51 0.08 6.03** 
Expatriates x institutional quality     -0.37 0.00 -5.11**      -0.20 0.00 -3.10** 
Subsidiary autonomy x institutional quality             -0.19 0.01 -2.94* 
                
R2   0.10       0.24       0.26       0.38   
Adjusted R2  0.06    0.21    0.23    0.35  
Note: N=181; SA=subsidiary autonomy; SE=standard error. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01;  
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Hypothesis 1 suggests that subsidiary autonomy mediates the relationship between 
expatriates and subsidiary performance, in which expatriates negatively affect 
subsidiary autonomy and a reduction in subsidiary autonomy leads to a decrease in 
subsidiary performance. Table 4.7 presents the regression results of Hypothesis 1. The 
first-stage effect of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy in Model 1 is significantly 
negative (β=-0.15, p<0.05), whereas the second-stage effect of subsidiary autonomy on 
subsidiary performance in Model 3 is positive and significant (β=0.43, p<0.01). 
Furthermore, the direct effect of expatriates on subsidiary performance appears to be 
insignificant (β=-0.07, p>0.10). Therefore, there is a full, indirect-only mediation rather 
than a partial mediation (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010) which indicates that the level of 
expatriates affects subsidiary autonomy but does not affect subsidiary performance 
directly. Therefore, subsidiary autonomy fully mediates the relationship between 
expatriates and subsidiary performance. This is confirmed by a Sobel’s test (Sobel, 
1982), which is significant (z=-5.37, p<0.01). Consequently, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
In model 3, the direct effect of the host country institutional quality on subsidiary 
performance is also tested. The coefficient of host country institutional quality is 
negative and significant (β=-0.22, p<0.01), which indicates that the host country 
institutional quality has an impact on the subsidiary performance.  
The results in Model 2 and Model 4 show that the institutional quality of host countries 
positively moderates the negative impact of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy, but 
negatively moderates the positive impact of subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary 
performance. Thus, the author receives support for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3.  
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Table 4.8 The effects of the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy and between subsidiary autonomy and 
subsidiary performance at different levels of institutional quality 
Model  Institutional quality First stage Second stage 
E-SA-Performance Low  0.55* 0.70* 
 High -0.17* 0.32* 
 Difference 0.72* 0.38* 
Note. N=181. The first and second-stage simple effects for low and high levels of institutional quality were calculated with coefficient estimates from 
Table 4.5. Institutional quality were +0.98 (i.e., one SD above the mean) and -0.98 (i.e., one SD below the mean) for the high and low levels of 
institutional quality, respectively. Differences in simple effects were calculated by subtracting the effects for high institutional quality from the effects 
for low institutional quality. Significant tests for the first and second-stage simple effects are equivalent to tests for the coefficients of the interaction 
terms in the first and second-stage model in Table 4.7, respectively.  
E = expatriates; SA = subsidiary autonomy.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Table 4.8 summarises the results of further testing Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. One 
standard deviation above or below the mean is used to indicate a high or low level of 
host-country institutional quality (Aiken & West, 1991) which shows the 
interrelationship between expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance 
at different levels of institutional quality. The first-stage moderation, which applies to 
the first-stage of the indirect effect, was significant (0.55-(-0.17) = 0.72, p<0.05). The 
results indicate that the first-stage effect was 0.55 (p<0.05) in the host countries with a 
low level of institutional quality and -0.17 (p<0.05) at the high level of host-country 
institutional quality. Thus, the results further confirm hypothesis 2, which suggests that 
the negative relationship between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy is stronger when 
institutional quality is high. The second-stage moderation, which applies to the second 
stage of the indirect effect, was significant (0.70-0.32=0.38, p<0.05). The second-stage 
effect was 0.70 (p<0.05) in the host countries with a low level of institutional quality 
and 0.32 (p<0.05) at a high level of institutional quality. The results further support 
Hypothesis 3, which proposes that the positive relationship between subsidiary 
autonomy and subsidiary performance is stronger when institutional quality is low.  
In order to have a better understanding on how institutional quality moderates the 
relationship between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy, and between subsidiary 
autonomy and subsidiary performance, the author plotted the interaction effects in 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3. As shown in Figure 4.2, a high level of expatiate staffing is 
associated with a low level of autonomy in conditions of high host-country institutional 
quality. In Figure 4.3, it can be seen that greater autonomy is related to a high level of 
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subsidiary performance in the host countries with low institutional quality. Both Figure 
4.2 and Figure 4.3 further support Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 respectively. 
 
Figure 4.2 The effect of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy in the host countries 
with high and low levels of institutional quality 
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Figure 4.3 The effect of subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance in the 
host countries with high and low levels of institutional quality 
 
In summary, the author finds that the level of subsidiary autonomy mediates the 
relationship between expatriates and subsidiary performance. In addition, the results 
also show that the effect of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy and the impact of 
subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance are moderated by host-country 
institutional quality. 
4.6 Discussion 
Based on a sample of Chinese MNEs, the author has examined whether subsidiary 
autonomy mediates the impact of expatriates on subsidiary performance, and have 
considered the moderating effect of the institutional quality of host countries on the 
mediation mechanism. Our findings show that subsidiary autonomy, to a large extent, 
serves as a key mediator in the relationship between expatriates and subsidiary 
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performance. By assigning expatriates to a subsidiary, the MNE parent may grant less 
autonomy to the subsidiary, which in turn reduces subsidiary performance. In other 
words, the power relationship between a subsidiary and its parent will shift toward the 
subsidiary when the level of expatriates decreases. The results differ from those of the 
majority of previous studies which reported a direct relationship between expatriation 
and subsidiary performance (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003a; Richards, 
2001).  
The author further examined the interrelationship between expatriates, subsidiary 
autonomy and subsidiary performance given different levels of institutional quality. 
The findings indicate that the level of expatriates is used as a strategic control and 
resource exchange mechanism by EMNEs. Specifically, high quality institutions in host 
countries induce EMNE parents to send fewer expatriates, which results in a high level 
of subsidiary autonomy. This suggests that subsidiaries are motivated to engage in asset 
exploration in those host countries by granting them a high level of autonomy. There 
may be more resource exchange between subsidiaries and local firms in host countries 
with well-established institutions. Thus, the negative relationship between expatriates 
and subsidiary autonomy is reinforced in host countries with high institutional quality. 
When subsidiaries are located in host countries with a high institutional quality, they 
may be able to employ more local employees and engage more closely with local 
suppliers and clients. The findings also suggest that the impact of expatriates on 
subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance varies depending on host-country 
institutional quality. The nature of strategic asset-seeking outward FDI from emerging 
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economies is also reflected in the relationship between the corporate parents and 
subsidiaries. When EMNE subsidiaries operate in developed host countries with well-
established institutions, they tend to establish a decentralised organisational structure 
which facilitates knowledge access and knowledge acquisition. For example, Lenovo 
acquired IBM’s PC division in 2004, and in the meantime appointed IBM’s Senior Vice 
President, Steve Ward, as the first foreign senior executive of the PC division of Lenovo 
in order to maintain knowledge access and customer acceptance (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
In contrast, the link between expatriates and subsidiary autonomy is reversed from 
negative to positive in host countries with lower institutional quality. Our findings 
suggest when subsidiaries operate in a host country with a high level of uncertainty and 
risk, they rely on both expatriates and subsidiary autonomy to respond to the frequent 
changes and to counterbalance the impact of the risky environment. This implies that a 
subsidiary is granted more autonomy when institutional quality in the host countries is 
low. The findings suggest that EMNEs are likely to use more expatriates in countries 
with low institution quality compared to those in countries with high institution quality. 
Thus, the level of expatriates not only acts as an internal control mechanism but also as 
a means of intra-organisational or internal resource exchange between the MNE parent 
and subsidiary when external resource exchanges are unreliable and subject to high 
transaction costs due to greater uncertainty in  the host countries. Subsidiaries operating 
in a host country with low institutional quality need to have additional autonomy and 
extra expatriates from headquarters. As such, they are able to use intra-organisational 
resource flows to reduce their external dependence on local staffing. This finding also 
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indicates the importance of investigating the moderating effect of institutional quality. 
EMNEs are sensitive to local institutional quality and are very flexible in their response. 
EMNE parents support their subsidiaries in lower institutional quality countries with a 
higher level of expatriates and give them autonomy to run local subsidiaries according 
to the local environment, whereas in countries with higher institutional quality, parental 
firms tend to use a lower level of expatriates which leads to a higher level of autonomy.  
Our findings show that there is a substitution effect between subsidiary autonomy and 
host-country institutional quality on subsidiary performance. The higher autonomy will 
enable effective local decision making to quickly respond to dynamic market changes 
and absorb the uncertainty in the countries with low institutional quality. Autonomous 
local decision making is more important in the host countries with low institutional 
quality where a lack of well-developed communication infrastructure makes it difficult 
for EMNE headquarters to remotely control and coordinate their subsidiaries. This 
study reveals that Chinese MNEs tend to assign more expatriates and grant more 
autonomy to the subsidiaries located in the countries with low institutional quality in 
order to enhance subsidiary performance. 
4.7 Summary 
Adopting the resource dependence perspective, this paper examines the indirect effects 
of expatriates via subsidiary autonomy on subsidiary performance, and is based on a 
sample of Chinese MNEs operating in 49 countries. The author finds that assigning 
more expatriates enables parent companies to have tighter control on subsidiaries and 
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reduce their autonomy, which in turn leads to a decrease in subsidiary performance. 
The results show that subsidiary autonomy mediates the relationship between 
expatriates and subsidiary performance. Such a relationship is moderated by host 
countries’ institutional quality. The institutional quality of host countries reinforces the 
negative impact of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy, but reduces the importance of 
the latter on subsidiary performance. By examining the moderating effect of host-
country institutional quality, this study sheds new light on the contingency of the 
institutional environment of a host-country and EMNEs’ subsidiary performance. Thus, 
our study advances research on the post-entry organisational structure of EMNEs by 
providing new insights into the role of expatriates and subsidiary autonomy as 
mechanisms of external dependence reduction and knowledge exploration in host 
countries with different institutional qualities. 
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the major findings and contributions of the thesis, as well as the 
practical implications for managers and policy makers. It also acknowledges the 
research limitations, and points out possible future research. This chapter consists of 
four sections. Section 5.1 summarises the main findings of this study. Section 5.2 
reviews the major contributions of this study. Section 5.3 outlines implications to 
managers and policy makers. Finally, section 5.4 discusses limitations and proposes 
possible future studies. 
5.1 A Summary of the Main Findings 
This thesis looks at the performance implications of the internationalisation of Chinese 
firms. Given that China’s outward FDI has become one of the major contributors to the 
world FDI outflows and its increasing power in the world economy, this thesis provides 
a timely assessment by examining the short-term impact of cross-border M&As by 
Chinese firms on their stock market performance (Chapter 2), investigating the long-
term impact of such M&As on their post-acquisition operating performance (Chapter 
3), and inspecting whether certain management strategies can improve the performance 
of overseas subsidiaries (Chapter 4). 
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5.1.1 The Main Findings based on the Short-term Stock Market Performance 
Study  
Chapter 2 discovers the conditions under which cross-border M&As create shareholder 
value for Chinese acquirers based on signalling theory and the institution-based view. 
The results show that cross-border M&As by Chinese acquirers are interpreted by 
investors in the stock market as strong signals released by Chinese firms resulting in a 
significant and positive stock market reaction. M&A activities by Chinese firms 
symbolise these Chinese firms’ financial confidence and global ambitions, and are 
perceived as a spring board to acquire strategic resources and capabilities from a global 
market in order to seize opportunities to enhance their competitive advantage.   
The findings also show that there are asymmetric market reactions to cross-border 
M&As by Chinese firms in the Mainland Chinese stock markets and the Hong Kong 
stock market. Divergent market reactions in Hong Kong and Mainland China reflect 
the institutional arrangements of ‘one country, two systems’ across China. The 
Mainland Chinese stock markets behave differently from the Hong Kong stock market. 
The former exhibits good-news-chasing behaviour which results in more significant 
reactions to the same M&A events than those in the Hong Kong stock market.  
Moreover, the results indicate that the shareholders of Chinese firms acquiring target 
firms in host countries with low levels of political risk gain higher cumulative abnormal 
returns than those firms targeting the countries with high levels of political risk. Chinese 
cross-border M&As benefit from a stable investment environment with well-
established institutions in target countries with a low level of political risk. This 
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indicates that cross-border M&As enable Chinese acquirers to span national boundaries 
to obtain strategic assets and credibly enhance their global reputation (Siegel, 2009), 
thus causing positive market reactions. 
Finally, the author finds that cross-border M&As have different performance 
implications for acquiring firms with different ownership structures. The shareholders 
of Chinese state-owned enterprises experience lower abnormal returns compared with 
those of Chinese privately-owned firms when engaging in cross-border M&A activities. 
This finding indicates the hidden relationship between the ownership structure and 
market performance of cross-border M&As - the shareholders of Chinese SOE 
acquirers earn a lower level of abnormal returns than those of private acquirers. 
5.1.2 The Main Findings based on the Long-term Operating Performance Study 
Chapter 3 analyses whether cross-border M&As initiated by Chinese firms in different 
destinations influence their operating performance. Drawing on the organisational 
learning and the institution-based view, this study investigates the long-term impact of 
cross-border M&As, initiated by Chinese firms, on their operating performance. Based 
on a sample of Chinese firms during the period 2000-2012, the findings show that cross-
border M&As tend to improve the post-acquisition operating performance of Chinese 
acquiring firms with serial acquisitions and horizontal acquisitions. These imply that 
the prior knowledge learned through past experience of cross-border M&As plays a 
crucial role in identifying the value of external knowledge in target firms and enhancing 
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post-acquisition integration and synergy, which results in better post-acquisition 
performance in cross-border M&As.  
By examining how different country-level characteristics moderate the value creating 
effects of acquisitions, the results indicate that the positive effects of serial acquisitions 
and horizontal acquisitions on the post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquirers 
are stronger for cross-border M&As taking place in host countries with high 
institutional quality. High-quality knowledge is more likely to be obtained from host 
countries with high institutional quality. Acquiring a target company located in a 
country with high institutional quality represents a quick way to gain access to superior 
knowledge and resources which usually are not available in the closed domestic market 
in China and therefore positively moderates the effect on post-acquisition performance 
of Chinese acquiring firms.  
The author finds that the positive effects of serial cross-border M&As and horizontal 
cross-border M&As on the post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms are 
stronger for cross-border M&As taking place in Chinese speaking regions/countries. 
This indicates that language difference is a significant barrier for effective 
communications especially when target firms are from non-Chinese speaking 
regions/countries during the process of post-acquisition integration and synergy. While 
target firms are from Chinese speaking regions/countries, the common language will 
facilitate organisational learning between Chinese acquirers and overseas target firms 
which will positively strengthen the effect on the post-acquisition performance of 
Chinese firms. 
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5.1.3 The Main Findings based on the Overseas Subsidiary Performance Study 
Chapter 4 investigates whether different management strategies can enhance the 
performance of overseas subsidiaries. Drawing on the RDT, this study examines the 
indirect effects of expatriates on subsidiary performance via subsidiary autonomy. The 
findings show that an increase in expatriates reduces the level of subsidiary autonomy 
and thus negatively affects subsidiary performance. Subsidiary autonomy, to a great 
extent, serves as an important mediator of the link between expatriation and subsidiary 
performance. By assigning more expatriates to an overseas subsidiary, the MNE parent 
may grant less autonomy to the subsidiary, which in turn reduces subsidiary 
performance. In other words, the power relationship between an overseas subsidiary 
and its parent will shift toward the side of the overseas subsidiary when the level of 
expatriates decreases. 
In addition, this study finds that the institutional quality of host countries reinforces the 
negative influence of expatriates on subsidiary autonomy. The findings indicate that the 
level of expatriates is used as a mechanism for strategic control and resource exchange 
by EMNEs. More specifically, high quality institutions in host countries induce EMNE 
headquarters to send fewer expatriates, which in turn results in a high level of subsidiary 
autonomy. This means when subsidiaries are located in host countries with high 
institutional quality, the subsidiaries may be able to employ more local employees and 
engage more closely with local suppliers and customers. In such cases, the EMNEs tend 
to establish a decentralised organisational structure to facilitate knowledge access and 
acquisition. In contrast, the relationship between expatriation and subsidiary autonomy 
167 
 
is reversed from negative to positive in host countries with a lower level of institutional 
quality. Our research results show that when subsidiaries operate in a host country with 
a high level of uncertainty and risk, the overseas subsidiaries will be more dependent 
on both expatriates and less subsidiary autonomy in adapting to the frequent changes 
and absorbing the influence of the risky external environment. 
Finally, the findings indicate that there is a substitution effect between subsidiary 
autonomy and host-country institutional quality on subsidiary performance. The higher 
autonomy enables effective local decision making to quickly adapt to dynamic market 
changes and counterbalance the uncertainty in the countries with low levels of 
institutional quality. Autonomous local decision making by overseas subsidiaries is 
more important in the host countries with low levels of institutional quality where a 
lack of well-developed communication infrastructure makes it difficult for EMNE 
parents to remotely control and timely coordinate their overseas subsidiaries. This 
thesis also reveals that Chinese MNEs tend to send higher levels of expatriates and grant 
higher autonomy to the subsidiaries located in the countries with low institutional 
quality in order to improve subsidiary performance. 
5.2 Research Contributions 
5.2.1 The Contributions based on the Short-term Stock Market Performance 
Study 
This study on short-term stock market performance contributes to the existing literature 
in three main ways. First, unlike previous studies, the author integrates the signalling 
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theory and the institution-based view to examine the short-term performance 
implications of Chinese cross-border M&As, and unpack what is behind such activities. 
The findings from our study provide new insights into cross-border M&A value 
generation through market reactions and the extent to which short-term market 
performance reflects investors’ perception on the institutional characteristics of M&A 
events. Although it is well documented that Chinese firms use cross-border M&As as 
a strategic means of acquiring valuable technology, brands and managerial capability, 
there is a lack of evidence on the market reactions to this important strategic approach. 
The study thus adds much needed evidence on the link between market reactions and 
the unique institutional characteristics embedded in cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms.   
Second, this study takes a first step towards investigating the impact of the institutional 
setting of the financial markets on market reactions to cross-border M&As by revealing 
the different magnitudes of such reactions under ‘one country, two systems’. The 
findings imply that the short-term market performance of cross-border M&As by 
Chinese firms is contingent on the development of the capital market. Investors in less 
developed capital markets may overestimate the positive impact of cross-border M&As.  
Third, this study explicitly evaluates the impact of various types of political risks on 
market reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms. Political stability and 
governance quality are two important components of political risks. By delineating 
political risk into different components, the research provides new insights into the link 
between different dimensions of political risks, and stock market reactions to M&A 
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announcements, and fills a research gap, given that there is a lack of research in this 
area. Additionally, the author captures the impact of the ownership of the acquiring 
firms and contributes to a better understanding of the impact of ownership status on the 
short-term performance of cross-border M&As from an institutional perspective. SOEs 
represent a product of the Chinese institutional environment, and their M&A activities 
are perceived differently compared with privately owned firms, thus resulting in 
different short-term market performance. Therefore, the study further reveals the 
impact of the institutional dimension embedded in the ownership status of Chinese 
acquiring firms. 
5.2.2 The Contributions based on the Long-term Operating Performance Study 
By examining the long-term performance implications of cross-border M&As, this 
thesis makes several contributions to the existing literature in this area. Firstly, the 
author developed a new unified multilevel framework to help interpret the influence of 
internal factors and external factors on the post-acquisition performance of Chinese 
EMNEs across the firm-, industry- and country-levels by combining organisational 
learning and an institution-based view. This framework adds to the existing literature 
in the area of M&As and can be used to analyse the impact of cross-border M&As on 
the long-term operating performance of acquiring firms from emerging economies. 
Secondly, the author identified the important moderating role of host-country 
institutional quality on the relationship between acquirers’ experience and the post-
acquisition performance of the acquiring firms as well as between the targets’ industrial 
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relatedness and post-acquisition performance. The study is one of the first to investigate 
institutional conditions under which acquirers’ experience and target firms’ industrial 
relatedness affect post-acquisition performance and add much needed empirical 
evidence on the effects of the moderating role of host-country institutional quality. 
Thirdly, this study is the first to investigate the moderating role of language on the 
interrelationship of acquirers’ experience and targets’ industrial relatedness on the post-
acquisition performance of acquiring firms. The findings enhance our understanding of 
the mechanisms through which the effect of language, an important informal institution, 
on operating performance of cross-border M&As is realised and thus fills an important 
research gap. The findings shed new light on the importance of language ability in post-
acquisition integration and synergy. 
5.2.3 The Contributions based on the Overseas Subsidiary Performance Study 
The study on overseas subsidiary performance makes several contributions to the 
existing literature. Firstly, unlike previous studies which emphasised the effects of 
expatriates on performance in isolation, this study examines interconnection between 
expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance. Such an investigation 
enables us to provide new insights into how EMNEs resolve the tension between 
expatriates and subsidiary autonomy in achieving desirable performance. The findings 
improve our understanding of the mechanisms through which the effect of expatriates 
on subsidiary performance is realised and thus fill an important research gap, given that 
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much research in this domain has mainly focused on the direct link between expatriates 
and subsidiary performance.   
Secondly, while previous studies have predominantly focused on expatriates moving 
either from developed country MNEs to other developed countries or to developing 
countries (Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003a), 
few have examined the role of expatriates from EMNEs in a variety of host countries 
with diverse institutional qualities (Turcan & Juho, 2012). The study fills this gap by 
investigating the adaptive subsidiary control strategies of Chinese MNEs that have 
rapidly invested in both developed and developing host countries. The findings provide 
new insights into the contingent impact of host-county institutional quality on the links 
between expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance.  
Finally, this study is one of the first to investigate the indirect relationship between 
expatriates and subsidiary performance, taking account of the mediating role of 
autonomy granted to the subsidiary and the moderating role of the institutional quality 
of host countries. It extends the extant literature on the subsidiary performance of 
EMNEs and provides much needed evidence on the complex relationship between 
expatriates, subsidiary autonomy and subsidiary performance, given the institutional 
quality of the host countries. In particular, the findings enrich our understanding of how 
EMNEs, in the early stage of internationalisation, adjust the number of expatriates and 
subsidiary autonomy to achieve overseas success in a variety of host countries. 
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5.3 Policy and Managerial Implications 
5.3.1 Implications from the Short-term Stock Market Performance Study 
First, the research shows that the announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms results in a positive stock market reaction which is more significant in the 
mainland China markets than in the Hong Kong market. This suggests that policy 
makers need to design appropriate regulations and further develop the capital market to 
avoid good-news-chasing behaviour by removing ownership restrictions, currency 
control and liquidity restrictions. Establishing a well-functioning capital market can 
reduce the dramatic volatility of market reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms.  
Second, the research draws attention to an important factor - political risk within target 
countries - which affects the market reaction to cross-border M&As. China’s increased 
presence in Africa and other developing countries has raised concerns due to the high 
levels of political risk. The findings confirm the negative impact of political risk on 
market reactions to cross-border M&As, and thus suggest that Chinese investors should 
be aware of the detrimental impact of political risk when acquiring target firms from 
those host countries. Therefore, Chinese managers who deal with cross-border M&As 
should take political risk seriously to reduce their vulnerability and minimise loss when 
things go wrong. For policy makers of target countries, an improvement in the overall 
political environment is required when attracting future Chinese investment as firms 
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may become cautious when making M&A decisions in order to avoid a negative market 
reaction. 
Third, the findings from our research provide useful guidance not only for Chinese 
acquiring firms that are expanding globally, but also for overseas target firms who are 
looking for buyers or investors in a bi-directional selection process. The findings show 
that the shareholders of Chinese SOE acquirers experience lower cumulative abnormal 
returns than those of Chinese private acquirers when engaging in cross-border M&As. 
Therefore, overseas target firms who are seeking buyers from emerging markets should 
keep in mind that state ownership may influence the financial market investors’ 
reactions.  
5.3.2 Implications from the Long-term Operating Performance Study 
The findings have a number of managerial implications for practitioners. First, the 
results show that firms with serial cross-border M&As perform better than those with 
first-time cross-border M&As. Therefore, Chinese firms should be more cautious in 
their first cross-border M&A deals. Professional personnel and organisations with 
abundant prior experience of cross-border M&As could be involved in both pre-
acquisition assessment and post-acquisition integration and synergy.  
Second, the research draws attention to an important factor – institutional quality of 
target countries, which affects the post-acquisition operating performance. The positive 
effect of serial cross-border M&As and horizontal acquisitions on post-acquisition 
performance of Chinese acquiring firms will be stronger in the host countries with high 
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institutional quality. The findings confirm the positive impact of institutional quality on 
the post-acquisition performance. Therefore, host-country institutional quality is an 
important factor that EMNE managers should consider in selecting potential targets in 
cross-border M&As. Chinese acquirers who require superior managerial expertise, 
international market knowledge and advanced patent-protected technology may be able 
to acquire these strategic assets through horizontal acquisitions in host countries with 
high quality institutions. 
Third, the author found that the positive effect of serial cross-border M&As and 
horizontal acquisitions on post-acquisition performance of Chinese acquiring firms will 
be stronger in Chinese speaking regions/countries. The language barriers for effective 
communication should not be ignored in the post-acquisition integration and synergy, 
especially when acquirers are from a country like China with only 0.73% English 
speakers. Other Chinese speaking regions/countries could be a good ‘springboard’ for 
acquirers from mainland China to expend globally. The research finding, from the other 
side, also reflects the limited foreign language ability of Chinese EMNEs, which could 
be an obstacle for future expansion in non-Chinese speaking countries. In-house 
language training and recruitment of returnees (Liu, Lu, & Choi, 2014) could be 
potential solutions to mitigate this language obstacle problem. 
5.3.3 Implications from the Overseas Subsidiary Performance Study 
The findings have a number of managerial implications for practitioners. First, the 
evidence shows that subsidiary autonomy is an important mediator linking expatriates 
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and subsidiary performance. Because of the negative relationship between expatriates 
and subsidiary autonomy, and the positive relationship between subsidiary autonomy 
and performance, foreign subsidiaries will be able to achieve a higher level of 
performance when they are granted a high level of autonomy. This implies that EMNE 
parents should adopt a light touch approach by delegating their subsidiaries more power 
and authority for decision marking to achieve overseas success.   
Second, the author has found that the relationship between expatriates, subsidiary 
autonomy and performance varies depending on host country institutional quality. 
Therefore, host-country institutional quality is an important factor that EMNE 
managers should consider in determining a suitable level of expatriate personnel. In 
other words, different institutional environments require a different balance of 
expatriates and subsidiary autonomy. Subsidiaries should be granted more autonomy 
with an increasing level of expatriates from headquarters when investing in host 
countries with under-developed institutions, but fewer expatriates and a higher level of 
autonomy when operating in host countries with high institutional quality.  
In addition, the author found that subsidiary autonomy relates more positively to 
subsidiary performance when institutional quality is lower, rather than higher. This 
suggests that EMNEs should consider granting a higher level of subsidiary autonomy 
to the subsidiary as this can reduce a subsidiary’s logistic costs and therefore increase 
efficiency. Subsidiary autonomy could be adopted as a strategic response to 
environmental uncertainty in those host countries with low institutional quality. EMNE 
managers should understand the importance of autonomy and flexibility when their 
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subsidiaries are operating in an environment with a high uncertainty and political risk. 
They need to pay particular attention to intra-firm resource exchange and reducing 
organisational rigidity and external dependence.  
5.4 Research Limitations and Further Research 
Recommendations 
The research limitations should be acknowledged, considering reliability and validity 
issues, which point to avenues for future research.  
First, the study focuses on outward FDI undertaken by Chinese firms. Therefore, the 
findings may be specific to the research setting in the context of Chinese firms’ 
internationalisation. Future research should extend the sample to other emerging 
economies, such as India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa. A comparative study using 
different countries of origin would help verify whether the findings are idiosyncratic to 
the Chinese context. 
Second, due to data availability, only publicly listed firms have been investigated when 
investigating the performance implications of cross-border M&As in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Future research should consider non-listed Chinese firms in order to generate a more 
complete picture of performance implications on the internationalisation of Chinese 
firms.  
Third, this thesis has mainly evaluated the impact of differences in China’s stock 
markets, political risk and ownership structure on the short-term performance of cross-
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border M&As by Chinese firms when investigating the short-term implication of cross-
border M&As on stock market performance in Chapter 2. In particular, the author has 
used fine-grained measures to capture different dimensions of political risk. However, 
other factors, including the characteristics of shareholders, a firm's industry, the state 
of management, unfavourable exchange rates, and the broad economic conditions of a 
host country and the home country can also affect market reactions. This represents a 
promising avenue for future studies.  
Fourth, a perceptual measure of subsidiary performance is used in this study when 
investigating the implication on overseas subsidiary performance in Chapter 4. Further 
work could use objective measurements to evaluate the effect of expatriates on the 
different dimensions of subsidiary performance. In addition, expatriates are 
heterogeneous and vary in terms of skills and ability (Zhang & Fan, 2014). Future 
research is needed to further test whether different types of expatriates affect subsidiary 
performance indirectly via subsidiary autonomy in host countries with different 
institutional environments.   
Lastly, the study only tested one mediator and one moderator, namely subsidiary 
autonomy and the institutional quality of host countries when investigating the 
implications of overseas subsidiary performance in Chapter 4. Future studies could 
examine whether other factors, such as knowledge transfer and cultural distance, also 
serve as mediating and moderating mechanisms. Doing so will further expand our 
understanding of the complex relationship between expatriation and subsidiary 
performance. 
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Appendix: Survey Items 
Dependent variable: 
Subsidiary performance (seven-point scale with very dissatisfied/very satisfied 
anchors). 
(1) Sale growth 
(2) Local market share growth 
(3) Sales margin growth 
Independent variable: 
Expatriate percentage: The proportion of domestic staff send to their overseas 
subsidiary. 
Mediating variable: 
Subsidiary autonomy (seven-point scale with very low/very high anchors). 
(1) Right to decide the scope of operations by heads of overseas subsidiary 
(2) Right to decide budgetary and financial decisions by heads of overseas 
subsidiary 
(3) Right to hire, reward, promote and fire employees by heads of overseas 
subsidiary 
(4) Right to mergers and acquisitions and other capital operations by overseas 
subsidiary 
Moderating variable: 
Institutional quality (5 point scale with low quality/high quality anchors). 
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(1) Voice and Accountability 
(2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
(3) Government Effectiveness 
(4) Regulatory Quality 
(5) Rule of Law 
(6) Control of Corruption 
Control variables: 
Subsidiary age: Number of the years since the subsidiary was established 
Parent’s age: Number of the years in business 
Parent’s size: Number of employees (logged) 
Ownership: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the MNC parent is a state-owned 
enterprise 
Industry: A dummy variable that equals 1 if subsidiary locates in the manufacturing 
industry 
 
